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1 Introduction 
This study deals with the constraints on, processes in and bias of 
expert panels evaluating research quality and research priorities. The 
kinds of evaluations studied are expert panel evaluations of research 
fields, research programmes and research institutions. How do such 
evaluation panels work? How do they know, or find, the answers to 
such questions as what is good and worthwhile research, promising 
research areas and good research groups? How do we know that the 
evaluations are properly done and that the conclusions are not biased? 
Do the panel/group setting and the organisational context influence 
the assessments? 
 These issues are analysed broadly, including discussions of such 
different problems as the implications of different ontological views on 
‘good research’, and implications of group effects and of various 
constellations of interests on the panels. Six different evaluation 
processes are studied to provide an insight into what influences expert 
panels’ conclusions. Central findings are that there is little overlapping 
competence on the panels, a high degree of task division and that the 
composition of an expert panel, the organisation of its work, and the 
(lack of) group interaction may be decisive for the conclusions of the 
evaluation. Moreover, ‘bias’ is found to have many different meanings, 
and not all kinds of bias in research evaluation are necessarily 
unacceptable. With regard to the relation between the task and the 
capacity of the panels, there seems to be a serious disparity between 
the capacity and resources of actual evaluations and the demands that 
ideally should be met when judging scholarly quality. 
 This chapter deals with the ‘roots’ and foundation of the study. 
Section 1.1 deals with the background and paths leading to interest in 
the topic. Section 1.2 gives a conceptual introduction to research 
evaluation, and contrasts expert panel evaluations of research fields, 
research programmes and research institutions with the traditional 
peer review systems. Section 1.3 points out the research questions and 
approaches of the study, while Section 1.4 discusses methods and data 
sources. 
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1.1 Why a monograph on the decision-making 
aspects of evaluation of research? 
The interests in the decision-making of expert panel evaluation are 
manifold. From the point of view of studies of public policy and 
decision-making, research evaluations may illustrate both trends and 
problems in research policy. Evaluations in various forms have 
become central in public policy. Large parts of scholarly research are 
publicly funded and state agencies are increasingly concerned with 
setting priorities for allocations of funds. From the point of view of 
gaining insight into the central characteristics of the scientific commu-
nity and the borderline between politics and science,1 research 
evaluations are particularly interesting. Evaluations of research are a 
critical and ‘politically sensitive’ kind of activity for the scientific 
community, a kind of activity which may pinpoint general characteris-
tics that are not as visible in its more day-to-day activities, and a 
promising setting for studying decision-making processes on the 
borderline between science and politics. 
1.1.1 Evaluation in public policy 
Routines and practices for planning, gathering information, learning 
and control within bureaucracies have varied both geographically and 
historically. In the post-WWII period evaluation has become a central 
concept. The use of public resources and the effect of public initia-
tives are to an increasing degree expected to be evaluated as a matter 
of routine, and the more special or important cases are subject to 
separate, often ‘external’ evaluation. Social scientists do ‘evaluation 
research’ for public administration (Albæk 1988; Weiss 1972), consul-
tancy firms are contracted to evaluate organisational efficiency and 
expert committees are appointed to undertake various kinds of 
evaluations. Evaluation research grew at a ‘meteoric rate’ in Western 
Europe and North America during the mid-sixties and seventies 
(Hellstern 1986:279). Means and effects of government programmes to 
achieve social change were assessed. Since the late seventies and early 
eighties, with economic constraints, the focus turned to assessing 
utility and costs of public expenditure, and development of account-
                                                     
1  ‘Science’ and ‘scientific’ are in this study used in its general sense (‘Wissenschaft’) 
and not restricted to the natural sciences. 
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ability and quality control procedures. From the mid-eighties evalua-
tion has been more integrated into administrative routines and a 
variety of approaches are used (Hellstern 1986:305). It should be 
noted that in addition to general and acknowledged purposes of 
public policy evaluations – such as accountability, improvement and 
increased knowledge – strategic motivations may play a central role. 
Such motivations may include ‘to gain time, to show up a front of 
rationality, and to disseminate an overly handsome view of the 
executives’ work’ (Vedung 1997:111). 
 Emphasis on evaluation also affects the research sector (Rip 1990). 
During the eighties and the nineties we have seen a large number of 
evaluations of research programmes, research institutions and research 
fields/disciplines in Norway as in other OECD countries. Various 
modes and combinations of expert panels, organisational studies and 
bibliometric analyses2 are used (Hansen & Jørgensen 1995). Practices 
vary both according to discipline and nationally. Also within the 
Nordic countries practices are manifold (Christiansen & Christiansen 
1989). 
 This increase in evaluations of research succeeded the growth in 
the public finances spent on research, the channelling of such 
resources through research programmes,3 and an increased ‘awareness 
of the consequentiality of a greatly-expanded science’ (Cozzens 
1990:282, see also OECD 1987). Both research programmes and 
‘externally’ initiated research evaluations are ways of public authorities 
to communicate with and control the research communities. Program-
mes are ways of allocating resources and of setting research priorities, 
while evaluations control characteristics of the research activities and 
output (quality, productivity, goal attainments etc.), and are also 
potentially a way of learning (e.g. about effects of policy measures). 
 The more formal side of evaluation initiatives should also be 
noted. The ideas of ‘Management by Objectives’ which have influ-
                                                     
2 Including publication counts, citation indexes, journal impact factors etc. 
3 ‘Research programme’ in this study refers to a time limited research effort in a 
particular research or problem area, organised as a grant programme by a research 
council. Other meanings of the term (not used in this study) are ad hoc 
‘departments’ at universities (sometimes also named centres) and 
schools/directions of a research field, e.g. the so-called ‘strong programme’ in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge.  
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enced public policy demand control and monitoring and increases the 
need for evaluations. Agencies are responsible for showing how 
public means given as block grants are spend. In Norway, focus on 
systematic evaluation is now required by Government decision 
(‘Økonomireglement for staten’, Royal Decree of 26 January 1996). 
 Within the research sector, the demand for evaluations has been 
met with extended use of the traditional way of evaluating research 
quality: peer review. 
1.1.2 The decision making aspects of expert panel evaluation 
Evaluation by researchers competent in the field under review (peer 
review) is the predominant method used for research evaluations, and 
normally seen as an ‘unavoidable’ method which cannot be replaced 
by quantitative methods:  
‘quantitative measures cannot form an alternative method to peer review. Indeed, 
reference to peer judgement is necessary to develop and test their usefulness in the first 
place. For example, in constructing influence measures, only the peer community can 
identify which are the most significant journals in that field; determining what should be 
considered to be ‘measures of esteem’ is also dependent on peer judgement. In addition, 
peer-judgement is needed to interpret bibliometric and other data in individual cases’ 
(ABRC 1990:13). 
Within the scientific community peer review is normally seen as the 
only legitimate method for valuing scientific quality. To assess the 
quality of scientific research one has to be a ‘peer’ of the researcher 
under review (i.e. an expert in the area). At the same time this method 
is being questioned. It is claimed that peer review is partial, biased 
and unreliable, and it takes time away from research activities4 
(Chubin & Hackett 1990; Wood 1997; Campanario 1998a and 1998b; 
Langfeldt 2001b). I.e. the growth of the research sector and the 
increasing emphasises on evaluation and control have lead to both 
broader reliance on evaluation of research by peers and growing 
scepticism towards the objectivity of this kind of evaluation.  
 This is a particularly interesting context for the study of situations 
where science and politics meet, and points to a need for studying the 
characteristics of expert panel evaluation of research. Theory-building 
and research that might uncover central mechanisms are particularly 
                                                     
4 The UK research councils have estimated that the time used for their peer review 
processes amounted to 115 researcher work-years annually (ABRC 1990:38). 
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important if we want to understand the more complex aspects of 
expert panel evaluation, like the ‘scholarly’ constitutive versus 
‘politically’ contingent bases of peer judgements, the group dynamics 
of peer panels, or more generally the situational constraints of 
evaluation processes (see Chubin & Hackett 1990:47). Hence this 
monograph is devoted to the decision-making aspects of expert panel 
evaluation of research. Expert panel evaluation as a research policy 
instrument is studied by focusing mainly on the basis of peer judge-
ments and the decision-making of expert panels. The overarching 
research question is: What affects decision-making processes when research 
programmes, research institutions and research fields are evaluated by expert panels? More 
specifically, the influence of structural and organisational 
characteristics of such evaluation processes on the content of the 
evaluation reports, is analysed. Throughout, the focus is on peer 
judgements on research quality and research priorities. Expert panel 
evaluation may also encompass judgements on other aspects of the 
units under review, such as organisation, users’ opinions and market 
adaptability. Judgements on such aspects are not studied here as they 
do not demand peer judgement. (Other kinds of expert analysis and 
judgements may be just as legitimate.) 
 
1.2 Peer review and research evaluation: 
concepts and development 
1.2.1 Peer review and related concepts 
‘Peer review is the name given to judgements of scientific merit by other scientists 
working in, or close to the field in question. Peer review is premised upon the 
assumption that a judgement about certain aspects of science, for example its quality, is 
an expert decision capable of being made only by those who are sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the cognitive development of the field, its research agendas and the 
practitioners within it’ (OECD 1987:28). 
This OECD-report further makes a distinction between direct peer 
review and modified direct peer review. Direct peer review is ‘carried 
out specifically for the purpose of determining and confined to 
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questions of scientific merit’, while modified direct peer review 
addresses a broader range of questions (OECD 1987:28).5 
 Expert evaluations of research programmes, institutions and fields 
are normally modified peer review; in addition to scientific merit they 
may concern working conditions of the researchers and other 
organisational questions, socio-economic impact of the research or 
potential for utilisation of the results. Such evaluations may also be 
‘modified’ peer review with regard to the expertise of the evaluators. 
When the evaluation not only addresses questions of scientific merit, 
not all members of the evaluation panels are necessarily ‘peers’ or 
active researchers in the relevant fields. 
 I will reserve the term ‘peer review’ for the more traditional review 
systems of scholarly communities (e.g. manuscript reviews for 
scholarly journals, review of applications for academic positions, and 
review of grant applications to research councils). The term ‘expert panel 
evaluations’ will be used for the kind of evaluations under study – 
research council commissioned (often ad hoc) reviews on the 
institutional, program or discipline level. ‘Peer evaluation’ denotes such 
evaluations when the panel consists of researchers qualified in the 
area under review. In cases where expert panels consist of both 
‘peers’ and other experts I refer to ‘mixed panel evaluations’. 
 Expert panel evaluations of research can be seen as the result of 
the meeting of traditional (micro-level) peer review with the growth 
of, and demand for evaluation in public policy. In contrast to tradi-
tional peer review it aims at assessments of research on the meso-level 
(the institutional level) and the macro-level (the national level), 
whereas traditional peer review makes assessments at the micro-level 
(single manuscripts, applications or applicants). 
1.2.2 The origin and development of referee systems 
The origin of peer review can be traced back to the appearance of 
scientific journals in the seventeenth century. As scientific societies 
started to organise communications of discoveries, various review or 
censor mechanisms developed. Such reviews served a number of 
                                                     
5 A more common term for modified direct peer review is merit review. The 
OECD-report also deals with indirect peer review, which uses ‘historic peer review 
judgements made primarily for purposes other than the evaluation in question’ 
(OECD 1987:28), and includes bibliometrics. 
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missions. They gave the initiating ‘societies’ a measure of control over 
the contents of their publications, they motivated to raise the standards 
of submitted manuscripts and they ‘certified’ the manuscripts and gave 
faith to their contents (Zuckerman & Merton 1971). Until after World 
War II, there was no general ‘movement’ to adopt formal peer review 
practices. Practices were adopted piecemeal and independently in 
each journal in response to idiosyncratic conditions (Burnham 1992).  
 In the post-WWII period, journal peer review has become more 
formalised, e.g. ‘double-blind review’6 of all submitted manuscripts by 
two or more reviewers. Research councils have formalised procedures 
for assessing grant applications, including standing or ad hoc panels of 
experts in the field, mail review by individual experts, or both panel 
and mail review. Both journal peer review and grant peer review 
processes are now more or less regularly subjected to studies, debates 
and refinements (for example Chubin & Hackett 1990; Speck 1993; 
Fisher et al. 1994; GAO 1994; Garfunkel et al. 1994; Laband & Piette 
1994; Nylenna et al. 1994; NIH 1996; NSF 1996; Wood 1995 and 1997; 
Campanario 1998a and 1998b). 
 As already mentioned, evaluation by peers is initiated and also 
used by actors outside the research community. In the following, we 
look at this new kind of evaluations in contrast to the more traditional 
forms of peer review. 
1.2.3 New kinds of research evaluation vs. traditional peer 
review 
Central characteristics of non-researcher initiated macro- and meso-
level expert panel evaluations of research are displayed by contrasting 
these with traditional micro-level peer review. Both purposes and 
contexts vary considerably between the two. Macro-level expert 
evaluations are normally aimed at decision-making processes outside 
the research community, whereas micro-level peer review may be part 
of the research process itself. As mentioned, the referee systems of 
scientific journals, for instance, serve functions as improving the 
                                                     
6 Double blind review means that the author does not know the identity of the 
reviewer and the reviewer does not know that of the author. A substantial 
number of scholarly journals also practice simple blind review – the reviewers are 
not known to the authors, but the authors are known to the reviewers. 
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manuscripts and providing confidence in the research results (Zucker-
man & Merton 1971). 
 By further contrasting the new forms of expert panel evaluation 
with traditional peer review, we easily reach the conclusion that the 
former differs from the latter in various ways that indicate that it will 
produce vaguer or more positive judgements: 
• Firstly, expert panel evaluations of programmes, institutions and 
fields are expected to be instruments of national research policy. 
This purpose – external to the research community – may make 
peer evaluators insecure and sceptical about the potential use of 
their evaluation reports and make them very careful about what to 
write and what not to write when the reports are put together. 
Paradoxically this may apply especially if the purpose is vaguely 
stated. If the evaluators do not get a clear answer to what the 
evaluation will be used for, they will either presume that it is 
purely ritual – in which case they do not need to do a thorough 
evaluation – or they will suspect that an evaluation may yield so 
serious implications that the commissioning body refuses to 
inform them about the purpose (as the commissioning body fears 
such information would scare peer evaluators from participating in 
such an evaluation). In the latter case a peer evaluator with 
‘decent’ loyalty to his/hers colleagues is likely to be very careful 
not to put anything into print that may be of disadvantage to the 
evaluees (i.e. the researchers/research units being evaluated).7 
• Other important differences between micro-level peer review and 
evaluations of programmes, institutions and fields, are the fact that 
the reviewers are identifiable, the public status of the reports and 
the scope of the evaluations. While micro-level reviewers are 
mostly anonymous, confidential and limited to one project or 
manuscript, macro-level reviewers are visible to those being 
evaluated, the reports are normally public and encompass a large 
number of projects and publications. These are all characteristics 
that may lead to less outspoken and more vague reports. Visible 
evaluators writing public reports are made personally accountable 
                                                     
7 A Nordic interview study of evaluees found that scientists criticised in public 
evaluation reports were ‘met with decreased status and reputation and suffered 
adverse psychological impacts’ (Luukkonen 1995:364). 
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for the content of the reports, and are therefore likely to be more 
cautious about what they put into print (Grigson & Stokes 
1993:176). The large scope of the evaluation means that the 
review will be more superficial.8 
• Moreover, the character of the ‘good’ that is distributed is 
substantially different. In manuscript review and grant review, 
scarce goods – in the form of journal space or money – are 
distributed. The evaluees are marked and ranked, and losers and 
winners are identified. It is a zero-sum-game, whereas the kind of 
evaluations studied here is not. All evaluees may, in principle, be 
just as happy or unhappy with the content of the report: no 
winners or losers have to be identified in these evaluation reports. 
The evaluators distribute comments, honour, advice and recom-
mendations for future research and investments, ‘goods’ that may 
be seen as non-limited. It should be noted that practices vary 
among countries. The argument above only applies when the 
evaluations do not explicitly compare and rate the evaluated units 
and results are not directly linked to allocations of resources. For 
the UK practice of rating departments (see Hansen & Jørgensen 
1995), for instance, this argument does not apply. Another point is 
that it might be unclear what kind of good is distributed (refer the 
first point above). Evaluations may, for instance, provide good 
arguments for more resources or better research conditions for all 
evaluees and the situation may be perceived, not as a zero-sum 
game, but as a variable-sum game (more resources for research 
will gain the society). 
• Finally, the panels are expected to write a report that they all agree 
upon. When there are different views on the evaluation panel and 
no ranking of the evaluated units has to be made, compromises 
will often mean vague formulations. 
 
                                                     
8 It is not realistic to opt for macro-evaluations with the same possibilities for 
thoroughness as micro-evaluations, e.g. a discipline evaluation spending the time 
used for a manuscript review multiplied by the number of manuscripts produced 
in the discipline during (e.g.) the last five years. 
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Table 1.1 Micro-level versus macro-level evaluations of research 
 
 Micro-level  
(peer review) 
Macro- and meso-level 
(expert panel evaluation) 
 
Object of evaluation 
One researcher, one manuscript 
or one application is assessed 
separately and ranked or 
graded. 
One ore more research 
programmes, institutions or 
disciplines. 
Goods distributed  
Scarce goods/zero-sum 
Non-limited goods/unclear 
what goods are distributed 
Decision-making 
arena 
 
Intra-scientific 
 
Extra-scientific 
Public reports?  
Seldom public 
 
Mostly public 
 
The evaluation 
process and the 
anonymity of the 
evaluators 
Manuscript referees write 
separate reports and are 
normally anonymous. 
Committees for screening 
applicants to chairs (in Norway) 
write common reports, and are 
not anonymous. 
Practice for grant proposal 
reviews vary: anonymous 
individual mail review and/or 
non-anonymous panel review. 
The evaluators write one 
common, unanimous 
report, which are never (or 
seldom) anonymous. 
 
 
Table 1.1 gives an overview of central differences between traditional 
peer review and expert panel evaluation of research on the meso- or 
macro-level. To some degree the characteristics are simplified, micro-
level peer review encompasses a variety of review processes for a 
variety of purposes and to varying degree may be directed solely at 
‘intra-scientific’ decision-making. Macro- and meso-level evaluations 
are less institutionalised and might vary even more, especially 
between countries. The content of the table is a compromise between 
setting up characteristics valid for Norwegian expert panel evaluations, 
and characteristics with more general validity. Expert panel evaluation 
may be directly associated with the allocation of scarce resources, 
evaluators may be anonymous, and some evaluation reports will be 
confidential. In Norway, though, such evaluations do not (hitherto) 
distribute scarce resources, are never anonymous, and always 
unrestricted. 
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1.3 Research questions and approaches of 
the study 
As there is little research on decision-making in research evaluation, 
there is no sound basis for very specific research questions or 
hypothesis. Yet, as partly demonstrated in the previous section, social 
studies of science and studies of peer review can help us to see what 
may affect evaluation processes. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the 
relevant literature and outline a theoretical frame for the study. The 
overall research questions addressed are open-ended and explorative 
and try to cover the central aspects of the context of the decision-
making: 
• Are there neutral criteria of good research? What does ‘unbiased’ 
evaluation imply? Is it attainable, and is it definitely desirable? 
• How is good research identified, and what ‘professional’ and 
social norms affect judgements? 
• How may the group setting of expert panels evaluating research 
affect the outcome? 
• How may the commissioner (of the evaluation) influence the 
outcome through organisational means, e.g. panel composition, 
terms of reference and signals about the planned use of the 
evaluation report? 
 
Based on the theoretical groundwork of the previous chapters, 
Chapters 4 and 5 present, analyse and compare six evaluation 
processes. Questions here are more concrete and deal with how the 
research evaluations were conducted and what influenced the 
evaluators and their evaluation reports. The effects of organisational 
design and other structural constraints, as well as cognitive bias, 
personal and scientific interests are considered. 
 These are the questions deemed the central ones for more 
extensive insight in the context and mechanisms of research evalua-
tions by expert panels – questions that previous studies have not 
confronted, or pointed to as the challenges of future research (see 
Chubin & Hackett 1990). To understand the decision-making proces-
ses in question we need to look both at the micro-level contexts of 
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group decision-making and at how the institutional environment is 
likely to affect the process. Focus on a broad group of factors in a 
detailed analysis of concrete situations is the proper basis, further-
more, for an explorative study. 
 The approach chosen for the theoretical discussions in Chapters 2 
and 3 is open-minded with regard to the various ‘paradigms’ in 
political science. There is no encompassing theory within the social 
sciences aimed at understanding complex decision-making settings 
and exposing the central mechanisms of social processes. The 
discussion draws on literature from various disciplines and ‘schools’, 
and different theoretical ‘tools’ are seen as complementary rather than 
competing. This also includes such traditionally ‘antagonistic’ ap-
proaches as norm-driven or interest-driven actors as the explanation of 
human actions. 
 The empirical analysis tries to uncover the actors’ own under-
standings of their motives. Informants may very well not provide 
honest answers when interviewers try to find out, for example, 
whether particular actions were driven by self-interest or institutional 
norms. This should not stop us from trying to answer such questions. 
With multiple data sources and opening up for a wide rage of reasons 
and explanations, we should be able to provide a ‘thick description’ 
giving good insight in the phenomenon studied. A thick description 
allows us to consider all relevant contextual factors and include the 
various actors’ ‘reasons or rationales for acting the way they do in 
their own situations’ (Farr 1985:1090), and may combine theoretical 
approaches as ‘rational actors’ and ‘social norms’. 
 Rationality approaches and social norm approaches aim at 
explaining different kinds of actions or might be seen as explaining 
different aspects of actions. Game theory is ‘formal’ theory for 
understanding decision-making situations as such, whereas organisa-
tional and institutional theory allows ‘substantial’ hypotheses on the 
constraints on the situation/the actors. Organisational and institutional 
theory may, therefore, very well serve as inputs to models set up by 
rational theories, and the two approaches may easily be combined for 
the purpose of empirical study.  
 Still, the fundamental underlying ideas of the approaches have 
traditionally been seen as conflicting. In sociological institutionalism 
actors’ preferences are formed by institutions, while in rational choice 
theories preferences are exogenously given, generally as the actors 
self-interests. Problems may arise in empirical research, when different 
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causes lead to the same action. For example, scholars may conform to a 
norm of scholarly communities, saying that they should do a literature 
review before writing an article, (1) because they know it is to their 
own advantage – they know the article will be reviewed by referees 
with good knowledge of previous research, and in order to get the 
article published and avoid a ‘slaughter’ by the referees they need to 
undertake a literature review (self-interest). Another reason for 
complying to the norm may be that (2) the scholar thinks it is to 
her/his advantage, erroneously believing that a lack of a literature 
review will be detected (self-interest and constraints on informa-
tion/bounded rationality). Yet another reason for the same action may 
be that (3) the norm is internalised, it is ‘the thing to do’, and the 
scholar wants to do it regardless of the chances for getting the article 
published, and without the personal interest of gaining time by 
neglecting the literature review being even considered (norm ori-
ented/non-outcome oriented action). 
 If we want to explain such phenomena as to why scholars 
undertake literature reviews, we need some evidence (or ‘theory’) for 
choosing between the theories.9 One method, is to argue that human 
actions are partly norm-driven (and non-outcome oriented), and partly 
interest-driven and outcome-oriented, and trying to integrate the two 
theories in some way as done by Elster 1989, for example. A combi-
nation of interests and norms seems a reasonable supposition, but it 
does not help us to point out the motives of particular actors in 
particular settings. Dealing (partly) with other approaches, Knott & 
Miller promote a ‘parsimonious theory’ for consolidating theories of 
‘cognitive limits’ and ‘bureaucratic incentives’, a theory that ‘shows 
how a single set of assumptions can lead to the kind of behaviors 
predicted by both models’ – explaining ‘why organizations sometimes 
create incentives that lead individuals to remain ignorant, use biased 
information, and satisfice’ (1987:179). A theory that integrates funda-
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mentally different motives is far more difficult. Such a theory also needs a 
‘tool’ to separate situations where norms are followed because of cost-
benefit calculations from situations where the norm is internalised. 
Motives are substantial for understanding human action, and good 
social analysis should be able to distinguish norms and interests as 
motives, even when resulting in the same action.  
 One way of resolving such questions is to make priorities 
between the explanations based on what seems the most normal 
motive. March and Olsen (1989:23–24) for example, think that norm-
driven (‘obligatory’) action ‘seems more to describe action’ in 
institutional settings than outcome oriented (‘anticipatory’) action. In 
the case of studying a specific action or decision, such suggestions are of 
little help, and thick descriptions, the empirical way out chosen here, 
are more recommendable – especially for explorative studies.10 
 
1.4 Methods, selection of cases and data 
sources 
1.4.1 The research design and strategy 
As mentioned, the research questions are explorative. They point to a 
design allowing thick descriptions of specific decision-making proces-
ses to uncover central mechanisms of expert panel evaluations of 
research. This entails an intensive research design, that is, to study 
many variables and few cases. One unique strength of such case 
studies is the ability to draw on several different data sources to 
                                                                                                                            
9 I concentrate on interest-driven versus norm-driven behaviour as the question of 
bounded rationality (whether actors have full information of consequences or 
not) does not really matter for answering research questions concerning the 
motives of the actors. In many cases it can be taken for granted that the kind of 
actors in question generally base their decisions on uncertain information. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to answer the question of faulty information. The 
question of detecting lacking literature reviews may, for instance, be answered by 
empirical study. 
10 Empirical analysis may also find that the most plausible explanation includes 
much more complex reasons than self-interests or norms. That distinction may as 
well turn out to be trivial or irrelevant. 
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analyse the same event, e.g. archives, interviews with actors, field 
research and direct observation (Yin 1989:20). A major disadvantage is 
the limited possibilities for generalising the results when studying only 
a few cases. To study one evaluation process may, for instance, have 
very limited value with regard to drawing conclusions about more 
general reasons and mechanisms. Extensive designs,11 on the other 
hand, allow more conclusive generalisations of the results, but are not 
good at answering ‘why’ questions in a little researched area (see Yin 
1989).12 
 A multiple-case design may, however, provide a more general 
insight than separate studies of single cases. Multiple-case studies aim 
at conclusions which may be generalised, but which are based on a 
different logic than the sampling logic of extensive research designs 
(Yin 1989:52–59). They use a comparative logic when selecting cases 
fit to answer the specific research questions. 
 There are two major comparative research strategies. One strategy 
is to hold all variables constant except the (two or more) variables that 
are being tested to find any relation/covariation (called method of 
difference or most-similar systems design). The other strategy selects 
cases which are similar regarding the variables that are tested to find a 
relation/covariation, but maximise differences on other variables 
(called method of agreements or most-different systems design). A 
third possibility is a mixed strategy: some variation and some similari-
ties in all (relevant) variables, allowing both kinds of comparisons. 
According to Frendreis a mixed strategy is superior with respect to 
                                                     
11 That is, a quantitative study: a study of many cases, but a restricted, predefined set 
of variables. 
12 How a quantitative study may yield meaningful answers to the research question 
set out in Section 1.3, is hard to imagine. 
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generability,13 it is more feasible and adaptable to actual research 
settings and it allows a good basis for comparisons even when 
variation in the interesting variables cannot be correctly estimated a 
priori (Frendreis 1983:268). In Yin (1989) we find arguments for a 
similar strategy, combining what is here called ‘literal replication’ and 
‘theoretical replication’.14 The logic of literal replication is used within 
groups of similar cases, while ‘theoretical replication’ may be used 
across different groups of (similar) cases. In this way multiple-case 
studies may provide a broader spectrum of empirical evidence. 
 For our research questions, there is little previous research which 
points to predefined theories or promising hypotheses, and conse-
quently not a limited set of factors to be tested. Furthermore, the 
research evaluations in question vary with regard to a large number of 
factors. The composition of the panels vary: they may consist of only 
peers, or both peers and users, they might have Nordic panel 
members or a broader international representation. The kind of discip-
lines involved differ, and evaluations may encompass one discipline or 
be multi-disciplinary, they may evaluate basic research, applied 
research, or both, and the units being evaluated might be program-
mes, institutions or research fields. In addition, there are (i.e. in 1992) 
five different Norwegian research councils which may organise such 
evaluations in very different ways. As spelled out above, there is very 
little previous research to tell us which of these factors are the most 
                                                     
13 Frendreis’ argument for the better generability of mixed strategies is that they 
allow the researcher to select a more representative sample of cases than do the 
most similar or the most different systems. In the two latter systems, cases are 
systematically excluded either to hold the dependent or the independent variables 
constant. This is not needed in a mixed system, which therefore allows a more 
representative sample of cases. To me, this seems a weak argument based partly 
mistakenly on the sampling logic of quantitative designs. When a mixed strategy 
allows more generability than another comparative design, this would not be 
because of its similarities to a ‘universe’ of cases, but rather because it allows the 
researcher to test out competing hypotheses, for example, by using both the logic 
of most similar and most different systems, and to check for all kinds of 
potentially deviant cases (as, explained by Frendreis, no particular kind of ‘real 
life’ cases needs to be systematically excluded). 
14 These concepts are somehow related to most similar and most different systems, 
but not well defined. Literal replications are cases which yield the same ‘results’, 
while theoretical replications yield ‘contrary results but for predicable reasons’ 
(Yin 1989:53). 
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crucial to analyse, and a design opting for similar and different cases to 
control for all such factors is hardly feasible – at least not as a one-
researcher non-life-time project. One way to tackle this would be to 
select cases that vary considerably regarding the mentioned factors, 
and then, when analysing the data, to look for interesting character-
istics and mechanisms common to all cases. This strategy suits a 
central object of the present study, to understand what characterises 
expert panel evaluations of research, as such, regardless of varying 
contexts. In contrast to the normally prescribed comparative designs, 
this approach does not test specific hypotheses, and if we do not find 
any characteristics or phenomena common to all cases, the compara-
tive design has not been much help with regard to generability.15 As 
an extra ‘chance’ for conclusive data, we should then also seek some 
similarities in central factors, that is, a mixed strategy which allows 
using both the logic of the most similar and the most different 
systems. 
 What number of cases is needed for such a strategy? According to 
Yin (1989:58) the required number of different cases depends on the 
number of external conditions that produce variation in the phenome-
non studied, and then within each different kind of case, a minimum 
of two or three similar cases is needed. As the phenomena to be 
studied are rather complex, and there is a substantial number of 
‘external’ conditions that may affect them, a considerable number of 
cases seems to be needed. The need for and possibility of variation on 
central factors is discussed below. 
 
Studying variations between fields of learning 
Do central aspects of evaluation processes vary between fields of 
learning? If so, in order to draw conclusions about differences, a solid 
basis for studying each discipline is needed. A design for studying 
disciplinary differences of expert panel evaluation of research 
including all research disciplines would be a vast project. If we take 
for granted that differences, if any, follow a simple distinctions 
between the humanities and social sciences on the one hand, and 
natural, medical and technical sciences on the other, the task is much 
more manageable. Previous studies of disciplinary differences may 
                                                     
15 While the prescribed designs always provide some substantial conclusions either 
by confirming or refuting a theory based hypothesis. 
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also be used as a basis for interpreting results and strengthening 
conclusions (Whitley 1984; Becher 1989; Gulbrandsen & Langfeldt 
1997). 
 A study limited to gross differences is also more realistic given the 
limitations of finding a proper empirical basis for reliable conclusions 
on disciplinary differences. When restricted to Norwegian cases suited 
for study expert panels’ decision-making at the time of data collection 
for the present study, there are far from enough cases available for 
studying the different disciplines. The older the cases, the more 
limited details interview data may give. As interviews will frequently 
be the only sources for data on the decision-making processes in the 
panels, I excluded evaluation reports which were more than three 
year old from my list of suitable cases. Among the evaluations 
remaining, there were very few cases in some disciplines, and in the 
‘hard’ natural sciences like physics and mathematics, there where no 
evaluations at all. However, the final choices represent a broad rage of 
fields of learning. Fields in the humanities, natural, technical, social 
and medical sciences are included (see below). 
 
The various kinds of research units subjected to evaluation 
The purpose of evaluation may vary between the various kinds of 
macro- and meso-level expert panel evaluations of research.16 
Evaluating temporary ‘units’ such as programmes may, for instance, 
include advising on whether to continue or terminate the programme, 
while evaluations of university departments may aim at ranking and 
distributing status to the departments. Aims may also be multiple, and 
vary for the different actors. Evaluation reports may not give very 
much information on such purposes, and a selection of cases on the 
bases of such aims is consequently difficult, particularly if the desired 
criteria for selection are how the evaluators or the evaluees perceive 
the purpose of the evaluation. When searching for cases for this study 
no evaluations supposed to provide information for specific budget 
cuts, reorganisations or similar, were found. All the evaluations studied 
therefore have rather general (official) aims. Going in more detail, the 
aims still differed between the evaluations of fields, institutions and 
programmes. 
                                                     
16 The contrast to the specific micro-level decisions at which grant reviews and 
journal refereeing aim, is provided in Section 1.2. 
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 The evaluations of research fields were intended to give a broad 
overview of the standing of the field in an international perspective, 
and provide general information and documentation for the research 
councils which commissioned them. The main purpose was to learn 
what could be done to improve the quality of the research in the 
research areas. The evaluations of research institutions asked whether 
the institutions performed their tasks satisfactorily, and did not, at least 
not explicitly, aim at ranking institutions nor at providing recommen-
dations for reorganisation processes. The evaluations of research 
programmes studied, indirectly asked whether it was worth investing 
more money in the programmes. The main reason for the evaluations 
was that the government required that the programs should be 
evaluated as they had invested a large amount of money in them. The 
research councils that organised the evaluations were eager to assure 
the public that it was worth investing money in the programmes. The 
cases were selected with the expectation that the different purposes of 
these three kinds of evaluations may help us understand differences in 
evaluation process and decision-making. 
 
Conclusions of the evaluation reports 
The outcome of the decision-making of the expert panels, that is, the 
written report to the commissioning research council, may be seen as 
the dependent variable of the study. What affects central characteris-
tics of the report, such as the explicitness of the assessments, and 
critical or praising conclusions? To study such questions, evaluations 
with varying degrees of explicitness and ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ 
assessments were selected. With hindsight, more variation in the 
conclusions of the selected evaluation reports would have been 
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preferable. However, the cases available at the time had a limited 
range of variation on such factors.17 
 
Strategy: focus on similarities, ‘controlling’ for differences and developing ideal types 
The cases studied include both similar and different evaluations with 
regard to design, approach and purpose, and they deal with a wide 
range of academic disciplines (see next section). What they all have in 
common is that they in some way are ad hoc evaluations. They were 
all the first evaluation of their kind of the specific field, program or 
institution, which means both that no routines for evaluations were 
established and that the implementation and potential effects of the 
evaluation were uncertain. 
 Both the limited number of cases and the ad hoc character of the 
cases imply that systematic differences found between variables may 
have limited claim to validity for other cases than those studied. It may 
be difficult to make substantial general conclusions of the nature of for 
instance evaluations in the humanities in comparison to evaluations in 
engineering, or evaluations of institutions in comparison to evaluations 
of research fields. What these different cases turn out to have in 
common, however, should yield good basis for conclusions on general 
features of the making of public ad hoc evaluations of research by 
expert panels within the research areas covered by the study (as 
mentioned, the study does not cover ‘hard’ natural sciences like 
mathematics or physics).  
                                                     
17 The prevalence of positive and vague conclusions was explained in Section 1.2. 
One report with conclusions differing from those chosen appeared at the end of 
1992 after I had made the final choice of cases and commenced data collection: 
‘Informatikk: Research and Teaching in Norway. A Critical Evaluation’ (NAVF 
1992). This evaluation makes clearer judgements on the evaluees and picks 
‘winners and losers’ to a greater extent than the evaluations which are part of the 
present study. The information contained in the evaluation report and the 
reactions from the evaluees contained in the ‘hearing documents’ form valuable 
data on a deviant case. The evaluation of Norwegian work research (NORAS 
1992) is another example of a rather critical evaluation of Norwegian research. 
However, as this evaluation was conducted by one expert and not a panel, it does 
not deal with the kind of decision-making studied here. In recent years, more 
evaluation reports clearly deviating from those studied here, have appeared, e.g. 
‘Physics research at Norwegian universities, colleges and research institutes’ (The 
Research Council of Norway 2000). See also Section 7.2. 
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 Consequently, the main analytic strategy is to describe and explain 
common characteristics and mechanisms. In addition, a ‘mixed’ 
comparative strategy should allow (more tentative) conclusion also 
about differences between various kinds of evaluations.18 Furthermore, 
to summarise the theoretical insights gained, ideal types extracting 
central factors and relations are developed. These are analytical 
constructs to pinpoint the logic and mechanisms of expert panel 
evaluations of research. This additional way of presenting conclusions 
from the study serve both analytical and communicational purposes. 
Ideal types are pure and extreme cases, without direct basis in (more 
complex) real life situations.19 The ideal types, which extract theory 
from the empirical findings expressed in a purified abstract form, 
demand simplifications of contexts and relations, and should make 
conclusions clearer to the reader. 
1.4.2 The cases  
The study is based on analysis of six ad hoc panels (of mostly non-
Norwegian experts) appointed by various research councils to 
evaluate research in Norway at the end of the eighties and the 
beginning of the nineties. There are two evaluations of research fields, 
two of institutes and two of programmes.20 
• Two of the cases are evaluations of research fields – one from the 
humanities and one from the natural sciences. These are mainly 
evaluations of basic research at university departments conducted 
by international peer panels. 
• Two other cases are evaluations of research institutions – one of an 
engineering research institute and one of three social science 
                                                     
18  As explained in the first part of this section. 
19 ‘An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct.’ ‘This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository 
purposes’ (Weber 1949:90). 
20 Because of confidential data-material the cases are presented anonymously. See 
below. 
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institutes. These are evaluations of mainly applied research, con-
ducted by Nordic experts. The panels were mixed, i.e. consisting 
of both researchers in relevant fields and sector representa-
tives/potential users, and evaluated both the applicability/rele-
vance and the scholarly quality of the research. 
• The two last cases are evaluations of research programmes/priority areas 
– one natural science programme and one multidisciplinary 
programme, including applied, strategic and some basic research. 
One of them was conducted by an international peer panel, the 
other by a Nordic peer panel. 
 
Altogether, a broad variety of fields of learning are represented. Half 
of the cases include either natural or medical sciences, two include 
engineering, and two include social sciences, one includes the 
humanities.21 Of the six evaluation panels, four are peer panels, two 
are mixed panels, three are international panels and three are Nordic 
panels. Four different initiators/commissioning research councils are 
covered by the cases. One of the evaluation reports has clearly 
praising conclusions, two are more moderately praising, two are both 
praising and critical, and one has rather vague conclusions. Details 
about the characteristics of the various cases are found in Tables 5.2 to 
5.7.22 
1.4.3 Data sources and data collection 
The data sources used were the files on the evaluations in the archives 
of the commissioning research councils, interviews with the partici-
pants in the decision-making processes and in some cases, their 
private notes and drafts. All except one of the members of the selected 
evaluation panels have been interviewed (27 out of 28 panel mem-
                                                     
21 Two cases involve more than one of the categories. 
22 Several factors co-vary. The evaluations of fields assessed basic research in one 
discipline, were organised by the same research council, and were carried out by 
international peer panels. The evaluations of institutes were undertaken by Nordic 
mixed panels and assessed applied research. The research programmes were 
multi-disciplinary, consisting of both basic and applied research, and were 
evaluated by (Nordic or international) peer panels. 
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bers).23 Five panel members were Norwegians, ten were from other 
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Nordic countries and twelve were non-Nordic. Four of the evaluators 
were ‘non-peers’ whose function was to assess extra-scientific 
relevance, applicability and use of the research (the two panels 
evaluating institutes). 
 In-depth semi-structured interviews were used, that is, open-
ended questions posed in a certain order, and with possibilities for 
follow up questions. The order of the questions was frequently 
changed to facilitate the dialogue. Eighteen of the interviews were 
person-to-person, nine were conducted over the telephone. At least 
half of each panel was interviewed person-to-person. Phone inter-
views are, of course, not optimal neither in terms of obtaining 
sensitive information, nor in terms of preventing misunderstandings, 
but as the evaluators were from all over the world it was impossible to 
reach them all within a reasonable travel budget.24 
 The interviews commenced by asking the evaluators why they 
thought they were selected to undertake the evaluation, and their 
motives for accepting the job. These questions provided much back-
ground and network information, and proved to be a good way to 
start a dialogue and develop a rapport with the informants. 
 The core of the interviews dealt with the sources of information 
provided and used by the panel, the criteria for assessment, the way 
discussions were conducted in the group, and disagreements between 
the panel members. This included questions about the panel members’ 
prior information about the research and researchers they were going 
to evaluate, the criteria for different kinds of reviews, and for the 
evaluation in question, and what criteria they thought the other panel 
members had adopted. 
 The interviews usually ended with more general questions about 
the evaluators’ opinions on the purposes, usefulness and weaknesses 
of the kind of evaluation they had participated in. Most interviews 
lasted between 1½ and 2 hours.25 The interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.26 Interview data were seen in relation to the other data 
sources – the research councils’ files on the evaluations, oral informa-
tion from the secretaries of the panels,27 and in some cases the 
evaluators’ private notes and their drafts for the evaluation report. 
When informants’ accounts on the same question diverge, the various 
versions are presented in the case descriptions. When reaching 
conclusions, conflicting statements are analysed in relation to each 
other and the context in which they were stated (informants memory 
 
 37
of events differed, as well as their will to speak openly about sensitive 
matters).28 
 The cases studied are presented anonymously. To secure infor-
mants’ confidentiality was seen as necessary in order to acquire the 
necessary information on the decision-making of the panels, especially 
on disagreements among the panel members and other kinds of 
information systematically excluded from the evaluation reports. As 
the identity of the panel members of the evaluations is public 
knowledge, I cannot disclose which evaluations are studied without 
revealing the identity of the panel members and my informants. 
Consequently both informants and cases are anonymous. A reason for 
full confidentiality, in addition to the access to data that informants 
was expected to otherwise be very reluctant to provide, was not to 
affect those involved in the evaluations. If, for instance, the non-
official conditions for the evaluation reports had been made public, it 
might have affected both the credibility of the reports, and the 
reputation of the evaluees. 
 Informants were told that they would not be cited by name, and 
that they would be allowed to read text in which they were (anony-
mously) cited before publication. The major drawbacks with confi-
dential data are that these cannot be checked by the reader, and the 
reader cannot draw on other information he or she has about the case 
(Yin 1989:142).29 The only ‘external’ check on validity of the presenta-
tion of the cases was made by the actors themselves (panel members, 
co-ordinators and secretaries). They were all asked to comment on my 
draft on the description of the evaluation. The drafts presented the 
various accounts of the panel members and (when necessary) tried to 
‘reconcile’ them into a coherent story.30 All secretaries/co-ordinators, 
and seventeen of the panel members provided comments. Most of 
them just gave a short message saying ‘no objections’ or ‘OK’. A few 
reacted to particular formulations in the accounts which did not affect 
the description as such, in which case I reformulated the phrases in 
question. When informants wanted to change the formulation of their 
statements in a way affecting the meaning, this is included in foot-
notes (Chapter 4). I also received inspiring feedback from informants, 
especially concerning those cases with more ‘intricate’ decision-
making, stating that they had gained some insight by reading the draft 
(Case 5 and 6).31 
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 There are obvious problems with collecting relevant data from 
confidential decision-making processes like expert panel evaluations. 
Written documentation is limited, and the participants have incentives 
to give a picture of their decisions as more neutral and thorough than 
they actually were. Apart from problems with getting appointments 
with some of the panel members, the data collection has been easier 
than expected. Some of the interviewees have been quite outspoken 
and have provided me with information which has been useful when 
interviewing less outspoken persons to get their views on controver-
sies and similar in the group. Nevertheless, it is all second-hand 
information. The data material might have been better with direct 
observation of the decision-making. However, taking the ad hoc 
character of the evaluations into consideration, direct observation 
might easily have affected the work of the panels. A more pressing 
problem would be getting permission and access to observe on-going 
evaluations (see Section 7.2 for further discussion). 
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2 The problems with identifying 
good research 
A central focus of the literature and debate on peer review has been 
the problem of biased assessments. It is, for instance, more or less 
directly, claimed that peer review is essentially an ‘old boy system’, 
that it is full of scientists feathering their own nests, that it stifles 
innovative research because assessments are done by well-established 
researchers rejecting ideas differing from their own, that it discrimi-
nates against scientists working in low-prestige institutions, or fails to 
screen out grant applications of questionable merit (Cole et al. 
1978:11ff; Turney 1990:39; Chubin & Hackett 1990; Wood 1997).  
 The concept of bias is seldom discussed, but interpreted in various 
ways. Some studies finding disagreements among peer reviewers 
interpret this as some sort of ‘cognitive particularism’ (Travis & Collins 
1991) or ‘confirmatory bias’32 (Mahoney 1977), while others interpret 
disagreements as ‘real and legitimate differences of opinion among 
experts about what good science is or should be’ (Cole et al. 
1981:885). Such divergent interpretations reveal a lack of common 
understanding not only of the notion of bias, but also about what are 
legitimate considerations when evaluating research. This chapter deals 
with perspectives on constitutive and contingent properties of the basis 
of research evaluation as a starting point for discussing the notion and 
researchability of ‘bias’ in research evaluation. The first section 
discusses the existence of, and need for, criteria and indicators of 
good research. In the second section formal and informal rules for 
evaluation processes are discussed and the ontology of ‘research 
quality’ is seen from the point of view of realism, idealism and 
pragmatism/nominalism. The third section elaborates on the properties 
of research evaluation by discussing the norms of scholarly communi-
ties and scientific activity. The last section discusses the notion of bias 
and develops a classification of bias in research evaluation. 
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2.1 What constitutes ‘good research’? 
To deal with the notion of bias in research evaluation we need to 
know at least something about what an unbiased evaluation is 
supposed to be based on. Is there something that is unrefutable as the 
basis of research evaluation – something we all must accept as the 
nature or essence of ‘good research’? Are there identifiable impersonal 
and neutral criteria for good research, or factors that should not 
influence research evaluations?  
 While scientific research is traditionally looked upon as a truth-
seeking activity, we may say – considering the extensive focus on bias 
– that fair judgements or neutrality seem to be an overall requirement 
for the evaluation of research. Separating the concepts of truth and 
neutrality, it may be expressed as follows: When doing research truth is an 
objective, while neutrality might be the way leading to truth.33 When 
evaluating research, neutrality is an objective, while truth, methodological 
stringency, refutability, and similar, may be neutral or scientific criteria 
for assessing research.34  
 Not everybody would agree to such a focus on neutrality and 
impartiality in research evaluation. Judging the technological or 
societal relevance or effects of research involves taking a political 
position: what technology and what kind of society do we want? 
Discussing criteria for selecting research projects or effort areas, 
Weinberg (1963) puts forward both internal and external criteria. 
These can be summarised as follows:  
Internal criteria for scientific choice:  
- Is the field ready for exploitation? 
- Are the scientists in the field really competent? 
External criteria for scientific choice: 
- Technological merit: Is the technical end worthwhile? 
- Scientific merit: Relevance to neighbouring fields? 35 
- Social merit: Are the social goals worthwhile? 
 
This list illustrates the wide spectrum of considerations relevant to ex 
ante research evaluation: competence, researchability, interdisciplinary 
relevance, societal and technical ends.36 Are the assessments of these 
aspects expected to be neutral/impartial in some way? Technological 
and social ends are as mentioned normally not considered neutral or 
impartial.37 Yet, procedures for impartial assessments may be construc-
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ted (at least theoretically, see John Rawls’ A theory of Justice, 1971). As for 
the internal criteria, impartiality is expected to be a far more central 
characteristic of the assessments. The concern with bias deals 
specifically with intra-scientific evaluation (i.e. peer review). Personal 
interests or other biases are not welcome as the basis for the assess-
ments of the competence of a researcher, of whether a field is 
researchable or not, or of the quality of a research report. 
 What are such assessments supposed to be based on then? 
According to empirical studies there is a certain set of aspects and 
attributes of research quality that researchers have in common and use 
for scientific assessments. The most emphasised aspects are the 
research problems, the methods and the results. Stringency, correct-
ness, novelty, depth, breadth, intra- and extra-scientific relevance and 
productivity are examples of attributes of good research – some of the 
attributes are presumably more relevant for one aspect than another 
(Hemlin 1991). 
 Combining Weinberg’s list with these findings, including some 
later issues in research policy debates (environmental merit, ethical 
acceptability) and also considering possible indicators of good 
research, we may end up with the following sketch of what constitutes 
good research and how it may be assessed: 
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Table 2.1 Possible aspects, attributes and indicators of good research 
 
Aspects 
 
Attributes (examples)38 
 
Indicators (examples) 
 
Intra-scientific quality 
Research questions 
 
 
Methods 
 
 
Theory 
 
 
 
Reasoning 
 
 
 
Results/effects 
 
 
 
Researchability, fruitfulness, 
stringency, originality. 
 
Fruitfulness, stringency, 
correctness. 
 
Explanatory power, consis-
tency, simplicity, generality, 
cumulativity, originality. 
 
Consistency, stringency, 
profundity, completeness, 
originality. 
 
Correctness, theoretical and 
empirical contributions/ 
novelty. 
Ex ante indicators 
Expert judgements of: 
 Reseachability/fruitful-
ness. 
 ‘Talent’. 
 Previous formal reviews 
(book reviews, review 
of candidates for 
chairs, etc). 
 Reputation (institutional 
affiliation, posts, inter-
national network). 
Ex post indicators:  
 Peer judgements of the 
various attributes. 
 Frequency/amount and 
forum of research 
reports/ publications/-
communications. 
 Citations. 
 
Extra-scientific 
relevance/effects 
 
 
Societal merit 
Technological merit 
Environmental merit 
Ethical acceptability 
Actual or potential 
applications, patents, 
feared or experienced 
societal/environmental 
consequences,  
ethic board assessments. 
 
Productivity 
 
Cost efficiency 
Organisational efficiency 
Intra- or extra-scientific 
results/effects (output) 
according to resources 
(input). Relevant input 
factors: funding, equipment, 
organisation (academic 
freedom, group size, etc.). 
 
 
Underlying the kind of model presented in Table 2.1, and most 
philosophy of science, is what may be termed a ‘constitutive’ perspec-
tive on good research. There are certain characteristics that constitute 
good research as such, and restrict what may be meant by ‘good 
research’. Table 2.1, for instance, assumes that a question needs 
specific attributes (e.g. researchability, fruitfulness, stringency and 
originality) to be a good research question, implying that a question 
lacking all these characteristics cannot be a good research question. 
When it comes to indicators of good research, the claims of a 
constitutive perspective may be more vague. The kind of ‘evidence’ of 
good research listed in the last column is not constitutive in the same 
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sense as the attributes. The talent and reputation of a researcher is not, 
for instance, said to constitute the quality of his/her research ques-
tions. Nor do patents constitute technological merit, though patents 
may be socially constituted as a ‘valid’ measure of what should count 
as technological merit.39 
 Strictly speaking a constitutive perspective, defining the nature of 
research quality, is required for a meaningful concept of biased 
evaluation. To separate a biased from a non-biased evaluation, we 
need a concept of good research that specific suspicions about biased 
judgements may be measured against. If there is nothing that constitutes good 
research as such, everything is equally valid and it does not make much sense to speak of bias. 
A constitutive perspective allows a meaningful concept of ‘neutral’ (i.e. 
non-biased) judgements on research quality. Yet, if there is no general 
agreement on specific indicators of the constitutive attributes of good 
research, a constitutive perspective will not directly challenge the 
conclusions of any specific evaluation – as long as these conclusions 
do not refer to criteria in a way that violates what is said to be 
constitutive of good research (e.g. judges a theory as good because it 
has low explanatory power, or a research question as bad because it 
is researchable). In other words, a constitutive perspective is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for distinguishing biased from 
non-biased research assessments. 
 
2.2 The two faces of research evaluation: 
constitutive versus contingent aspects 
Prevailing theory within science and technology studies implies that 
by studying constitutive aspects of science from an ‘armchair philo-
sophy’ point of view, we get only part of the picture – only one of the 
faces of science. We get the ideal, ignoring its relation to ‘real life 
science’. Likewise, if we focus on the ready made, black-boxed side of 
scientific research, we easily ignore ‘science in the making’ including 
controversies, the art of arriving at a convincing result, and all kinds of 
social, political, economic and psychological aspects that philosophers 
of science traditionally have paid little attention to (see Latour 1987). 
Science is said to have one ‘official’ face, suitable for the public, and 
one ‘informal’ face reserved for insiders.  
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 One way of studying these two faces is to analyse scientific 
discourse, focusing on the divergent repertoires that scholars use in 
different situations. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) identify a contingent 
repertoire as opposed to an empiricist repertoire used in the formal 
research literature.40 The contingent repertoire is used in informal 
discourse and gives accounts diverging from the accounts of the 
empiricist repertoire. In a chapter studying scientific humour Gilbert 
and Mulkay exemplify this with what they call the scientific proto-
joke, of which they obtained various versions from several bioche-
mistry research groups. The joke consists of one list of phrases used in 
the formal research literature, and another list of their informal 
equivalents. An example from the formal lists is ‘Accidentally strained 
during mounting’, the informal counterpart being ‘Dropped on the 
floor’. Some of the other ‘couples’ are:  
‘Handled with extreme care throughout the experiment’ – ‘Not dropped on the 
floor’ 
‘It has long been known that . . .’ – ‘I haven’t bothered to look up the reference’ 
‘Fascinating work . . .’ – ‘Work by a member of our group’ 
‘Of doubtful significance’ – ‘Work by someone else’  
(Gilbert & Mulkay 1984:176) 
 
Categorising this joke, it may be said to be the kind of humour that 
makes us laugh because it pushes to extremes something partly taboo 
that we all easily recognise. In this case, the joke shows us the way 
we disguise our formal communication with the proper rhetoric in 
order to gain scientific credibility. It ‘comes close to being a satire 
directed at the official discourse of science’ (Gilbert & Mulkay 
1984:178). 
 The existence of such double repertoires, or two divergent faces, 
is not unique to science. In fact, the example of two divergent faces 
most relevant to research evaluation panels that I have found, is from 
the legal realm. In Garfinkel’s presentation of official and informal 
rules for jurors we find a version of dual rules easily ‘translated’ to the 
context of research evaluation. Substituting ‘evaluator’ for ‘juror’,41 the 
official rules appear as follows: 
 
 
 45
Table 2.2 Official rules for fair and thorough evaluation processes 
 
Impartiality requires: 
I1. For the impartial evaluator, personal preferences, research interests and paradigm, 
i.e., his/her perspectival view, are suspended in favour of a position that is 
interchangeable with all positions found in the concerned research community. 
His/her point of view is interchangeable with that of ‘Any Researcher’ in the area. 
I2.  Assessments vary independently of sympathy. 
Thoroughness requires: 
T1. For a good evaluator, ‘criteria’ and ‘evidence’ are the only legitimate grounds for 
an assessment. 
T2. The good evaluator delays judgement until all material subjected to evaluation has 
been investigated. 
T3. For a good evaluator the expression of a position that involves an irrevocable 
commitment is withheld. A good evaluator will not take a position at a time that 
will require him to defend it ‘out of pride’ instead of ‘on the merit of sound 
criteria and available evidence’.  
 (Moderated from Garfinkel 1967:109–110) 
 
In contrast, focusing on the non-official face of research evaluation the 
following rules appear: 
 
Table 2.3 Informal rules for good evaluations processes 
 
An evaluation process is good: 
P1. If it keeps to its time limits. 
P2. If it does not require the evaluator – as a condition for making judgements – to 
act as if he knows nothing, i.e. it does not require the evaluator to make no use of 
What Any Competent Member of the Research Community Knows that Anyone 
Knows. 
P3. If the number of variables defining the problem (and thereby the adequacy of a 
solution) can be reduced to a minimum by trusting that the other persons on the 
panel subscribe to the same kind of common sense. 
P4. If the opportunity and necessity for looking behind the appearance of things is 
held to a minimum.42 
P5. If only as much of the situation is called into question as is required for a socially 
supportable solution to the immediate problem in hand. 
P6. If the evaluators emerge from the inquiry with their reputations intact. 
  (Moderated from Garfinkel 1967:108) 
 
The two sets of rules bring out the incompatible requirements 
confronting an evaluator. On the one side there are formal (and 
maybe unrealistic) requirements, on the other side there are informal 
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pragmatic requirements. The formal rules focus on aspects that may be 
said to be constitutive of research evaluation: impartiality and 
thoroughness. If research evaluation is not supposed to be impartial 
and thorough, it becomes somewhat meaningless. Even as means in a 
political power struggle the conclusions of an evaluation lose a crucial 
function (credibility/authority) if it is clear to everybody (and every-
body knows this) that the evaluation cannot be said to be impartial 
and thorough – or at least as impartial and thorough as ex-
pected/possible for the specific purpose. The impartiality requirements 
are common to various contexts of judgements, both legal and 
professional. The rules of thoroughness have their parallel in standards 
of scientific research and are part of what is meant by ‘scientific’. 
 The informal rules focus on pragmatic aspects, on various 
simplifying or cost reducing strategies, that moderate the requirements 
of impartiality and thoroughness. The informal rules say that time 
limits, common ‘knowledge’, a socially supportable conclusion and the 
reputation of the evaluators are more important than impartiality and 
thoroughness. They may, however, be taken to be pragmatic either 
the way that they tell you to do your best within the given confines, 
or to choose the easiest way out. In the first case the informal rules 
tell you to moderate the formal rules as little as possible. In the latter 
case they tell you that you may disregard the formal rules. 
 Anyway, the double set of rules pictures an ambiguous situation – 
there are two divergent sets of rules for ‘good’ evaluations. In 
Garfinkel’s study the informal rules are presented as the decision rules 
of everyday life and perceived by the interviewed jurors as seemingly 
unacceptable in a legal context. The jurors gave idealised accounts of 
their decision processes in line with the formal rules and became 
anxious ‘when during the interviews, their attention was drawn by 
interviewers to the discrepancies between their ideal accounts and 
their ‘actual practices’’ (Garfinkel 1967:113).  
 That informal rules are not officially ‘promoted’ or admitted does 
not deny their existence. Yet, to count as rules they must in some way 
be accepted (at least informally) as pragmatic strategies – and not seen as 
mere imperfections. In Table 2.3, P1 and P4 prescribe cost reducing 
strategies, P2 and P3 prescribe the use of common ‘knowledge’ and P5 
and P6 prescribe attention to what is socially acceptable. 
 There may be a more ‘nuanced set of rules, reconciling the formal 
and informal rules, by specifying in what way and to what degree the 
formal rules may be modified, or in what situations the various sets of 
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rules apply. When such rules do not exist, each decision-maker is 
‘free’ to find his/her own way out of the ambiguities. In other words, 
discretion is essential, as for most professional decision-making. 
2.2.1 Divergent rules in light of ontological perspectives: 
realism, idealism and pragmatism/nominalism 
Statements on how research quality is constituted or on the status of 
‘attributes’ of good research imply an ontology of research quality. As 
we shall see, the understanding of bias in research evaluation heavily 
depends on the ontology of research quality we rely on. Different 
ontological views on research quality also have different implications 
for the kind of rules suitable for guiding evaluation processes. The 
formal and informal rules (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) do not only differ in 
their requirements for good evaluation processes, they also have 
divergent meanings for the basis of research evaluation, i.e. divergent 
implications on the content of ‘research quality’. The constitutive 
aspects of research evaluation relate to how we understand the 
ontological status of ‘research quality’. 
 In discussing how ‘research quality’ may be said to be constituted, 
we shall use the terms ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ in their old philosophi-
cal meaning. Realism denotes the view that reality exists independently 
of being experienced or conceived. Realism of research quality means 
that there are standards constitutive of good research, unrelated to 
what evaluators might define as good research. In this view, good 
research might be something quite different from what the research 
community defines as good research. Idealism, on the other hand, 
means that reality is constituted by experience and thought, and 
therefore there is no reality independent of human consciousness 
(Lübcke 1983:362, 204). An idealistic concept of research evaluation 
implies that the meaning of ‘good research’ is constituted through the 
evaluation process. 
 Both realism and idealism may be seen either from an optimistic 
or pessimistic point of view. Being optimistic, realism can be taken to 
mean that there are independent standards for good research obvious 
to the evaluators. Pessimistic realism, on the other hand, takes the 
existence of independent standards of good research for granted, but 
says that such measures are not obvious, and an evaluator may easily 
reach false judgements. Optimistic idealism may for instance say that 
evaluation processes constitute research quality thoroughly and 
 48 
impartially, and therefore authoritatively. Pessimistic idealism may for 
instance say that evaluation processes are heavily influenced by non-
relevant factors, power strategies and the like, and research quality is 
therefore ‘constituted’ in a partially and non-authoritatively manner.43 
 ‘Research quality’ might also refer to something that is neither 
independent of how evaluators may define it, nor culturally or socially 
constituted through evaluation processes. It might refer to the 
conclusions of single evaluations as such, regardless of how these 
conclusions relate to independent or socially/culturally constituted 
standards. In such a perspective ‘research quality’ has no particular 
content, and any conclusion is equally valid. Standards left for judging 
an evaluation then, are standards like whether the evaluation process 
is efficient and its conclusions unambiguous. This may be called a 
pragmatic perspective on research quality. The perspective is also 
related to nominalism – the view that general terms have no content 
and that the particulars they denote have nothing in common except 
that the same general terms are used about them (Lübcke 1983:316). A 
nominalistic view on research quality implies that ‘good research’ is an 
empty concept meaning that various good research projects have 
nothing in common except that we say they are good.  
 Three major different understandings of ‘research quality’ have 
been outlined above: realism, idealism and pragmatism, summarised 
in Table 2.4. Realism and idealism have both an optimistic and a 
pessimistic version. 
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Table 2.4 Perspectives on ‘research quality’ 
 
Realism: 
There are independent standards for good research. 
Optimistic realism: 
These standards are obvious to competent evaluators. 
Pessimistic realism: 
These standards are not obvious to evaluators. 
An evaluation panel may easily reach false judgements.  
Idealism: 
Standards are culturally and socially constituted, i.e. research quality is defined through 
evaluation processes. 
Optimistic idealism: 
Evaluation processes define research quality thoroughly and impartially, and 
therefore authoritatively. 
Pessimistic idealism: 
As evaluation processes are heavily influenced by non-relevant factors, power 
strategies and the like, research quality is defined in a partial and often non-
authoritative manner. 
Pragmatism: 
‘Research quality’ has no generalisable content: various good research projects have 
nothing in common except that we say they are good (nominalism). 
The main object of research evaluation is reaching a conclusion.  
To succeed, decision-making rules constructing consent are essential. 
 
‘Realistic’ evaluations mean assessments according to specific non-
socially constituted standards. The legitimacy of evaluations in a 
realistic perspective, depends on the competence of the evaluators – 
their insight into the independent standards and their ability to reach 
the right conclusions. Idealism implies that the felicity of conclusions 
depends on characteristics of a collective decision-making process. 
Realism does, however, not exclude the idea that some kinds of 
decision-making processes are more likely to lead to the right 
conclusions than other processes (in Plato’s terms this would be a 
process leading out of the cave). 
 Realism and idealism are in line with a constitutive perspective. 
Realism says that there is something that is constitutive of ‘good 
research’, idealism says that ‘good research’ is constituted culturally 
and socially.44 Pragmatism/nominalism on the other hand, rejects both 
these views – saying that ‘good research’ has no content except as 
conclusions of particular evaluations. An exclusively pragmatic/-
nominalistic view on research quality renders research evaluation 
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meaningless. If all conclusions are equally meaningful or good, there 
is no need to appoint experts to evaluate research. The outcome 
might as well be determined by a lottery or another cost-effective 
method. Such a random method would never be accepted as an 
evaluation. When research quality is ‘constituted’ by a ‘nude’ decision it 
appears random and meaningless. Randomness contradicts the whole 
concept of evaluation. 
 We shall not attempt to make any clear-cut conclusions on the 
status of ‘research quality’, here. Questions like ‘Is research quality 
unrelated to how it may be perceived or defined by evaluators – 
research quality per se?’ need not have a definitive answer. One 
possibility is that realism, idealism and pragmatism are supplementary 
ways of understanding research quality, not necessarily contradictory 
perspectives. Consistency may, for instance, be seen as a realistic 
aspect of research quality, while novelty and cumulativity may be seen 
as idealistic aspects, constituted through consensus-making processes. 
On other aspects, like fruitfulness and extra-scientific merit there may 
be no broad common understanding. Such aspects may be ‘resolved’ 
by pragmatic decisions when evaluation panels are expected to give 
unanimous judgements on them. 
 What about the divergent rules for research evaluation? What 
implications do a ‘realistic’, an ‘idealistic’ or a pragmatic view on 
‘research quality’ have on the understanding of official versus informal 
requirements for evaluation? In a ‘realistic’ perspective procedural rules 
are in themselves irrelevant for whether an evaluation is ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. The requirements of thorough evaluation processes in Table 
2.2., for instance, cannot guarantee the right outcome. A lottery may 
by hazard also provide a correct conclusion. Yet, rules specifying 
standards for ‘correct’ assessments (i.e. standards of good research) 
and how to reach the ‘right’ conclusions, may be essential as a means 
to a correct evaluation. In such a perspective the official rules, 
emphasising criteria, evidence, impartiality and thoroughness definitely 
seem better suited than the informal rules emphasising cost-reducing 
strategies, common knowledge and social acceptability. If, for 
instance, an evaluation is not thorough enough to detect inconsisten-
cies in a research report, it will reach faulty conclusions regarding the 
consistency of the report, which – given that consistency is a ‘real’ 
aspect of research quality – have implications for whether the 
assessments of the research quality are correct. Informal rules promo-
ting common knowledge and social acceptability, on the other hand, 
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are not the way to detect inconsistencies and would therefore not 
serve realism. Furthermore, realism claims that ‘research quality’ is 
independent of the kind of social factors emphasised by the informal 
rules. 
 From an ‘idealistic’ perspective we may claim that the best rules are 
those that best serve the process defining research quality, i.e. the 
rules should reproduce authoritative definitions of research quality or 
redefine research quality authoritatively. The question then is whether 
the official or the informal rules best serve this process. If we say, 
under the ‘idealistic’ perspective, that impartiality and thoroughness 
are essential (social/cultural) requirements for acceptable evaluations, 
the answer is that the idealistic perspective brings about the official 
rules. It should be noted that this answer is culturally conditioned, and 
not given a priori. In principle, any procedural rule – also the informal 
pragmatic requirements – may help define research quality, depending 
on what kind of evaluation processes yields authoritative results in a 
given context. In this regard, the requirement of social acceptance 
(included in the informal rules) is likely to be able to overrule 
requirements of thoroughness and impartiality. 
 From a pragmatic perspective ‘research quality’ has no content, and 
the most efficient rules are the best. As the informal rules are likely to 
be easier to follow and yield conclusions faster than the official rules, 
they are preferable from a pragmatic perspective. 
 Summing up, the official rules seem to be the most appropriate 
from a ‘realistic’ perspective on research quality, while the informal 
rules are the most appropriate from a pragmatic view on research 
quality, and idealism in principle may apply both sets of rules. 
Idealism therefore may be the best suited for combining the two sets 
of rules. 
2.3 Norms of research evaluation? 
This section further discusses the status of divergent rules and the 
scope of acceptable evaluations by looking at the two sets of rules of 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (official rules and informal rules for good evalua-
tion processes) in relation to norms of the scientific community.  
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2.3.1 ‘The ethos of science’ 
The classic text on the norms of the scientific community is Merton’s 
‘The Normative Structure of Science’, written in 1942 (at least partly as a 
response to the Nazis’ attempts to control science). According to 
Merton, there is an ‘ethos of science’ containing four sets of institu-
tional imperatives: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism. Versions of universalism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism may be recognised in thoroughness and 
impartiality of the ‘official’ rules (Table 2.2), while communism has no 
parallel in these rules, nor is it directly applicable to the evaluation of 
research. 
 Universalism says that ‘the acceptance or rejection of the claims 
entering the list of science is not to depend on the personal or social 
attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class and 
personal qualities are as such irrelevant.’ Universalism further demands 
that careers be open to talents. In terms of evaluation procedures, 
universalism demands that ‘truth-claims, whatever their sources, are to 
be subjected to preestablished, impersonal criteria’ (Merton 1942/1973: 
270–272).45 
 Communism, here meaning common ownership, says that ‘the 
substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration 
and are assigned to the community.’ Scientists may compete and have 
controversies over priority, but the products of competition are 
communicated and common property. The producer’s reward is 
recognition and esteem, not private property of the findings. Merton 
describes patents as incompatible with communism and a threat to the 
scientific ethos. As a response to this threat ‘some scientists have come 
to patent their work to ensure its being made available for public use’, 
Merton writes (ibid.:273–275). 
 Disinterestedness is a norm aimed at preventing fraud and misconduct 
in science. Merton is not specific about the content of this norm. He 
says that it is not a question of ‘distinctive motives’ that the scientist 
should have, ‘it is rather a distinctive pattern of institutional control of 
a wide range of motives which characterizes the behaviour of 
scientists’. The norm is ‘effectively supported by the ultimate 
accountability of scientists to their compeers’ (ibid.:276). The inter-
pretations of Merton’s ‘disinterestedness’ vary from Mulkay saying that 
it ‘requires researchers to pursue scientific knowledge without 
considering their career or their reputation’ (Mulkay 1977:98), to the 
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rather strict ‘without having any reward in view, whether financial, 
emotional or social’ (Barnes & Dolby 1970:4) or more general 
interpretations like ‘curbing of personal bias’ (Zuckerman 1988).46 
 Organised scepticism is the mandate of the scientific investigator to wait 
for evidence before making judgements, and to ask questions about 
any aspect of nature and society regardless of ‘the cleavage between 
the sacred and the profane, between that which requires uncritical 
respect and that which can be objectively analyzed’ (Merton 
1942/1973:277–278).47 
 According to Merton, the norms and values of the scientific ethos 
‘is held to be binding on the man of science’ and ‘are expressed in the 
form of prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences and permissions’. The 
ethos has not been codified, but ‘can be inferred from the moral 
consensus of scientist as expressed in use and wont, in countless 
writings on scientific spirit and in moral indignation directed toward 
contraventions of the ethos’ (ibid:269). This does not mean that the 
norms are not violated. The desire for recognition may lead to fraud 
and plagiarism, violating all sets of norms (Merton 1957/1973). 
Nevertheless, the idea seems to be that the ethos is either violated or 
obeyed. There is no room for the kind of ‘negotiability’ expressed by 
the ‘informal’ rules, the ethos being roughly in line with the ‘official’ 
rules. 
 Merton’s ‘proposal of norms in science provoked [a] prolonged 
and heated discussion’, which was one factor leading to the division 
of sociologists of science into ‘several contending groups’ advocating 
different approaches to the studies of science (Zuckerman 1988:516).48 
My argument here is that the existence of the ethos is not a question of 
whether it is violated or not. Examples of violation of the norms are 
easy to find and probably most scientists know of some violations. 
The real test of the social significance of (potential) norms – of 
whether they are adhered to or not – is the moral reaction to such 
violations. In our case the question is: are there examples of behav-
iour contrary to the ethos – particularism, non-communication of 
results, personal bias or ‘dogmatism’ – that will not be sanctioned or 
entail moral indignation among colleagues, if detected?  
 As I see it, the answer depends on how categorically the ethos of 
science is interpreted. If we take universalism to be incompatible with 
all kinds of ‘old boys networks’ and institutional and personal 
loyalties, communism to be a norm not only for academic research, 
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but also for industrial research, organised scepticism to forbid the kind 
of dogmatism a scientific paradigm entails, and disinterestedness to be 
incompatible with the kind of personal bias resulting from having 
personal and institutional loyalties and complying to a paradigm, then 
we do not even need empirical studies to answer the question. With 
such an interpretation there are obvious situations in which one would 
be expected to be (and rewarded for being) ‘particularistic’, ‘dog-
matic’, ‘personally biased’ or to not communicate results.49 On the 
other hand, if we adopt a ‘soft’ interpretation, and say that the only 
violations of the ethos are those including behaviour that are clearly 
understood as fraud or misconduct, we come close to a tautological 
argument, saying that all violations of the ethos entail moral indigna-
tion because everything defined as fraud or misconduct entails moral 
indignation. 
 So, with a categorical interpretation the ethos is obviously not 
binding – it can be violated without provoking moral indignation or 
negative sanctions – but with a ‘soft’ interpretation it is binding per 
definition. In deciding whether scientists are ‘controlled’ by profes-
sional norms or not, however, we do not have to take a stand on 
which of these interpretations is the best (and Merton is reasonable 
enough to have meant something in between). The fact that some behaviour 
is defined as fraud or misconduct and sanctioned, is evidence enough to claim that the scientific 
community has some norms. This does not mean that Merton’s proposal is an 
adequate description of those norms however, nor that the norms are 
the same for all scientific periods, environments or situations.50 As 
mentioned, several studies find that there are reasons to question ‘the 
ethos of science’ as put forward by Merton. Whether ‘the ethos of 
science’ provides an adequate description of the actual behaviour of 
scientists or not, it seems to be a good account of the way scientists 
like to portray themselves (Jasanoff 1990:63; Mulkay 1977:108). The 
ethos is the proper rhetoric for maintaining the prestige of science in 
society, which means that we should be somewhat critical about 
scientists’ own accounts on their adherence to such norms. 
 Thus, we cannot conclude this section by pointing to a set of clear 
and specific norms that guide behaviour in scientific communities. 
Studies of science have not yet fully grasped the balance between 
fraud and misconduct on the one side, and acceptable loyalties to 
persons and paradigms, and acceptable secrecy of results on the other 
side. The reason for this might be that there are no clearly set borders, 
but continuous negotiations about the definition of specific cases as to which 
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side of the border they belong – a set of unclear, unspoken, context-
dependent and changing informal ‘rules’ that moderate or assist in the 
interpretation of the ‘official ethos’.51 The recent establishment of 
ethics committees, both at the institutional and national level, would 
be one indicator that the norms of the scientific community are felt to 
be too ambiguous to be interpreted solely by individuals on their own. 
 Some analysts have dealt explicitly with the ambiguities of the 
norms of scientific behaviour, however. Merton himself stresses that 
‘the social institution of science ... incorporates potentially incompa-
tible values’ (Merton 1963/1973:383). On one hand, for example, there 
is a ‘value set upon originality52 which leads scientists to want their 
priority recognised’ (loc.cit.). On the other hand, there is the norm of 
‘selfless dedication to the advancement of knowledge for its own sake’ 
(op.cit:399), and a ‘value set upon due humility, which leads [scien-
tists] to insist on how little they have in fact been able to accomplish’ 
(op.cit.:383). Merton uses these ambivalent norms to explain the 
contradicting statements and behaviour of scientists. Scientists involve 
themselves passionately in priority debates, while in other contexts 
they tend to trivialise or even reject such priority debates. The idea of 
ambivalence caused by norms and counter-norms in science is further 
developed by Mitroff in a study of the Apollo moon scientists. He 
finds counter-norms to all the norms of ‘the scientific ethos’, and 
concludes that the dominance of norms is context dependent. In some 
situations the norms of the ‘ethos’ will dominate; in other situations 
the ‘counter-norms’ will dominate. Mitroff suggests that the nature of 
the scientific problem addressed will be among the factors influencing 
what set of norms will dominate a specific situation, but concludes 
that much more study is required before we can understand the 
ambivalence of scientists (Mitroff 1974). 
2.3.2 Basis and norms of quality evaluations 
Given the sparse and inconclusive empirical studies of general norms 
in science, trying to infer specific norms for evaluation behaviour 
might be a bit too optimistic. However, the ‘ethos of science’ might 
serve as a fruitful starting point. Translated into imperatives for 
evaluating research quality, Merton’s scientific ethos could be 
summarised like this: 
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Your evaluation shall not depend on personal or social character-
istics of the researcher, nor shall your personal motives influence 
your evaluation. Your evaluation shall be based on preestablished 
impersonal criteria, and be rigorous enough to uncover any fraud 
or misconduct. You shall reward critical, undogmatic inquiry and 
free communication of results. 
There are two critical problems with this ethos for evaluation. Firstly, 
as mentioned above, there is no evidence that ‘the ethos of science’ is 
binding on the scientist, and certainly no evidence saying that my 
‘translation’ of the ethos to the context of evaluation is binding. 
Several studies of peer review indicate that assessments are neither 
rigorous, nor impartial (Ceci & Peters 1982; Peters & Ceci 1982; 
Chubin & Hackett 1990; Cicchetti 1991; Cole et al. 1981; Mahoney 
1977; Travis & Collins 1991; Wood 1997). The focus on bias, however, 
and the concern to bring the problems into the light, indicate that it is 
common view that research evaluation ought to be rigorous and based 
on impersonal criteria. In terms of idealism, evaluations need a 
minimum of rigour and impartiality to be authoritative. Furthermore, if 
one were to argue for the opposite, that evaluations should be lax or 
partial, one would contradict the whole meaning of evaluation. In 
terms of realism, there is some intrinsic idea in the notion of evalua-
tion saying that a lax or partial evaluation cannot be a good evalua-
tion. Consequently, we can conclude that such an ‘ethos of evaluation’ 
is likely to be in accordance at least with scientists’ official statements 
about evaluation (the official rules), but not necessarily a good 
description of what norms peer evaluators adhere to (the informal 
rules), i.e. one may violate the ‘ethos’ without provoking any moral 
indignation if all those competent to detect the violation conceive the 
‘ethos’ as mere rhetoric, and that no one (or very few) try, or have the 
capacity, to live up to it. In addition, there might be a large ‘grey area’ 
between a rigorous and impersonal evaluation, and a lax and partial 
one, and as long as one does not move outside this area – over in the 
area of clearly lax and partial evaluation – the evaluator might not 
need to fear any negative sanctions. 
 Secondly, even if there are norms saying that evaluations shall be 
impersonal and rigorous, and reward critical inquiry and free commu-
nication of results, these norms give no guidelines for determining the 
quality of research. How is research of good quality distinguished 
from research of inferior quality by journal referees, committees for 
academic appointments and grant application reviewers? What are the 
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standards or criteria adopted for evaluation? As we saw in the previous 
sections, these questions have no apparent answers. 
 Ravetz emphasises that the assessment of research quality 
‘involves the making of a number of subtle, indeed tacit judgements, 
which depend on an intimate craft knowledge of the work under 
review’ (Ravetz 1971:274, see also Appendix A for an explication of 
‘tacit’). The techniques are too subtle, the criteria too specialised, and 
the materials too rapidly changing, for any formal categories of quality 
to be feasible. It has also been underlined that the attempts by 
philosophers of science to formulate criteria of good research (i.e. 
corroboration, explanatory power, predictive power, simplicity, and 
similar) are ‘not intended as practically applicable measures for 
appraisal within science policy’ but are aimed at understanding the 
nature of science, and are part of ‘the dynamic and critical self-
reflection of the scientific community on the criteria of good science’ 
(Niiniluoto 1987:22). This reliance on tacit knowledge, craft skills, and 
the lack of explicit criteria,53 underscores that there will normally be a 
large grey area of acceptable evaluations, i.e. evaluations not clearly 
definable as lax or partial. 
 As mentioned, numerous studies of peer review have focused on 
the reliability and possible bias of peer review and found a low 
degree of agreement between referees and various kinds of bias 
(academic and institutional status, nationality, gender and research 
field of the author/applicant influence judgements, as well as different 
kinds of cognitive bias).54 Contrary to such studies, the studies of 
Hemlin referred to in Section 2.1, focus on criteria. He finds a 
common ‘language’ in evaluation of scientific quality, a certain set of 
criteria (aspects and attributes) to which researchers pay attention. He 
also finds significant differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences in 
the emphasises on the various aspects. The humanities and social 
sciences, for instance, put more emphasis on theory, while the natural 
sciences put more emphasis on the results. There is also generally 
more variation in the emphasis on the various criteria in the humani-
ties and the social sciences, than in the natural sciences (Hemlin 
1991).  
 As Hemlin did not address the question of inter-reviewer agree-
ment on the assessments of the candidates, his studies do not 
contradict the studies that find low reliability in peer review. If both 
the findings of low reliability and Hemlin’s findings of a common set 
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of criteria for evaluation of research quality are correct, this can be 
taken to mean that while there is a certain set of criteria to which 
attention is paid – more or less explicitly – by peer evaluators, these 
criteria are interpreted or operationalisised differently by various evaluators. This is in 
accordance with Ravetz’s account of subtle, tacit judgements and lack 
of formal categories of research quality.  
 Such a common set of criteria (or conceptual basis) with a wide 
range of interpretative possibilities, can also be read into the findings 
of a Norwegian study of peer review looking both at criteria and bias. 
Fürst (1988) studied the basis for evaluations of candidates for 
professorships in Norway. According to the rules a certain amount of 
‘breadth’ is required for these positions, and Fürst also found that this 
criterion was emphasised in the evaluation documents. There were no 
clear norms for the assessments, however, and there was a large 
variation in what criteria were emphasised – and how they were 
emphasised. It may seem therefore, that what determined each case 
was accidental. Nevertheless, Fürst sees some patterns in the evalua-
tion documents. As criteria have no standard operationalisation or 
interpretation there are ample possibilities to choose interpretations 
that promote the personal favourites of the evaluators. The study 
concludes that these interpretations tend to be biased against the 
female candidates. The choice of words for describing the breadth and 
depth of a candidate’s research production, is one of the major 
examples. The research of female candidate is typically described as 
either narrow and one-sided, or spread over many areas, while the 
research of her male competitors either goes in depth, has thematic 
coherence, or good breadth. As a result of the nature of the research topic, 
Fürst was not able to prove whether such differences in the 
descriptions of candidates were a result of reviewer bias or not simply 
caused by differences in the research production between the male 
and female candidates. This illustrates an important characteristic of 
peer review – and the main problem for students of bias in peer 
review – quality criteria are not standardised and their interpretation is 
the privilege of the reviewer (see Ravetz op. cit.). Outsiders, then, 
seldom have the possibility to ‘prove’ bias (see the ‘researchability’ 
discussion below).55 
 The lack of pre-set standards and formal hierarchy of control, and the large scope of 
acceptable outcomes of peer review, in no way necessitates the conclusion that peer review is 
accidental and unreliable. According to Cole a certain degree of consensus is 
assured, even at the research frontier, both in the natural and the 
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social sciences. Consensus is created and maintained by social 
processes. One main process is the training provided in graduate 
school, another is the dependence on evaluations made by others: 
‘In making evaluations, scientists depend heavily on standards internalized in graduate 
school. Most scientists have been educated at a relatively small number of prestigious 
graduate departments where they studied with eminent scientists. To some extent the 
views of these teachers influence the standards adopted by their students and the 
subsequent evaluations made by the students’ (Cole 1983:136). 
This is the way tacit knowledge and craft skill is learned. When 
executed, evaluations depend on the informal hierarchy of the 
research field: 
‘In the process of evaluation, some opinions count more than others. Generally, the stars 
of a particular discipline occupy the main gatekeeping roles. By their acts as gatekeepers 
and evaluators, they determine what work is considered good and what work 
unimportant’ (Cole 1983:138). 
As most people in the research community are willing to accept the 
judgements made by others, the system works: 
‘We give people more credit for publications in prestigious journals. We think more 
highly of people who have received grants, fellowships, awards, memberships in 
prestigious organizations – all based on the evaluation of others’ (Cole 1983:137). 
Dependence on reputation/eminence and internalised standards 
facilitates consensus, but studies of peer review still show low inter-
reviewer agreement. The diversity and the individualism in science 
leading to diverse views seem unavoidable. In addition to the fact that 
different groups promote different standards of quality and relevance, 
each member of the scientific community tends to have his/her own 
particular ideas about quality and relevance. The problem is amplified 
by the highly specialised character of scientific work. In some cases 
there may be no ‘peers’ to conduct peer review: 
‘For the “best” scientists peer review is unlikely. Scientists are at the mercy of peer 
review systems that may offer neither “peers” nor “review.” Instead, applicants must 
compete with others’ intellectual capital, positional advantage, and political clout. Luck 
of the reviewer draw or mere chance may matter nearly as much as measurable features 
of the manuscript or proposal. Under current conditions of high competition for research 
funds and space in first-rate journals, such nonmeritocratic criteria make a decisive 
difference at the margin’ (Chubin & Hackett 1990:194). 
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Yet, such a tendency of fragmentation and ‘mere chance’ should not 
be overstated. Research areas overlap, depend on each other and 
compete with each other. Those at the top of the informal hierarchies 
of science not only influence the standards of their own area; as they 
are obliged to satisfy each other’s expectations to ensure funds and 
facilities for their area of speciality, there is also a tendency towards 
some degree of unity. This points towards a ‘system of quality control 
... throughout the whole of science’ (Mulkay 1977:107). 
 Summing up the discussion on the basis and norms of peer review, 
we may conclude that peer review depends on tacit knowledge and 
craft skills internalised through socialisation processes – rendering 
some unity in the basis of peer review. Informal hierarchies, 
‘gatekeepers’, dependence on judgements made by others, and the 
overlap and dependencies between research areas also contribute to 
unity. Moreover, there seems to be a common ‘language’ for peer 
review – a certain set of criteria that reviewers (more or less explicitly) 
pay attention to. 
 On the other hand, studies of peer review find low inter-reviewer 
agreement, indicating that evaluators either use different criteria, 
emphasise the various criteria differently or interpret the criteria 
differently – all leading to divergent assessments. Various characteris-
tics of scientific research and scientific communities may account for 
such findings – a major one being the tacitness of the basis for 
assessments. Tacit basis means a large scope of possible assessments. 
The tacit basis of evaluation also means that the status of the rules (in 
addition to the rules themselves) may be tacit. Other factors pointing 
against unitarian standards or norms for evaluation are the inherent 
uncertainty and controversy in scientific research and the individual-
ism of the scientific culture.  
 In consequence, we cannot specify rules, standards or exhaustive 
criteria of peer review. There are still limits as to what may be seen as 
acceptable evaluations. Criteria are set more or less explicitly by the 
‘stars’ of the discipline, internalised through graduate school, et cetera. 
We may add that to keep to such limits an evaluation at least has to 
appear to be rigorous and based on impersonal criteria of scientific 
merit. 
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2.4 The concept of ‘bias’ in research 
evaluation 
In Section 2.1 it was stated that a constitutive perspective is necessary 
for distinguishing biased from non-biased evaluations. If there is 
nothing that is constitutive of research quality, we have no basis for 
saying that an evaluation is influenced by prejudices or partiality. In 
Section 2.2 we saw that philosophical studies of the constitutive 
aspects of research evaluation are likely to give a one-sided account, 
leaving out possible informal rules allowing conduct that might be 
called biased according to ‘official rules’ found in a non-empirical/-
philosophical approach. Section 2.2 furthermore emphasised that 
‘constitutive’ may have various meanings, depending on whether we 
rely on realism or idealism. Section 2.3 emphasised the tacitness of 
research evaluation opening a large scope of possible outcomes. In 
this section we shall identify different kinds and levels of bias in 
research evaluation, trying to understand the notion of bias in light of 
the preceding sections. 
 Bias may have its source on different levels. Research evaluation 
conducted by expert panels may be biased due to factors on either the 
organisational level, the panel level, or the level of the individual 
evaluator. We shall examine these possibilities from the two discussed 
perspectives on research quality that may identify bias: realism and 
idealism (see Table 2.4). 
 On the organisational level there is the organiser (e.g. the research 
council) setting the conditions for the endeavour. From a ‘realistic’ 
point of view the appropriateness of the organiser’s decisions depends 
on whether these decisions promote ‘correct’ evaluations or not. Rules, 
criteria and evaluation forms developed by the organiser may facilitate 
the task of finding the ‘right’ conclusion or they may cause ‘wrong’, 
i.e. biased, conclusions. Anyway, as far as such bias is standardised, 
the bias caused by the organiser is not random and might promote 
fairness in the sense that it provides a common basis for the judge-
ments which may prevent more random bias. According to realism 
however, such ‘fairness’ considerations are not relevant. Biased 
standardisations yield a predictable but arbitrary outcome. There is no 
help in predictable conclusions if they are not the right conclusions. 
On the contrary, standardised biased rules and criteria are likely to 
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persistently impede right conclusions. Under idealism on the other 
hand, organisationally standardised judgements are more likely to be 
accepted. If standardisation reproduces authoritative assessments or 
authoritatively contributes to a common basis for assessments, it may 
be said to be appropriate according to idealism. Organisational bias, 
according to idealism, are decisions not in line with common opin-
ions: e.g. appointing partial panels, ‘ordering’ superficial reviews 
(indirectly by demanding too much material to be reviewed within a 
limited period of time), or prescribing the use of methods that will not 
be accepted as the basis for valid assessments (e.g. publication 
counts).  
 On the panel level, group processes may either promote or impede the 
‘right’ conclusions (concern of realism) or authoritative conclusions 
(concern of idealism). We may for instance imagine that processes 
leading to conformity (see ‘groupthink’, Chapter 3) may hamper the 
thoroughness necessary for reaching the ‘right’ conclusions, or that 
processes encouraging polarisation may frustrate the authority of the 
conclusions. 
 On an individual level the competence of an evaluator is decisive 
both for realism and idealism. The meaning of competence differs, 
though. With realism, evaluators are incompetent if they do not make 
the ‘right’ judgements. With idealism evaluators are incompetent if 
conclusions are not in line with the process constituting ‘good 
research’. In the first case, the cognitive limits of an evaluator are 
supposed to be the source of bias. In the second case, some sort of 
social limits are also involved. Other kinds of bias involved at this 
level, may be various versions of partiality, for example, that assess-
ments vary dependently of sympathy (forbidden by the ‘official rules’ 
of Table 2.2). 
 The constraints of all levels are discussed in separate sections of 
Chapter 3 which deal with research evaluation as decision-making and 
asks what may influence the work of research evaluation panels. The 
rest of this chapter deals with various kinds of bias in research 
evaluation as such, developing a preliminary classification of bias in 
research evaluation. 
 One distinction highly relevant to idealism is that between 
‘structural’ and ‘non-structural’ bias. ‘Paradigmatic’ bias, for instance, is 
structural, while personal likes and dislikes need not be related to any 
structures. Such personal bias may however be shaped by social and 
cultural environment, and in that way be structural. Definitive dividing 
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lines between structural and non-structural bias may therefore be hard 
to draw. It may be easier to make a division between personal bias on 
the one hand, and professional or scientific bias on the other. 
However, personal and professional factors may of course be heavily 
interrelated, blurring such distinctions. Another distinction to be made 
is between bias due to interests and bias caused by cognitive con-
straints. This distinction may also be hard to deal with empirically. 
Both a large part of our cognitive constraints and our various interests 
are in some way social. They may in some way be socially related, 
shaped or constructed, and therefore more or less directly related. 
Interests may also be directly shaped by cognition, or the other way 
around: cognition may be shaped by interests.56 Such distinctions may 
be useful as analytical tools, but easily blurred empirically. 
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Table 2.5 Categories of bias in research evaluation 
 
 
 
Cognitive constraints 
 
Interests 
 
Scholarly/ 
professional 
bias 
A: The constraints of a 
professional platform: 
Preconceptions of good and 
valuable research. 
Selective perceptions = looking 
through ‘the glasses’ of your 
‘school’/scholarly view-
point/profession.57 
B: Research interests: 
Taking effects on economic and 
political standing of the 
field/research area into con-
sideration.58 
Nepotism = helping ‘heirs’ or 
other colleagues because of 
‘school’/scholarly viewpoint or 
research topic. 
 
Non-
professional/ 
personal bias 
C: General or personal 
cognitive constraints: 
Sub-optimal thoroughness and 
information seeking. 
Selective perceptions = dis-
regarding information due to 
routines/limited capacity for 
handling information.59 
D: Personal interests: 
Taking effects on personal 
situation or situation of friends, 
partners or competitors into 
consideration. 
Nepotism = helping colleagues 
because of friendship. 
 
Table 2.5 distinguishes between professional and non-professional/-
personal bias on the one hand, and between cognitive bias and 
interest bias on the other, arriving at four main categories of bias in 
research evaluation. The two upper categories – the constraints of a 
professional platform and research interests – are likely to be more 
structural and predictable than the two lower categories. The bias of 
category A is grounded in a field’s traditions for evaluating research 
and is therefore not likely to be defined as bias from the point of view 
of idealism. From such a point of view, the constraints of a profes-
sional platform are likely to be looked upon as the basis of (authorita-
tive) evaluations rather than as a source of bias. The bias of category 
B is more difficult to define in such terms. In some contexts research 
interests might be part of an authoritative evaluation; in other contexts 
they might have no authority. From the point of view of realism, both 
category A and B will be bias. Both professional preconceptions and 
interests are likely to impede the use of the right standards which 
realism takes to be culturally and socially independent. 
 In contrast to the two upper categories, the two lower categories 
are not very likely to count as authoritative bases for assessment, and 
more likely to be regarded as bias not only from the point of view of 
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realism, but also from the point of view of idealism. An evaluator or 
evaluation panel disregarding, or not understanding, vital parts of the 
material under review, is obviously incompetent both from the point 
of view of realism and idealism (category C bias). Giving credit for 
friendship or discredit for rivalry is also likely to result in neither a 
correct nor an authoritative evaluation (category D bias). Evaluees 
subjected to the ‘non-professional’ bias of category C or D have 
nothing else to rely on than the ‘luck of the reviewer draw’.60 In the 
case of professional bias, on the other hand, one can increase the 
probability of good assessments by sticking to mainstream or widely 
reputed approaches and topics, and trying to fulfil specific quality 
criteria.  
 The various claims of bias in peer review referred to in the 
introduction to this chapter, may illustrate all categories of Table 2.5. 
That reviewers are feathering their own nests may either mean that 
they ‘invariably argue … for better treatment of the[ir] field: for more 
money, more people, more training’ (Weinberg 1963:161), i.e. 
category B bias, or that they tend to credit friends and discredit 
enemies when reviewing research (category D bias). The claim that 
peer review stifles innovative research because assessments are done 
by a conservative ‘establishment’ is a claim of category A bias. That 
peer review fails to screen out grant applications of questionable merit 
is a claim of category C bias.61 
 We also see that the referred62 contradicting interpretations of 
disagreements among peer reviewers can be said to be a question 
about whether ‘category A bias’ is bias or not. Cole et al. (1981) 
interpret disagreements as legitimate differences of opinion about the 
definition of good research. Travis & Collins (1991) and Mahoney 
(1977) interpret disagreements as bias due to different scientific 
schools of thought/theoretical perspectives. All of them place the 
phenomenon in category A, but differently from Travis & Collins and 
Mahoney, Cole et al. do not recognise it as bias. We have said that 
category A is bias according to realism, but not according to idealism. 
Do Cole et al. promote idealism, while Travis & Collins and Mahoney 
promote realism? Not necessarily. There may be other reasons than 
ontological positions behind opinions on whether category A is bias 
or not.  
 In Travis and Collins’ article, the reason for defining category A as 
bias may be taken to be based on arguments of both fairness, 
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relativism and realism. Travis and Collins say that cognitive particular-
ism (i.e. ‘school of thought’/category A) in grant review is much more 
severe than institutional particularism63 because it directly influences 
the overall direction of the research field, its cognitive developments – 
having consequences that institutional particularism may only cause 
indirectly and in special circumstances. The authors seem to mean that 
the review system should not be allowed to discriminate or privilege a 
school of thought because all ‘schools’ are equally good (relativism) or 
must be treated equally well in lack of consensus. Applicants should 
have equal chances regardless of their school of thought (fairness). At 
the same time they say that ‘grant applications should be judged on 
universalistic criteria, such as the scientific merit’ (Travis & Collins 
1991:325), seemingly meaning that there are standards of good 
research unrelated to schools of thought. ‘Universalistic criteria’ may 
be taken to mean that there are socially and culturally independent 
standards of good research (realism), or that one should aim against 
standards that are universally agreed on. Nevertheless, their conclusion 
must be that all research is not equally good, that the definition of 
‘goodness’ shall not depend on particularistic criteria, and that ‘school 
of thought’ is a particularistic criterion. This implies that peer review 
should only use uncontroversial criteria (meaning ‘black-boxed’ or 
objective criteria) and not take a stand in ongoing debates. This is far 
from idealism which presents peer reviewers as the central actors in 
the definition and redefinition of ‘good research’.64 
 Researchability may be another argument for focusing on category 
A bias. Arguments related to school of thought and controversial 
assessments may serve as indicators of this kind of bias. Arguments in 
panel discussions or evaluation reports that indicate that ‘school of 
thought’ is part of the assessment are likely to be an easier subject of 
research than the other categories of bias. Category A and possibly 
also category B are likely to be more openly stated and therefore 
easier to detect than non-professional bias. Category C, disregarding or 
misunderstanding the material under review, will frequently not be 
conscious to the reviewer, and it may therefore be hard to find 
indications of this kind of bias. Category D, personal interests, is a 
more conscious kind of bias, but as there are clear social norms 
against such kinds of considerations when evaluating research, 
information on such bias may be very hard to obtain. Reviewers may 
of course inform on each other, or we may find indications in the 
form of correlation between friendship and outcome of reviews. On 
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the other hand, reviewers’ motives for saying that their co-reviewers’ 
assessments are biased due to personal interests may be unreliable, 
and correlation between friendship and outcome may be purely 
spurious. Such correlation might be a good indicator of bias, but not
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necessarily bias of category D. Personal interests may correlate with 
both professional platform, research interests and personal cognitive 
constraints. The four categories may consequently be hard to distin-
guish empirically. 
 Summing up this chapter, the initially posed questions have been found 
not to have any conclusive answers. Asking the questions: ‘Is there 
something that cannot be refuted as the basis of research evaluation – 
something we all must accept as the nature or essence of ‘good 
research’? Are there identifiable impersonal and neutral criteria for 
good research, or factors that should not influence research 
evaluations?’, we end up with the problem of defining bias. As there 
are no indicators of non-biased or correct evaluation independent of 
peer judgements, bias in research evaluation is difficult to study.65 The 
answer to what is the proper basis of research evaluation depends on 
whether we rely on idealism or realism. According to idealism, 
acceptability by the actors involved may serve as a good indicator of 
properly based evaluations. According to realism, there are no clear 
indicators of correct evaluations, unless we adopt the optimistic and 
somewhat naïve assumption that peer review consistently reveals the 
‘truth’ about research quality, in which case there is no need to study 
bias in peer review. 
 Two of the categories of bias lined out in Table 2.5 have been 
said to be likely to be defined as bias according to idealism (category 
C and D), while all four categories must be said to be bias according 
to realism. The category least likely to be defined as bias according to 
idealism (category A) has been found to be the one most easily 
subjected to research. Idealism therefore complicates the study of bias 
by making the most ‘researchable’ category less important. As 
mentioned above, the ‘dynamic’ concept of research quality and lack 
of pre-set standards implied by idealism in itself complicates the study 
of bias. Idealism, with the view that peer review is part of a continu-
ous  process  defining  quality,  also  implies  that  low  inter-reviewer  
consensus on an evaluation panel is no indication of low validity of 
the assessments. In fact, lack of consensus may indicate that the panel 
as a whole is highly competent to make valid assessments because the 
panel represents a large scope of the various views on what is good 
and valuable research (see Harnad 1985). In this view, the evaluation 
process may be a far better indicator of peer review validity than the 
outcome of the evaluation. A process based on tacit negotiations and 
compromises would probably give a far more narrow representation 
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of the reviewer’s opinions, than either a process based on open 
confrontation of the divergent views or a process based on independ-
ent reviews. The decision-making of the evaluation process is the 
topic of the next chapter. 
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3 Research evaluation as 
decision-making 
Having discussed the basis for defining good research and found an 
inherent problem in distinguishing biased from non-biased research 
evaluation, we turn to the question of possible constraints on 
decision-making. We will relate the constraints to the categories of 
bias (Table 2.5), but not deal directly with whether the constraints 
should be defined as bias or not. 
 What factors are likely to influence peer evaluators’ opinions and 
statements on research quality? We shall first discuss social conside-
rations and expectations guiding evaluation work in scientific com-
munities (3.1), and then analyse the contexts in which evaluations are 
made: the group work setting (3.2) and the constraints that the 
commissioning body (i.e. a research council) may place on the 
evaluation process (3.3). 
 
3.1 Social considerations and expectations in 
research evaluation 
The discussion on the basis and norms of peer review in Section 2.3 
concluded that peer review depends on tacit knowledge and craft 
skills. Socialisation processes renders some unity in the basis of peer 
review, as standards set (more or less explicitly) by the ‘stars’ of the 
discipline are internalised, for instance through graduate school. There 
also seems to be a common ‘language’ for peer review – a certain set 
of criteria to which reviewers (more or less explicitly) pay attention. 
Moreover, to be accepted, an evaluation at least has to appear to be 
rigorous and based on impersonal criteria of scientific merit. There are 
consequently limits as to what may be seen as acceptable evaluations. 
On the other hand, studies of peer review find low inter-reviewer 
agreement and indicate that the scope of possible outcomes of 
evaluations is rather wide. The tacit basis for assessments, the inherent 
uncertainty and controversy in scientific research and the individua-
lism in scientific culture may all impede unitarian basis and standards 
for assessments. 
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 In addition to norms of quality assessments, discussed in Section 
2.3, evaluations may also be influenced by more specifically social 
expectations and considerations. What does loyalty to the involved 
colleagues, or to the scientific community as such, require? How harsh 
can you be when writing a public evaluation report? The answer may 
depend on various kinds of norms or considerations.  
 The evaluator may consider the possible undesired effects his/her 
conclusions may have on the evaluees. Such tactical considerations and guards 
to avoid unwanted effects on the evaluees, may for instance be due to 
provisions not to play into the hands of opponents of the evaluees 
(e.g. make sure not to be involved in any political mission to 
obliterate the evaluees), or general considerations about how public 
criticism may endanger the working conditions of the evaluees 
(reputation and funds, see bias of Category B in Table 2.5).66 Other 
kinds of tactical considerations are those dealing with effects or sanctions on 
the evaluator (bias of Category D in Table 2.5). Such considerations may 
include avoiding unpleasant reactions/sanctions from the evaluees, 
from other colleagues, or from the commissioning body. An evaluator 
stating his/her opinions frankly might provoke the involved evaluees 
being the evaluator’s enemies for life. Not pointing out obvious 
weaknesses, on the other hand, might discredit the evaluator in the 
views of both the commissioning body and the research community. 
Thus, there are two diverging considerations to take into account. 
 Adherence to social expectations may not involve any specific 
tactical considerations at all. The strongest social norms are those 
which are internalised and with which people comply for no other 
reason than that they simply prescribe ‘the way things are done’. 
Evaluators may avoid harsh statements or any kind of overt negative 
criticism, simply because using harsh statements or distributing overt, 
negative criticism would be contrary to the evaluator’s own ethos. 
He/she would feel uncomfortable contributing to such criticism 
(‘internal sanctions’).67 
 Social groups invoke restrictions on the behaviour of their 
members, and the reasons for complying to the norms of a group may 
vary. The rest of this section focuses on the constrains on a peer 
evaluator due to identity with a scholarly group (community or 
paradigm), as – due to his/her socialisation – the identity with this 
group is more likely to yield internalised and ‘solid’ norms, than the 
relation to the commissioning body or the evaluees as such. What 
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would be the norms of a peer group, reasons to comply with such 
norms, and the effects on research evaluation?  
 Certain rules (mostly unwritten and maybe unspoken) must be 
obeyed to remain member of a group. Group membership is impor-
tant to most people. We normally do not like to stand alone, having 
no-one that shares our opinions and values (Mullen & Goethals 1987; 
Lysgaard 1961/1985). It may take time and resources to gain member-
ship of a group – especially the most prestigious and influential 
groups of the scientific community – and having been defined an 
insider in one group one is likely to be automatically defined as an 
outsider by certain other groups. If one is a member of a scholarly 
community complying to a specific paradigm, there are at least two 
different sets of reasons for not giving up the membership easily. 
Firstly, there is the identity and loyalty attached to the membership. 
Secondly, there is the talent and career invested in this community/-
paradigm, and the costs related to the process of gaining membership 
in a new community/paradigm. Scholars then, have various reasons 
for being loyal to their scientific community and paradigm, in addition 
to the group identity internalised through socialisation (Kuhn 
1962/1970).68 
 What kind of effects may such loyalty and group identity have on 
the evaluation of research? As mentioned, several studies of peer 
review find a low degree of inter-reviewer agreement. The three 
studies dealt with in Chapter 2 conclude that the lack of consensus is 
due to divergent professional platforms (Category A bias). Such 
findings indicate that ‘school’/scholarly viewpoint or identity is one of the main bases 
of peer review. Divergent bases for assessments on a review panel need 
not be explicit. Controversies within disciplines resulting in divergent 
opinions on research quality and relevance, may be tacit. A situation 
of tacit controversies is open to ambiguous or double identities – a 
kind of context giving incentives to deliberately avoiding confrontation 
and consequently reinforcing the tacitness of controversy. In such a 
context we may expect strong norms against overt criticism of both members 
of own or other paradigms or research communities. 
 In Section 3.2 we discuss group effects in the more narrow and ad 
hoc context of the expert panel evaluation. 
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3.2 Research evaluation as group decisions 
Panels are set to solve problems for various reasons of which 
representational reasons and efficiency reasons may be seen as major 
categories. A panel may be representative regarding the competencies 
needed to solve the problem and/or regarding the parties to the 
problem. Representation of competencies is aimed at the quality of the 
result. The idea is that the group will reach a better solution if 
competencies on all subjects relevant to the problem are represented 
on the panel. Representation of interests is aimed at the acceptability 
of the result. A broad interest representation on the panel is seen as a 
means to reaching a solution acceptable to all parties.69 
 The efficiency reasons for group work may not be as obvious as the 
representational reasons. The overall idea of group work when it 
comes to efficiency is that group work in some way yields a better 
result than individual work with the same resources. This may either 
be because group interaction generally increases the quality of the 
work or because it reduces the costs (time and other resources 
required). In the first case it is expected that group interaction yields 
better results than individual work, i.e., the sum of the work of the 
same persons working individually. In the second case it is expected 
that group work yields some sort of co-ordination profit. This may be 
that group work makes the most of secretarial/support services, or that 
groups work faster, e.g., having five separate reviewers would take 
more support resources and/or more time than having a group of five 
reviewers. In both cases (group work increases the quality or reduces 
the costs) a group of for instance five would be expected to work 
more efficiently than the five persons separately. However, such 
benefits are not obvious. It might be that group interaction impair the 
quality of the result (e.g. ‘groupthink’, see Section 3.2.1) or that the co-
ordination of panel work demands more resources than individual 
work (e.g. meeting costs). There are therefore no unambiguous 
reasons to organise panels from this cost/benefit point of view.70 
 Seeing efficiency in relation to representation it should be added 
that both representation of competencies and representation of 
interests may work against efficiency. Having opposing interests or 
competing competencies/scholarly viewpoints represented on a panel 
set to solve a problem (i.e. agreeing on a conclusion) may incapacitate 
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the group. Conflicts on vital questions may lead to a deadlock of 
endless debates. 
 Summing up so far, reasons for appointing a group to solve a 
problem may be that the group interaction itself is expected to give a 
better result than individual work, representation of various compe-
tencies is expected to give a better solution, or representation of 
interests is expected to give a more acceptable solution.71 At the other 
hand, the group level is one source of possible bias.72 In what way a 
group does a better job or comes to different conclusions than the 
same persons would have individually, depends on the decision rules, 
the constellation of interests and the group dynamics – all discussed 
below. 
3.2.1 Group effects73 
The kind of group effects that organisers hope for when appointing 
panels to solve problems is of course that the group in some way is 
more than the sum of the participants; that the interaction itself has qualities 
that enhances the review.74 This may be that the participants gain mutual 
insight through discussions, or simply that group interaction offers a 
situation where more information and a larger spectrum of ideas are 
considered by each member of the group. 
 Another possible effect of group work is that each member of the 
group strives harder to perform than he/she would have done working 
alone (Bozeman 1993:88). Translated to a peer review context, this is 
the situation where peers motivate each other to do a ‘good’ job – 
they are each others’ ‘supervisors’, each others’ ‘heroes’ to impress. In 
one extreme case such pressure to perform may end in a ‘slaughter’ of 
the work submitted for review. The evaluators ‘may compete with one 
another to identify the most flaws, mistakes or problems, either real or 
perceived’ (Bozeman 1993:89). This is like the context for appraising 
doctoral dissertations; the examiners are judged by their peers through 
their ability to find and communicate any possible flaws or 
weaknesses of the dissertation. In this case a likely result of panel 
work, compared to individual work, is a more profound/rigorous 
review, and lower ratings of the research under review.75 
 Group work may also yield the opposite effect. The shared 
responsibility for executing the task may yield a situation where no 
one performs – a situation of collective shirking.76 Shared responsibility 
 
 75
then means no responsibility. In this case the result of panel work, 
compared to individual work, would be perfunctory review. 
 Yet another possible group effect is groupthink which may be seen 
as the opposite of the good interaction that organisers of panel work 
hope for. ‘Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, 
reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group 
pressures’ (Janis 1982:9). Loyalty to the group ‘requires each member 
to avoid raising controversial issues, questioning weak arguments, or 
calling a halt to soft-headed thinking’ (ibid.:12). Groupthink may also 
be seen as ‘mental shirking’. Working in a group composed of highly 
qualified persons makes one feel confident of the quality of the work, 
and one may not strive as hard to detect possible flaws or weaknesses 
of the conclusions as one might if being charged with sole 
responsibility. Such an effect may occur on peer review groups as far 
as there is overlapping competence. 
 Another kind of groupthink relevant for review groups is the 
tendency to suppress minority opinions and arrive at a false consen-
sus. One obvious reason for this tendency is that internal conflicts 
reduce the group’s total efficiency and power, a situation the group 
tries to avoid (Hernes 1978:126). Going deeper into the social 
psychology of groupthink, the pressures towards uniformity in groups 
are explained by a drive for self-validation, i.e. a wish to establish that 
one’s opinions are correct (Goethals & Darley 1987). Such a drive for 
self-validation may bias the interpretation of information in various 
ways, overestimating the degree of consensus in the group: group 
members disregard each other’s objections, or they self-sensor 
opinions they fear wont be validated, and the others assume that 
silence means consent. We have a false consensus or an ‘illusion of 
unanimity’ (see Janis 1982:175). Self-censorship might also be more 
fundamental and impair critical thinking in a way resulting in ‘actual 
consensus’. In this case, the members of the group censor what they 
think, not necessarily what they say.77 
3.2.2 What kind of factors would promote the various kinds of 
group effects? 
In the previous section, four possible group effects were outlined: (1) 
the interaction has qualities that enhances the review work (more 
ideas/information are considered by each member, or the group 
members gain new insights through dialogue), (2) the group members 
 76 
try to impress each other and therefore work harder (or appear 
tougher) than when working alone, (3) shared responsibility results in 
collective shirking, or (4) pressures towards uniformity/groupthink. 
This section briefly discusses the contextual conditions of the four 
mentioned group effects. 
 Some contexts yield more opportunities or incentives for specific 
group effects than others do. For instance a low degree of task 
division in a ‘flat’ structure gives better opportunities for shirking than 
formal and explicit task division in a hierarchically organised group. A 
peer group that is homogeneous regarding research field and 
paradigm, but heterogeneous regarding academic status (for example 
containing both eminent full professors and more unknown/young 
researchers) may give raise to a situation where the ‘unknowns’ strive 
hard to perform, i.e. to impress the senior members of the group. A 
homogeneous group exposed to high external pressure, perceiving 
their task as difficult, may be a very easy victim of groupthink (Janis 
1982). We may expect an ‘especially fortunately’ composed group 
(e.g. homogeneous enough to really take each other points, but 
heterogeneous enough to have diverse background information and 
ideas) in an ‘especially fortunate’ setting (e.g. enthusiasm and 
confidence; the group has an interesting task with no ‘delicate’ 
implications), to result in fruitful dialogue. 
 Consequently, it is possible to imagine some rule of thumb of 
organising for desired group effects, though such ‘rules’ cannot be 
unambiguous. Take for instance the case of trying to avoid shirking 
and motivating the group members to supervise and impress each 
other. Division of tasks may prevent the tendency of shirking. Yet, if 
competence is not overlapping (in which we have the ‘natural case’ 
for division of tasks), the panel members cannot really value each 
other performances and have no particular incentives to try to impress 
their co-panellists. To make all members supervise and impress each 
other, a homogeneous and ‘flat’ structured group would be preferable. 
If the task is not of a kind making the group members compete, 
however, this might be the perfect context for shirking. The group 
members have shared competence and shared responsibilities and 
may therefore all try to avoid the work, if individual effort entails no 
‘profit’. 
 Similar problems may arise when trying to prepare for a ‘fruitful’ 
dialogue and avoiding groupthink. A relatively homogeneous group, 
with an open-ended problem to solve, and no strict division of tasks, 
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may be a good structure for creative work/good discussions (i.e., new 
insights through dialogue/more information and ideas considered by 
each person). Yet, such a structure provides no guards against 
groupthink.  
 Janis finds that ‘a group whose members have properly defined 
roles, with traditions and standard operating procedures that facilitate 
critical inquiry, is probably capable of making better decisions than 
any individual in the group who works on the problem alone’ (Janis 
1982:12). According to Janis the problem is that ‘the advantages of 
having decisions made by groups are often lost because of psycho-
logical pressures that arise when the members work closely together, 
share the same values, and above all face a crisis situation in which 
everyone is subjected to stresses that generate a strong need for 
affiliation’ (loc. cit.).  
 The stress factor that generates a need for affiliation may be highly 
relevant for expert panel evaluation. The evaluation task might put the 
peer evaluators in quite a ‘delicate’ situation. The scientific community 
to which the peers belong is likely to have high standards for review 
work, standards that the commissioners of the evaluation (for example 
a research council) expect them to live up to. At the same time the 
evaluation is expected to be an instrument of national research policy, 
but the reviewers do not know in what way the evaluation report 
might be used. In such a situation reviewers might be reluctant to 
keep high standards of impartial and rigorous review. They might 
conclude that the more vague and less criticising the review is, the 
better for their peers and the better for themselves (Larsen 1985). They 
are trapped between parties with conflicting expectations to the work, 
parties they are all expected to serve – the commissioning body and 
other potential national users of the report, the evaluees, the potential 
intra- and extra-scientific users of the work under review, and the 
research community as such. The best way to solve the task may be to 
make as little out of it as possible. 
 Another important point here is that the scope and amount of 
work to be reviewed is too large for the reviewers to live up to the 
standards of traditional peer review (see Section 1.2). Consequently 
the peer evaluators are in a situation where it is impossible to 
succeed, that is, to do what is expected of them. Their only ‘refuge’ is 
others in the same situation, their co-reviewers.  
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 In such a context, peer review panels have some characteristics 
which may expose them to groupthink – the group members are in a 
difficult situation both regarding the conflicting expectation from 
outsiders, and regarding the nature and the amount of the work. As 
their only non-controversial allies are each other – the other group 
members – the result may be a loyalty and unanimity pressure. Janis 
lists various characteristics of situations likely to lead to groupthink 
(Janis 1982:244): 
‘A. Decision-Makers Constitute a Cohesive Group 
B-1. Structural Faults of the Organization: 
1. Insulation of the Group 
2. Lack of Tradition of Impartial Leadership  
3. Lack of Norms Requiring Methodological Procedures 
4. Homogeneity of Members’ Social Background and Ideology  
  Etc. 
B-2. Provocative Situational Context: 
1. High Stress from External Threats with Low Hope of a Better Solution than the 
Leader’s 
2. Low Self-Esteem Temporarily Induced by: 
a. Recent Failures that Make Members’ Inadequacies Salient 
b. Excessive Difficulties on Current Decision-Making Tasks that Lower Each 
Member’s Sense of Self-Efficacy 
c. Moral Dilemmas: Apparent Lack of Feasible Alternatives Except Ones that 
Violate Ethical Standards 
  Etc.’ 
 
These characteristics do not feed directly into the context of peer 
review panels. Yet, seeing these characteristics in relation to the 
context described above, some are definitely relevant for the analysis 
of peer review panels. The task is difficult (B-2 2.b.) and there are 
high external pressures (B-2 1.). The difficulty of the task is related to 
a lack of methodological procedures for this kind of review (B-1 3.). 
Evaluation of institutions, programmes and entire research fields, is a 
new kind of task for which there are even less clear rules or standards 
than for more traditional peer review tasks. Those of the panel 
members who have previous experiences from similar tasks may 
perceive these experiences as failures (B-2 2.a.) – either because they 
had no effects or because they had undesired consequences.  
 The two first characteristics on Janis’ list may also follow from 
those already mentioned. The difficulty of the task and the external 
pressures yield an insulated (B-1 1.) and cohesive group (A). Insula-
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tion may also follow from the requirements to conduct an independ-
ent and impartial evaluation. 
3.2.3 Decision rules/how to handle disagreements 
Apart from group effects, the procedures for handling disagreements 
on an evaluation panel may determine in what way ‘the group level’ 
bias the outcome of an evaluation. Rules for handling disagreements 
may be more or less explicit. The explicitness of decision procedures 
may be placed on a continuum from open confrontation to sounding. 
At the confrontation end, we find explicit voting without any preced-
ing exploration of opinions – a process clearly defining winners and 
losers. At the sounding end, we find the participants tacitly feeling out 
each other’s opinions, systematic use of vagueness, avoiding the 
definition of clear alternatives, heavy emphasises on reaching 
consensus, and consequently no explicit voting (Olsen 1972). 
Confrontation and sounding may have divergent effects not only on 
the outcome of the decision. The procedures differ regarding the 
time/resources needed for decision-making and the effects on the 
participants/the decision-making body. Sounding may take far more 
time than confrontation, while confrontation may have dramatic 
consequences on the cohesiveness of the group. 
 When dissension is undesired, explicit voting or other confronta-
tion procedures are less likely. The actual decision rules of a sounding 
procedure are tacit and may therefore be hard to define. They may 
include tacit voting, tacit negotiations/bargaining/logrolling and 
discussions transforming opinions. When a group has no official 
decision rules, any group member may tacitly set the procedure, by 
just behaving as if there is a rule, for example by talking as if opinion 
A is the opinion of the group when sounding has revealed that a 
simple majority holds opinion A. (See Appendix A for definitions of 
the various kinds of tacit decision-making.) 
 An ad hoc evaluation panel will seldom adopt anything but tacit 
decision rules. Formal negotiation procedures or explicit voting rules 
are rare in such contexts. Yet, tacit rules may be decisive for the 
outcome. A situation where the participants confer to a tacit rule of 
simple majority decisions, may alter substantially from a situation 
where agreement is obtained through bargaining and logrolling, or a 
situation where the unpronounced rule is that disagreements should 
be resolved through discussions seeking to transform opinions. Such 
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major categories of procedures for handling disagreements as voting, 
bargaining and transforming opinions may be combined, e.g. voting 
may be preceded by logrolling votes or discussions partly transforming 
opinions (Langfeldt 1998). 
 It should be noted that there is no direct relation between the 
explicitness of the decision-making processes and the room for 
transforming opinions. Transformed opinions may be obtained by 
open confrontation and discussions of the different points of view, or 
without confronting the different points of view. An example of the 
last case would be a process where all participants contribute with 
pros and cons for a set of alternatives without stating their points of 
view in advance of the discussion. 
 Moreover, the characteristics of negotiations may be placed on a 
scale from strictly co-operative negotiations (‘the parties entertain a serious 
preference for joint problem-solving aimed at an efficient and fair 
outcome’ and ‘are completely attentive and open’) to pure bargaining/tug-
of-war (‘brinkmanship or attempts at attrition are predominant’ and ‘the 
possibility of commitment is exploited fully’) (Midgaard 1976). This 
important dimension of decision-making should not be confused with 
the confrontation-sounding dimension dealt with above. The 
confrontation-sounding dimension concerns the explicitness of the 
decision procedures, while the other dimension is related to the 
means by which the parties further their interests and their openness 
for changing their opinions.  
 In general, the dialogue in expert panels evaluating research can 
be expected to be more at the co-operative negotiation side than at 
the pure bargaining side of the scale. However, the degree of 
attentiveness and openness for changing opinions will vary, and 
panels may often reach a point where there is no room for (more) 
transformation of opinions, but they still have to reach a conclusion. 
The discussion in the following section focuses on possible solutions 
to such situations in different kinds of contexts.  
3.2.4 Decision games and the group members’ influence on the 
outcome 
Given that at least a part of the outcome is determined by tacit 
negotiations/bargaining/logrolling or rules tacitly set by individual 
panel members, the resource and interest constellations on the 
evaluation panel may be decisive. The power of the individual panel 
members depends on their resources – their competence, the time 
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they have available for the evaluation, their personality (e.g. reticent 
versus vocal panel members) and their general rank/status on the 
evaluation panel (depending, for instance, on academic eminence). 
They may have various interests in the evaluation process, or in the 
outcome of the evaluation. Interests in the evaluation process may, for 
example, include the status resulting from being on the evaluation 
panel (i.e. being identified with the scientific elite), and exploring/-
gaining information on the evaluation object. Interests in the outcome 
of the process may include all sorts of stakes in the field being 
evaluated (personal or scientific). 
 The type and constellation of interests may be important for the 
standing and influence of a panel member. Those with the highest 
stakes in the outcome will normally be the most active in using their 
resources and therefore the most influential members. Furthermore, 
‘legitimate interests’ may give a right to influence, and/or there may be 
a norm saying that one should not use one’s power in an area where 
one has no interests (Hernes 1978:38). On the other hand, the panel 
members may have loyalties or interests that ‘devaluate’ their rank in 
the group. Special loyalties to the commissioning body, the evaluees 
or other specific groups may define a panel member as an outsider, or 
someone the other panel members should guard against.78 There may 
therefore be a substantial gap between a panel member’s will and 
ability of furthering his/her interests. Furthermore, the members’ 
interests in maintaining loyalty to the evaluation panel may hinder 
them furthering their individual opinions or interests and consequently 
reduce their influence on the outcome. 
 Interests may also be decisive for the parties bargaining power. To 
control parts of the outcome that the other party is interested in is 
essential for bargaining power. Two opposing parties on an evaluation 
panel may, for instance, barter ‘authority’: Party X lets party Y have the 
final say on the assessments of institute A, in exchange for the final 
say on the assessments of institute B. Not being interested in some-
thing the others consider decisive may offer unique bargaining power. 
If, for example, actor X is far less interested than the rest of the panel 
in avoiding dissension in the evaluation report – because actor X 
thinks his/her personal dissension in the report may in fact carry far 
more weight than the statements from the rest of the panel – actor X 
may get his/her will on all vital points against ‘giving’ nothing more 
 82 
than unanimity. (X would have more to gain and less to loose from 
standing firm. See Figure 3.2 below.) 
 The composition of the panel may result in specific constellations 
of interests that give rise to various kinds of negotiations. Simplified, 
we may imagine three different situations of two parties bargaining/-
negotiating about the content of the evaluation report, crudely 
sketched in Figure 3.1.  
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 Figure 3.1 Various possible constellations of interests on an evaluation 
panel 
A. Evaluators from different sub-disciplines or ‘schools’ with partly common 
perceptions and evaluation standards 
 
(Assurance Game)    Discipline X 
 
 
 
compromise/co-operate 
 
insist 
 
compromise/ 
co-operate 
4 
4 
3 
1 
 
Discipline Y  
insist 
1 
3 
2 
2 
 
B. Peers and non-peers (i.e. non-academic experts/users of the research) on the same 
panel: opposing interests and no taboo to disagree publicly 
 
(Prisoner’s Dilemma)    User 
 
 
 
compromise/yield 
 
insist 
 
compromise/
yield 
3 
 
3 
4 
1 
 
Researcher 
insist 
1 
4 
2 
2 
 
C. Evaluators from different sub-disciplines or ‘schools’ with strongly 
opposing perceptions and evaluation standards (taboo to disagree 
publicly) 
 
(Chicken)     Discipline X 
 
 
 
compromise/yield 
 
insist 
 
compromise/
yield 
3 
3 
4 
2 
 
Discipline Y 
insist 
2 
4 
1 
1 
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In situation A all panel members are peers, representing two different 
sub-disciplines or ‘schools’ with partly common perceptions and 
evaluation standards, realising that to get a good outcome both parties 
need to have a say. The best solutions for both parties would be that 
they both co-operate, the worst that the other party alone influences 
the outcome.79 As situation A has the structure of an Assurances Game 
there are two equilibria: that both parties obtain their best solution 
(mutual co-operation (4,4)) or that they obtain their second worst 
solution (dissension (2,2)). Mutual co-operation will be the outcome if the 
situation is open enough for both parties to realise and trust that the 
other party has the same preference structure as himself. This situation 
provides opportunity for a strictly co-operative game and what above 
has been called ‘fruitful dialogue’, i.e. that group interaction offers a 
situation where more information and a larger spectrum of ideas are 
considered by each member of the group and the participants gain 
mutual insights through discussions. Dissension will be the outcome if 
one party (let this be X) expects the other party (Y) not to prefer 
mutual co-operation to X’s unilateral co-operation, and therefore X 
commits to a non-co-operative strategy to avoid being the only co-
operative party – which is X’s worst outcome. When X is firm on a 
non-co-operative strategy, Y will also choose a non-co-operative 
strategy – realising his/her second worst outcome (dissension) instead 
of his/her worst outcome (Y’s unilateral co-operation). It is hard to 
see, however, how such a situation can arise on an evaluation panel. 
It is generally quite clear on an evaluation panel that dissension 
should be avoided and conflicting opinions may be far from explicit. 
In a situation where the actors have partly common perceptions and 
evaluation standards, and realise that to get a good outcome every-
body needs to have a say, dissension is not a likely outcome, even 
when the parties do not realise and trust that the other party has the 
same preference structure as himself. A more likely situation is some 
kind of tacit process ending in a vague evaluation report, and maybe 
including some false consensus (see groupthink above). A tacit 
process in a situation like A would mean that no opinions are 
presented as conflicting, and no alternative conclusions are discussed 
or presented. 
 In situation B there are both peers and non-peers on the panel, 
constituting two parties with opposing opinions. Both parties would 
like to determine the outcome of the evaluation on their own, and as 
neither party would lose substantial credibility if publicly disagreeing 
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with the other party, a ‘non-unanimity’ report is not an unlikely result, 
but both parties would prefer a compromise to such dissension, as 
lack of unanimity would reduce the influence of the report. ‘Insisting’ 
is the dominant strategy of both parties, and a dissension is conse-
quently the only equilibria of the game. Depending on the circum-
stances, however, other outcomes are also possible. For instance, the 
chair of the panel may very well be in a position to achieve a 
compromise which all parties accept as being better than dissension. 
Moreover, the options of the parties need not be restricted to those 
given in Figure 3.1. To simplify the discussion, ‘insist’ or ‘yield’ are 
presented as the only options in Figure3.1, but normally the panel 
members may opt for different degrees of insisting or yielding – options 
on a continuum from no yielding to full yielding. One option on this 
continuum is to yield enough to accept that the other party’s opinion 
is presented in the report without stating (written) dissent. That is, a 
report with tacit dissension – an inconsistent evaluation report 
containing the views of both parties without pointing out the 
disagreements. In a situation like B, tacit dissension may be a likely 
result as none of the parties have anything to gain from explicit 
dissension.  
 In situation C all panel members are peers, and represent two 
different sub-disciplines or ‘schools’ with strongly opposing perceptions 
and evaluation standards. Like situation B, the best solution for both 
parties would be that their own perceptions and standards dominate 
the report, but differently to situation B. The worst solution for both 
parties would be that they do not reach an agreement – peers do not 
disagree publicly.80 In this situation the party best at brinkmanship will 
win. With a tacit process in a situation like C, the first party to get the 
impression that the other party holds another view and is not willing 
to compromise, will lose. If the winning party does not perceive such 
tacit disagreement, the winner may expect the other party to agree, 
also in ensuing games, and the winner of the first game therefore has 
good chances of winning repeatedly. However, if the initial losing party 
at some later stage in the process gets the impression that there is a 
chance that the previous winner may yield in one of the following 
situations like C, and the ‘loser’ mediates his/her opposing opinions, 
the parties may be directly confronted with their opposing opinions 
and their common fear of dissension. This may also open for explicit re-
negotiations of previous ‘agreements’,81 resulting for instance in a division 
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of authority over the various conflict issues (e.g. Y gets the final say 
on discipline Y, and X his/her say on discipline X). This might also be 
organised by the chair of the panel or some other third party to the 
conflict (if the chair is not considered a third party). 
 It should be noted that the symmetrical preferences of the parties 
in Figure 3.1 are hypothetical. There are no particular reasons why 
both parties should have the same preference structure. An example 
of a game where the actors have asymmetrical preferences is sketched 
below (Figure 3.2). Here the evaluator(s) from discipline Y has 
preferences as in situation C above (Chicken), while the evaluator(s) 
from discipline X has preferences as in situation B above (Prisoner’s 
Dilemma). This implies that one party (Y) thinks that dissension is the 
worst outcome, while the other party (X) would prefer dissension to 
being the only party that yields. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Game with asymmetrical preferences 
 
       Discipline X 
 
 
 
compromise/yield 
 
insist 
 
compromise/
yield 
3 
3 
4 
2 
 
Discipline Y 
insist 
1 
4 
2 
1 
 
 
If (or rather, when) Y realises that insisting is a dominant strategy of 
X, Y will yield and the outcome is found in the upper right cell of 
Figure 3.2 – that is, X insists and Y yields, which is the only equilibria 
of the game (2,4). This game illustrates the situation mentioned above 
where actor X is far less interested than the rest of the panel in 
avoiding dissension in the evaluation report and may get his/her will 
on all vital points against ‘giving’ nothing more than unanimity. 
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3.3 Organisational constraints: the role of the 
organiser 
So far, we have discussed how panel members may act given the 
incentives put on them by norms, interest and context, but not 
explicitly how the overall design of the evaluation process influences 
such factors. In this section we discuss the role of the research council 
commissioning the evaluation in setting organisational constraints 
influencing the evaluation process and its outcome. Organisational 
constraints set the context of an evaluation. The selection of evalua-
tors/composition of the panel and the kind of research subjected to 
evaluation may for instance directly set the operating norms and 
interest and thereby the opinions stated in the report. ‘Operating 
norms and interests’ may include norms of quality, loyalty, criticism 
and conflict-solution and the scientific and personal interests getting 
access to the evaluation, norms that the commissioning body might 
not be supposed to influence. Yet, more or less willingly and con-
scientiously those defining the evaluation object and composing the 
evaluation panel are decisive for the outcome. Units commissioning 
research evaluations may, however, conceive their role quite differ-
ently: 
 (1) The research council may see its role as the ‘neutral’ organiser, 
trying not to influence the outcome of the process in any way. If the 
commissioning body does not contract away all choices concerning 
the evaluation (which of cause is also a choice), such a role is not 
feasible. The commissioning body may still be ignorant about its 
influence. The commissioning body may have no idea about the 
effects of appointing Professor X, Y and Z for making the assessments 
of institute A, or the effects of appointing Professor Y as chair of the 
panel and Ms. W as the secretary. Such effects may indeed be 
unpredictable, and it may be impossible, even with hindsight, to say 
that given the organisational constraints set by the council the 
conclusions of the evaluation report ought to have been predicted. 
The tacitness included in the evaluation of research and the social 
processes on a review panel are by nature not (fully) predictable. In 
the meaning of not foreseeing the influence of one’s choices, the 
commissioner of a research evaluation may therefore be ‘neutral’, 
though not in the meaning of not influencing the outcome. The 
research council may be ignorant, but not without influence. 
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 (2) On the other hand, the council may see its task as controlling 
the evaluation process and guaranteeing a particular kind of outcome. This may 
be possible, given that the council has enough information about the 
research being evaluated, and about the evaluation standards/criteria 
and scientific viewpoints of possible evaluators. If it is also possible to 
foresee how the evaluators will function as a group and how they will 
reach decisions, the council may in fact ‘order’ the conclusions 
wanted.82 In this case the evaluation process is symbolic. The council 
could have written the conclusions of the evaluation report itself, but 
ordered someone with more authority to write it. Yet another case of 
symbolic evaluation would be the known but unwanted influence. 
The organiser may be aware of the likely consequences of their 
choices, without seeing any feasible alternative way to organise the 
evaluation, for instance because the definition of the evaluation object 
may be a result of internal compromises or previous 
practice/standards of the council, and selecting the most eminent 
foreigners ‘available’ for the job in each area to be evaluated, may be 
the only acceptable way of picking a review panel. If the research 
council sees that this will result in an evaluation report in which they 
will not have confidence, or do not want to act upon, but just ‘have 
to’ carry out, the evaluation will be more symbolic than the previous 
case referred – the evaluation report is not even intended for use. 
(Nevertheless, the council may be forced to use it.) 
 (3) The research council may, of course, see its own role as 
neither to guarantee a particular outcome, nor to pursue a hands-off-
policy. A third, and more evident, role would be to ensure the quality and 
acceptability of the evaluation. Such a task may for instance include 
ensuring that the most qualified evaluators are appointed, that all 
relevant scholarly viewpoints are represented on the evaluation panel, 
and trying to avoid obvious or unacceptable bias and undesired group 
effects. Furthermore, more detailed means, like a detailed mandate – 
including specifications of methods and criteria – or instructions on 
the division of task between the panel members, may serve to execute 
procedural control. By sticking to procedural objectives, the council 
may avoid directly influencing the direction of the conclusions of the 
report. However, such procedural influence may be a disguised way 
of pursuing a particular outcome. The distinction between influencing 
the content of an evaluation report on the one hand, and the quality 
and acceptability of the outcome, on the other hand, may in fact be 
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impossible to line up, as the quality and acceptability of an evaluation 
report are supposed to depend on its content.83  
 We stated in Section 3.2 that a major reason for setting down 
evaluation panels and not single evaluators, is that the interaction of 
the group is supposed to enhance the quality of the evaluation. At the 
end of Chapter 2 we stated that idealism implies that an evaluation 
panel should have broad representation of the various scholarly 
viewpoints in the field under review, and that open confrontations 
securing all ‘authoritative’ viewpoints a say in the conclusions are 
better than tacit negotiations and compromises that give a more 
narrow representation of the opinions on the panel. The latter kind of 
process may lead to a vague outcome expressing no ones opinion, or 
even to a false consensus. From this point of view, that game situation 
presented above (Section 3.2.4) which best promotes good panel 
work is situation A with a mutual co-operation outcome. In situation A 
the parties are close enough to each other to have a common basis for 
discussion, and they also realise that to get a good outcome both 
parties need to have a say, and there are consequently good condi-
tions for entering into a fruitful dialogue.  
 To make such a situation possible (or even likely) the 
commissioning body may adopt various organisational means. First, to 
get the assurance game of situation A, the composition of the panel is 
decisive. The panel members need to have partly common percep-
tions and evaluation standards as a basis for dialogue. Moreover, the 
subject of evaluation in itself should not provoke conflicts which are 
incapable of being resolved. A panel set to rank or compare work 
within various conflicting scholarly traditions is not very likely to find 
themselves in situation A, if they do not all adhere to the same 
‘tradition’ (in which case the evaluation is very unlikely to be accepted 
within the opposing traditions).84 
 Finally, to arrive at a mutual co-operation outcome and fruitful 
dialogue in situation A – and not a dissension resulting from a 
misunderstanding of the ‘opponents’ preferences – the co-ordination 
of the panel work, the time available for discussions and collaborative 
work may be decisive. 
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3.4 Central factors to be analysed  
This section sums up the chapter, by placing the various factors in a 
scheme of analysis (Table 3.1). The scheme gives an overview of 
organisational constraints which may affect the work of an evaluation 
panel (column 1), of various ways an evaluation panel may approach 
its tasks (column 2), and of possible characteristics of an evaluation 
report (column 3). The underlying idea is that there are some more or 
less clear links between the initial planning or design/organisation of 
an evaluation, the way it is executed, and the result85 of the process. 
Moreover, it is a point of departure that the kind of ‘optimistic realism’ 
referred in Chapter 2 does not apply to research evaluation processes. 
Research evaluation processes are more complex than a situation 
where reviewers simply ‘see’ the one and only correct conclusion to 
the questions asked by the commissioner of the evaluation. 
 For instance, the scope of the work/evaluation material and 
constraints on time and resources influence the possible thoroughness 
of the review work and the likely level of the assessments. A compre-
hensive evaluation object and limited time and resources set clear 
limits to the thoroughness and level of assessments (unit of analysis) 
the evaluation panel may adopt. 
 Another example is that when disciplines have different cultures 
for review work and emphasise different aspects or criteria when 
evaluating research, the kind of research being subjected to evaluation 
may, for instance, directly affect both the approach (method and 
thoroughness) of the evaluation panel, the criteria adopted, the 
report’s emphasis on descriptions, explanations and assessments, and 
how vague the conclusions are. Some fields may have rather explicit 
standards and a tradition of ranking/comparison, while other fields 
may have tacit standards and a tradition of descriptive or explanatory 
evaluation reports. 
 Moreover, the composition of the evaluation panel is likely to 
influence the division of tasks between its members, group effects, 
disagreements on the panel and how they are handled, all of which 
may influence the conclusions in one way or the other. For instance, a 
homogenous group with no official leader may give a ‘flat’ structure 
with ample room for shirking. A group of evaluators with incentives to 
impress one another, on the other hand, may give a very hard-
working group (and might ‘slaughter’ the evaluees). A group of 
evaluators with partly common standards in a setting of enthusiasm 
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and confidence may produce a fruitful dialogue, while homogenous 
groups exposed to a difficult task and external pressure may easily be 
exposed to groupthink. Ensuring specific group effects may be hard 
however, as explained in Section 3.2. 
 It should be noted that the scheme is open and tentative, and 
aims at an explorative study (see Chapter 1). 
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Table 3.1 Scheme for analysing research evaluation as decision-
making 
Organisational 
constraints set by the 
research council 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching 
their task 
The contents of the 
report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
One or more 
Institutions 
Programmes 
Fields 
 
Kind of research: 
Basic/applied 
Natural sciences 
Humanities 
Social sciences 
Multidisciplinary 
 
Mandate: 
Are focus, methods and 
criteria specified? 
 
Constraints on time and 
resources. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Peers/non-peers 
The coverage of various 
areas and paradigms 
 
The reviewers’ constraints 
and dispositions: 
competence,  
obligations, friends,  
research interests, 
likes and dislikes. 
 
Signals given concerning 
the planned use of the 
report. 
 
 
Methods: 
Reviewing publications. 
Questionnaires to the 
evaluees. 
Ordering statistics on input 
and/or output indicators. 
Site visits/interviews. 
 
Rigorous or superficial 
reviewing? 
 
Division of tasks between 
panel members or common 
group discussions, writing, 
editing? 
 
 
If disagreements on the 
panel: 
Transforming opinions 
Voting (tacit or explicit) 
Bargaining/logrolling 
(confrontation or tacit 
compromises) 
 
Group effects: 
Work harder 
Shirking 
Fruitful dialogue 
Groupthink 
 
The emphasis on: 
Describing 
Explaining 
Assessing 
 
Level of the assessments: 
The individual researcher 
The research group 
The institution 
The community 
The network 
 
Direct or indirect 
assessments: 
Based on the evaluators’ 
own views or assessments 
made by others? 
 
Criteria: 
input, output, 
quality, productivity, 
reputation, 
relevance (for the research 
community or for 
society/specific user  
groups). 
 
Conclusions: 
Vague or sharp. 
Appraising or criticising. 
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4 Six ad hoc panels evaluating 
research in Norway 
In this chapter the six evaluation processes under study are presented. 
For each case the background to the evaluation, the terms of reference 
(mandate) for the evaluation and the selection of evaluators, evalua-
tion work and strategies, the basis and criteria for assessments, the 
decision-making of the panel, as well as the reactions to the evalua-
tion report, are described. At the end of Section 5.4 there is a table for 
each of the cases summarising the central factors.  
 
4.1 Peer evaluation of research fields within 
the natural sciences 
4.1.1 Background 
The evaluations studied for this dissertation were part of various 
evaluation policies. In the first case, an evaluation of four natural 
science sub-fields, the initiative was part of an evaluation plan of the 
former Council for Natural Science Research adopted in the mid-
eighties. This evaluation policy was a modification of an evaluation 
model already adopted in Sweden for natural science fields, using 
international peer panels to assess fields and make policy recommen-
dations to the research council. 
 In the files of the Research Council a 3-level purpose for the 
evaluation in question is mentioned: The research groups would have 
attention drawn to their results, the Research Council should get 
guidelines for policies and priorities, and national authorities should 
have control and documentation of public spending. There is no 
official statement as to why the four sub-fields were selected for 
evaluation. One informant from the Research Council thought the 
objective was to put the relative status and value (intra-scientific) of 
the sub-fields on the agenda. However, this was not perceived by the 
panel members. They seemed to perceive the selected sub-fields as 
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just a natural unit for evaluation, and their mandate said nothing about 
comparing sub-fields. 
4.1.2 The selection of evaluators  
The research institutions involved in the four sub-fields (mainly 
university departments) were consulted about the composition of the 
evaluation panel. The Research Council asked the concerned institu-
tions for their opinions on suitable evaluators. Each institution was 
asked to propose two foreign researchers as panel members. The 
Council itself made the selection among the proposed candidates. The 
result was a group of six foreign scientists, representing the separate 
research fields to be evaluated, but also having general evaluation 
competence in the overall discipline of the four sub-fields:86 
 Professor Bowman was mainly involved in sub-field A. He had a close 
colleague in Norway, but had never visited Norway before. 
 Professor Bergström was a Swedish scientist with extensive connections 
to Norway and a good overview of the Norwegian research 
community in his area which included mainly sub-field B. 
 Professor Carvin was a scientist whose research area (B) was close to 
that of Professor Bergström’s, who was also an old colleague of his. 
He took special interest in Scandinavian research and knew about a 
dozen Norwegian researchers, and took a particular interest in the 
research of one of these, a person he had also visited in Norway. 
 Professor Eckard did research within area a of sub-field C87 and had 
some prior connections to the Norwegian research community 
through people he had met at international conferences. 
 Professor Oswald did research on area b of sub-field C. He had some 
personal contacts in Norway and had visited Norway several times. 
 Dr. Philips was a scientist whose main research interest was sub-
field D. He also had several personal research contacts in Norway. 
 All the panel members, except Philips, had been involved in 
similar evaluations before. As co-ordinator of the panel, the council 
appointed a Norwegian scientist who was not involved in the fields 
subject to evaluation. An executive officer of the Research Council’s 
secretariat and a doctoral student served as secretaries for the panel. 
4.1.3 The terms of reference  
The mandate given to the panel followed the mandate for the 
previous evaluations of science fields in Norway and asked for an 
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assessment of the scientific quality of the activity of the Norwegians 
groups in the field during the last decade, seen in an international 
context and taking available resources into account. The panel was 
also asked to comment on methods, give priority proposals and to 
review the Research Council’s role in developing the field. 
4.1.4 The evaluation work 
The Research Council asked all the research groups in the field to 
provide specific material on their activity. This material was forwarded 
as a package to the panel members. The package included a publica-
tion list for the last 10 years, reprints of representative articles and 
reports, reports on past activities and future plans, surveys of available 
resources and the groups’ self-assessments of their resources. 
 The panel met in Norway and visited all the departments and 
groups to be evaluated within 8 days. The days were used to talk with 
the evaluees, the evenings to discussions within the evaluation panel 
and writing drafts for the report. A division of tasks according to 
specialities was set by the Research Council by the selection of experts 
to the panel. As Philips put it: ‘I think [the division of tasks] became 
clear to the group … before we met. I am sure I had a letter telling 
me who the other members of the group were, and you know their 
names and you know what their specialities were.’  
 In fact, the panel members received a letter containing more direct 
information on the division of tasks than Philips, or any of the other 
evaluators, remembered while talking to me 4–6 years later. In a letter 
to the panel members, the Research Council explicitly points out the 
specific fields of responsibility for each of the panel members. They 
were sent publications for reviewing from a broader field than 
indicated here. The three evaluators from sub-fields A and B were sent 
all papers dealing with A and B and the three evaluators of sub-fields 
C and D were sent all papers dealing with C and D. At times, while in 
Norway, the three A-B experts and the three C-D experts of the panel 
were also divided in two separate working groups. 
 The Norwegian co-ordinator of the panel had purely administra-
tive tasks and did not take part in the assessments. Much of the report 
was written during the site visits in Norway. Each panel member pre-
pared statements on the research groups closest to his own speciali-
ties. Commenting on and discussions of these drafts were to a certain 
degree limited to the two sub-groups of A-B experts and C-D experts. 
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The panel did not meet again after the site visits, and the co-ordinator, 
with the help of two secretaries, was responsible for putting the report 
together, circulating it to the panel members and making the final 
changes on basis of their comments. 
4.1.5 The basis and criteria for the assessments 
When the panel members were interviewed about five88 years after the 
site visits, they were presented a list of possible criteria for evaluating 
research (see Chapter 5). Commenting on this list, Bergström, 
Bowman, Eckard and Oswald all mentioned profundity and originality 
as central criteria for evaluating scientific work. Bergström said: 
‘According to my view, one should never compromise when evaluating. One should 
always require the best possible international results. Originality, profundity, that is 
what is most important.’ 
When asked about whether any special criteria were used for the 
evaluation in question, Bergström said that for the kind of institutional 
evaluation the panel did, one would adopt a broader perspective, a 
perspective in which: ‘the relation between organisation, resource 
input, scientific quality and scientific output, is extremely important’. 
 Eckard said that correctness and profundity were the key criteria 
for evaluating research. Originality also rated high, he said, but he was 
also willing to let a high score on for instance the quantity of the 
research production, compensate for a ‘certain lack of innovation’. 
When asked about the importance of extra-scientific relevance he 
elaborated on how he thought a high score on one criterion might 
substitute for a low score on another: 
‘I would say that everything that really brings us a good step forward in understanding 
the problems of life, I would rate as important and as valuable. If something is 
expensive and not applicable and also along rather uninteresting routine lines, everybody 
would have known.. would have expected that anyway from the data already available. 
Then I would say, well here we have a deficit. So, I think there is not a single criterion. 
You would have to reach multi-sided evaluations, if you wanted to be fair.’ 
Oswald was less willing to do this sort of trading between criteria. 
After stressing the importance of correctness and profundity, he said: 
‘[T]he researcher who is very careful, or in other words very correct, needs much longer 
time than one who is not so correct, I would prefer the first one. But in our system, and 
also in yours, you have to produce a certain quantity and the conflict situation is that 
the higher the quantity is, the less the quality must be, because complex studies need 
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time. So, from my point of view, I prefer one publication a year which is really a very 
good one; brings new information, is absolutely correct and has strong profundity.’ 
Commenting on intra-scientific relevance he said: 
‘In the case of [sub-field C] and [my area], I prefer those papers which [deal] with very 
correctness with new organisms which were not known before. I dislike such publications 
which are only dealing with [classifying already known organisms]. This is not what I 
consider an important contribution.’ 
Carvin stressed intra-scientific relevance as his main evaluation 
criterion. When evaluating a paper, he was most concerned with 
whether it addressed an interesting problem, but to be of good quality 
the research also needed to be well done (i.e. ‘pure scientific criteria’) 
and yield interesting results, he said. He had clear opinions of what 
counted as interesting problems: 
‘[L]ots of studies are simply ... descriptive studies, which aren’t terribly interesting, and 
the other ones ... are more experimental, [which] I think, are more interesting and more 
insightful. So, you can just get simple divisions like that, you know. And then look at 
some of the groups in Norway, particularly, and say look, well these people are basically 
doing descriptive [B-work] the same sort which was going on 50 years ago. And you 
know, is this really modern [B-work]?’ 
Like Bergström, Carvin and Philips also made a distinction between 
the sheer evaluation of papers and the more encompassing evaluation 
of a field or a department. When evaluating a whole research field, 
Carvin said, one would also be occupied with other aspects of the 
research, aspects he saw as ‘coming from a whole other side’ than the 
quality of a paper: 
‘[T]his is a balanced judgement that comes down to sort of people, the facilities they 
have available to them, students available to them, or how the university treats them. 
You know, the structures of everything. You can have the greatest genius in Norway 
and [if] he or she isn’t given adequate structural support, so to speak, they won’t get 
anything done.’ 
Philips put this differently. He said that intra-scientific relevance and 
sound methods were the main criteria for evaluating papers, but when 
evaluating the work of a department he would emphasise the 
achievement and motivation of the researchers, the space for social 
and intellectual interaction in the department and to what degree the 
faculty completed and published their work. This view leaves room 
for a ‘harder’ evaluation than Bergström and Carvin argued for, 
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assessing the characteristics of a department separately, and not just 
taking the resources into consideration when assessing research 
output. 
 The panel did not discuss which evaluation criteria to adopt. 
Carvin said that such discussions are very seldom, because one seems 
to assume that everybody uses the same rules as oneself. However, he 
did not think that all the other panel members used the same criteria 
as he did. He suspected, for instance, that Eckard and Oswald might 
grade certain types of papers far better than he would, saying that 
some rather descriptive ‘C-D’-papers that he would rate 1 on a scale 
from 1 to 10, they would probably rate 5. He also thought that 
Bowman might put emphasis on the volume of papers published by a 
department, while he (himself) would not be impressed by the 
volume of papers unless they dealt with some interesting questions.  
 The way Bowman expressed his views indicated that the disagree-
ment between Carvin and Bowman was not a question of quantity as 
a criterion for evaluation, but rather a question of what are important 
and interesting research subjects. While Carvin stressed that he would 
not give a paper a favourable evaluation unless it addressed a 
problem he found interesting, Bowman emphasised cumulativity, a 
linkup with general questions, and profundity as central criteria, and 
stressed that something that is seen as irrelevant in current terms might 
prove to be extremely important. 
 While there seems to have been little if any discussion at all about 
the criteria for evaluating the papers, there were discussions about 
more departmental criteria, like group size, equipment and teaching 
loads. In addition there were some discussions about the use of 
citation indexes, as the Research Council had provided some citation 
and publication analyses which was to be included in the evaluation 
report. Bowman, Carvin, Eckard and Oswald seemed to think that 
citation analysis should not have been included in the report because 
there are so many flaws in citation analysis that they can give a 
completely false picture of reality. Bergström and Philips were also 
sceptical to such analysis because of possible pitfalls and biases, but 
thought that they might still provide some useful information. No one 
seems to have protested against the inclusion of bibliometrics. On the 
contrary, at least one of those who was most sceptical to such analysis 
in general, Carvin, explicitly praised the bibliometric appendix while 
commenting on the preliminary report: ‘Most useful to have this 
included in the report’, he wrote about the bibliometric appendix. 
 
 99
4.1.6 Evaluation strategies 
Four of the interviewees from the panel talked explicitly about the 
politics of writing evaluations of research institutions. Bergström, 
Bowman and Eckard emphasised that one should try to offer an 
evaluation that would serve the institution – to point out the positive 
sides and be very careful with negative assessments. The idea is to 
help the groups to develop and not cause trouble for individuals. 
These three all seemed to agree on such a ‘soft’ strategy, but they 
expressed various degrees of ‘softness’. Eckard said that the idea of 
evaluation is to stimulate good research by linking financing to 
research quality. Bowman stressed that there was too little Norwegian 
research in the field and too few institutions to neglect supporting any 
of them. 
 Carvin on the other hand, emphasised that an evaluation report 
demanding increased support to everybody would not be acted upon 
by the Research Council: 
‘I think, we felt it in general, that the sort of recommendations that simply said: we 
want more money for this and more money for this and more money for this, was just 
going to kind of fall on deaf ears. So, it was better to structure things that minimised 
the just demands for more money kind of question, without sort of losing it all together.’ 
Carvin doubted the effects of these kinds of evaluation reports in 
terms of the Research Council really enacting their recommendations, 
but he still thought they had several useful functions. These evalua-
tions give the Research Council information about the problems in the 
field and they are a channel for the researchers to inform the Council 
about their problems (in terms of scarce resources). In addition the 
evaluations signal to the researchers that the Council cares about how 
they spend their money and intends to check this regularly. Summing 
up Carvin said: 
‘And so it keeps the whole circle going, which I think is essential for good science, that 
the administrators, if you like, the higher-ups, really have some contact with what is 
going on down there, and what the problems are.’ 
When composing the report, the panel included the names of the best 
researchers in the assessments, but did not mention names of any of 
the other researchers.89 When asked why this strategy was chosen, 
Carvin answered that he could not remember how the decision was 
taken, but that he would have supported such a strategy because it 
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allowed the panel to point out who was doing the good research 
instead of evaluating the departments as units, which in his opinion 
would not make sense. He explained the omittance of negative 
assessments on individuals by saying that it would probably not be 
acceptable to ‘run down people’ in Scandinavia. ‘So, we would praise 
the good, but ignore the bad’, he said. 
 Bowman had a different account of why the panel did not 
distribute negative criticism to individuals. First he said: ‘I think in 
truth we didn’t find any that were bad’. Then he said: ‘It isn’t in 
anybody’s interest to say: Let us wipe out this particular group and 
have nobody in that particular area doing what they were doing. … 
We tried to offer an appraisal that would serve the institutions that 
were there – those that could improve to improve, and those that 
were doing well to continue doing so.’ 
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 Bergström had a similar explanation of why the report only 
mentions the good researchers by name: 
‘From the point of view of the research, the most important thing about evaluation is to 
prepare for the future. Though the authorities are concerned to get to know whether 
there are some things they can cut down, that is no concern of mine. ... That is their 
business. Contrary to this, I am very concerned that the research we evaluate and find to 
be good90 gets help to develop.’ 
Eckard emphasised a related aspect in his explanation of why the 
panel was careful with mentioning individuals: 
‘That [careless naming of individuals] might have produced later difficulties within the 
groups, or might have led to disadvantages for individuals, which we didn’t intend to 
do.’ 
Summing up these various explanations of why the report only 
mentioned the best researchers by name, it seems that Carvin was in 
favour of a somewhat ‘harder’ strategy than Bowman, Bergström and 
Eckard. Carvin thought that the panel at least should point out the 
good researchers because it would be meaningless to give an overall 
assessment of a department consisting of researchers doing work of 
very different quality. His reasons for not distributing negative criticism 
to individuals, seem country-dependent. Scandinavians are used to 
‘soft’ treatment, so one would have to be a bit ‘softer’ there than 
elsewhere. Bowman, Bergström and Eckard seemed more concerned 
about the possible consequences of distributing negative criticism to 
individuals, than about whether negative criticism was ‘impolite’ in 
Scandinavia or not. They were concerned that negative criticism could 
lead to worse working conditions for the researcher. To serve the 
evaluees one should avoid saying anything that could endanger their 
funding, or as Eckard put it, the evaluation report should at least not 
cause problems for individuals. 
4.1.7 The decision making of the panel 
The report is unanimous and most of the panel members claimed that 
there were no major disagreements in the overall assessments. There 
were some substantial changes in the first draft however. There was 
some back and forth as to what the recommendations for future 
research should be and the general assessments of one of the fields 
were rewritten. There were also some conflicting views about the 
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quality of the work of one of the departments within the A-B field and 
some of the C-D work as well. 
 In the files of the Research Council there is no trace of disagree-
ment within the evaluation panel, and most of the panel members did 
not recall any disagreement or did not want to talk to me about them. 
My presentation is therefore mainly based on information from the 
two panel members who did seem to speak freely on this subject, 
Bergström and Carvin, and from the secretary. The information from 
these informants offers a more substantial interpretation of the data 
available in the files than would have been possible without such oral 
sources. The written material alone, that is the preliminary drafts and 
the correspondence of the panel members during the editing of the 
report, tells the story about the changes in the drafts without indicat-
ing much about the reasons for the changes. 
 One point of disagreement was on the value of some of the 
research within the C and D sub-fields. Carvin, and to some degree 
Bergström, did not agree to all the assessments given by the C and D 
experts of the panel. Carvin put it this way: 
‘I get very tired of groups and professors who, you know, are kind of making their 
students do all of this [C work], and I think it is something that is about a hundred 
years out of date. So, we would argue about this, and I would state my radical view, 
and back down a bit, because, you know, in a sense we did have a gentlemen’s 
agreement with the [C-D experts]. I mean, whoever was sort of in charge, so to speak, 
would kind of have the most say and the others could scream and yell at them, and 
suggest modifications, but generally did not sort of veto their description of the place.’ 
Comparing the discussions of this panel to other evaluation panels he 
had been on, Carvin – noting that this panel had a much more 
heterogeneous composition than the others he had served on – said: 
‘[T]he views were so different, and you had in fact less discussions. Because you would 
basically have the kind of say: Oh, I think this and this, and I think that. But you.. 
Discrepancies were so great that you just sort of say: Oh, well I will bow to your 
judgements, in this case, because you know more about it than I do. So, I think.. Yes 
there would be an interesting kind of relationship there; when the committee is closer 
together, there is a whole lot of things you argue about – that are much more detailed, if 
you like, techniques whatever they are. Whereas when people get further apart, you have 
differences of opinion that you can’t.. I think, budge people from their view very much. I 
don’t know what the real reason is. Or you just feel you don’t know enough about it, 
you are uncomfortable with it, you think it is pure science or whatever, but you are not 
willing to kind of stand and fight a lot for it, because you are just uncomfortable, you 
don’t know enough. So, you know, I think the probably, the greatest fights in science 
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come between people who are doing exactly the same thing, or almost the same thing. 
Because only they really know the details that can be argued and discussed. At some 
point.. At least if you get further apart, you get less and less to disagree with.’ 
Bergström said that A-B experts and the C-D experts of the panel had 
different views and also different approaches to the evaluation. The C-
D experts’ assessments were quite descriptive, while the A-B experts 
were more evaluative, making firmer judgements, he said. He had the 
feeling that the C-D experts found the A-B experts’ assessments a bit 
too demanding. He did not say explicitly that he thought the C and D 
sub-fields received assessments in the report that were too kind, 
however. All of the C-D experts on the panel stressed that there were 
no major disagreements on the assessments, and said that they could 
not remember any specific comments on their drafts. 
 In addition to divergent opinions between the A-B experts and the 
C-D experts on some of the C-D research, the A and B experts also 
disagreed on the assessments and recommendations regarding some 
research within the A sub-field. Bowman wanted a more positive 
assessment and more favourable recommendations on this sub-field 
than Bergström and Carvin. The informants’ accounts on the dis-
agreements diverge. When interviewed, Bowman did not recall any 
substantial disagreements.91 Asked whether he had any comments on 
his draft on sub-field A, he did recall comments from other panel 
members and some revision of the draft. From his point of view these 
were comments helping him to recall details and write a ‘more 
complete catalogue of what the Review Committee saw and heard’ 
and he did not get the impression that anybody disagreed with his 
general judgements: 
‘I am notorious in letting details slip away. There were numerous things that 
embarrassingly were called to my attention that I then put into my report. But my 
general appraisal was pretty well accepted.’ 
Asked who were the most active participants in the group, Bowman 
mentioned Bergström, Carvin and Eckard. He especially mentioned 
that Bergström had a dominating influence as he had far more inside 
information about the Norwegian research than the rest of the panel 
members. Carvin was a central panel member as he was ‘very widely 
recognised’ in his field in Norway.  
 Each of the panel members had his field of responsibility (i.e. his 
own research field), and Bowman got the last say on the assessments 
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and recommendations regarding his field, the ‘disputed’ A sub-field. 
Bergström’s and Carvin’s accounts of the disagreement both give a 
partial explanation of the outcome. Bergström said: 
‘I sat down to write that paragraph [on this A field]92 because the kind [Bowman], he 
had difficulties finishing it, and didn’t know quite what to write. It [my version] 
became maybe a bit categorical. I simply pointed to the flaws ... But [Bowman] he 
thought, well of course much can be improved in Norway, but if you compare it to other 
countries, it is not that bad at all. And as we did not see [this sub-discipline] as that 
essential – you know, no one was willing to invest in [it] in Norway at that time ...  – 
so, [Bowman] he rewrote it, and I might have given some small comments on it, but it 
wasn’t much to bother about.’ 
Carvin could not remember anything about this paragraph, but 
rereading the report during the interview, he said that the description 
of especially one of the institutions doing research in this particular 
sub-discipline, was ‘certainly very watered down’ and written ‘very 
sympathetically’. He remembered that Bowman was rather less critical 
of people than Bergström and himself, and also that Bowman had one 
particular colleague at this site whose work he highly admired, so 
Carvin could understand Bergström’s attempt to rewrite Bowman’s 
draft in that context. He could not remember that he had participated 
in this himself, however, and trying to explain why the assessments in 
the final report were ‘not at all congruent with my memory of the 
place’, he offered some context-dependent excuses. Recalling that this 
particular site was the last one they visited and that due to a special 
dinner93 for the whole university that evening – to which the panel 
members were invited – he concluded that the panel didn’t have their 
usual evening meeting discussing the day’s site visits. This fact was 
particularly crucial for Carvin’s participation in writing the draft, as he 
left afterwards for three months’ fieldwork without any means of 
communicating with the rest of the world. When he came back and 
found the preliminary report on his desk, the evaluation work was no 
longer fresh in his memory, and he did not bother to ask for any 
changes. 
 With regard to the games discussed in Section 3.2.4, the Chicken 
Game (Figure 3.1 C) seems to best explain the outcome on this 
question. Both parties seemed to think that the best solution would be 
that their own perceptions and standards dominated the report, but 
both parties still seemed willing to yield to avoid dissension. In 
addition, the winner (Bowman) seems not to have perceived the 
controversy (until reading my draft, see note 91). If one party does not 
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perceive that there is disagreement he is likely to be the winner of a 
tacit game with the structure of Figure 3.1 C. 
4.1.8 Reactions to the report 
Some research groups have been provided with resources by referring 
to the evaluation report. The research group obtaining the best 
assessments and most positive recommendations for future priority 
within the mentioned ‘disputed’ A sub-field was not offered any 
additional resources. This provoked complaints from this group 
towards the Research Council. 
 
4.2 Mixed panel evaluation of an engineering 
research institute 
4.2.1 Background 
This evaluation had some specific reasons at the same time as it was 
part of the more or less regular evaluation activity of NTNF, the 
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. NTNF had a 
plan for ‘regular ad hoc evaluations’ of the sector institutes. Normally 
these evaluations were conducted by consultancy firms, but for the 
institute in question, which I here will name NIE, NTNF appointed a 
panel of experts in addition to a consultancy report. Documents from 
the board of NTNF say that consultancy reports had been useful for 
the institutes but that it is unclear how useful this kind of evaluation 
has been to the Council. NTNF wanted to try a ‘peer review’ approach 
to obtain experience with a broader spectrum of methods for evalua-
tion. The arguments against the consultancy reports were, firstly, that 
they were too general in their analyses of the relations between the 
Council and the institutes, and secondly, that the assessments of the 
quality of the activities of the institutes had not been at the level 
required by the Council. 
 The specific reason for evaluating this specific institute at the 
given time was that NTNF had reasons to believe that the research 
area where the institute was operating needed special attention. A 
previous evaluation of the field had raised questions about whether 
the research projects in this field were too small and pointed out the 
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lack of a total national strategy in the field. The evaluation was 
therefore meant to have consequences for the Council’s research 
policy in the field. 
 NIE was a 40-year-old institute, established by NTNF, but four 
years prior to the evaluation it had become detached from NTNF and 
was now owned by the two central industrial ‘branch’ organisations in 
its area, in addition to SINTEF, the Foundation for Scientific and 
Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology. NTNF-
sponsored projects and general funds amounted to about 20 percent 
of NIE’s income. NIE’s main source of income was commissions from 
industry. As a user-owned research institute, NIE had various tasks to 
fulfil. In addition to executing research commissions in a broad range 
of disciplines, the Institute should solve current problems for industry 
and provide continued training for the engineers in the field. 
 As mentioned above, NTNF ordered both a consultancy report 
and appointed an expert panel for the evaluation of NIE. An initial 
plan seems to have been to have two parallel and integrated evalua-
tions, but eventually the consultancy report was completed prior to 
the first meeting of the expert panel. The consultancy report offered 
both an analysis of the internal organisation of NIE and gave the 
market’s views on the Institute (on the basis of surveys and inter-
views). It was pointed out that the Institute might have future 
problems in attracting research contractors. This might force the 
Institute to do more consultancy and less research, the consultancy 
report said. 
 The consultancy report advised NTNF to work out a clearer 
strategy for support to the sector, both by a better integration of its 
own activities towards this sector and by specifying the roles of the 
different actors operating within the sector. NIE itself was given 
various advice, like undertaking more technologically-oriented 
research, working out a strategy for operating in the international 
market, and educating all project leaders in marketing and communi-
cation. 
4.2.2 The selection of panel members and the organisation of 
the work 
To complement the consultancy report, a mixed panel was appointed 
consisting both of peers and non-peers. The Research Council first 
selected panel members based on suggestions from sources inde-
pendent of NIE. After discussing this selection with NIE, NIE was 
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asked to propose members and the Research Council appointed some 
of NIE’s proposed candidates. The aim with input from NIE was to 
ensure that the evaluees regarded the panel as competent. According 
to the Research Council official serving as secretary for the panel only 
a minority of the final five panel members were proposed by NIE. 
According to the director of NIE all final panel members except one 
(Director Rainert) were proposed by NIE. Being interviewed for this 
study all panel members except Dir. Rainert said they knew NIE fairly 
well, and thought that NIE itself had proposed them as evaluators. 
 The panel appointed for the evaluation consisted of five experts – 
two Norwegians and three Swedes. None of the panel members had 
participated in a similar evaluation before: 
 Professor Svenson was a professor at a Swedish university 
department in the field. He had had good connections to NIE 
throughout a number of years. He knew the researchers there and 
their publications. He also had a good relationship to NIE’s director. 
 Professor Olson was a professor at a Swedish university department 
in the field and also had a background from industry and therefore 
had a twofold perspective on NIE. Due to a tight personal time 
schedule he only participated in the first panel meeting and wrote 
about one page of the evaluation report.94 He had prior knowledge 
about NIE through his background from industry, where he had 
commissioned research from NIE. He said he thought that they did a 
good job then, and that he also had a good prior impression of their 
publications and their international reputation. 
 Director Rainert was one of the two Norwegians on the panel. He 
held several positions that qualified him as an evaluator on the user 
side of the Institute. He had a leading position in one of the largest 
industrial firms in the sector NIE operates in, and he was the chairman 
of the research committee of a major interest group organisation. 
Rainert was the only one on the panel who had not had any prior 
direct contact with NIE. 
 Director Gundersen was the technical director of one the Norwegian 
companies that were NIE’s regular customers. He had been on various 
committees at NIE and said he knew both the projects and the 
researchers at NIE. He also had a broad interface on the user side, 
saying he knew the field and Norwegian industry in it very well. 
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 Director Carlson was the technical director of a Swedish company 
that sometimes gave commissions to NIE. Except for this he did not 
have any special prior connection with NIE. 
 The terms of reference for the panel were twofold, asking for an 
assessment of the Institute’s role in its sector in Norway and assess-
ments of its scientific level (‘faglige nivå’) both in a Norwegian and in 
an international context. This twofold mandate corresponded to the 
two groups represented in the panel – the customers and the 
researchers. 
 The panel had no formal chairman, but as mentioned an official 
from the Research Council served as secretary. There were three 
meetings of which the two first were held at NIE. The agenda for the 
first meeting included presentation of NIE by its director, presentations 
of the conclusions of the consultancy report by its author, and 
discussions of the mandate, the need for data, and the division of 
tasks. There was also time for visiting the different departments at NIE.  
 A preliminary table of contents was set up at the first meeting and 
as no initiative was taken to divide the tasks within the group, each 
participant contributed where he could. Their contributions varied 
from one to ten pages. These drafts were discussed at the last meeting 
and then edited into a final report by the secretary. 
4.2.3 The decision making of the panel 
Being interviewed, Dir. Rainert gave a picture of the evaluation as 
unproblematic teamwork. There was an informal and natural division 
of tasks on the evaluation panel. Everybody was equally active in the 
work and there were no disagreements among the evaluators. In his 
opinion, the objective of the research was to contribute to the 
economic growth and the competitive power of industry, and he saw 
the market as the ultimate evaluator of the research. 
 Prof. Svenson told me that he had been worried that emphasis on 
industrial applicability should dominate the work of the panel, as 
some of the panel members had strong roots in the industry and might 
not understand the needs of academic research. He said he was 
concerned that NIE should not be strangled by industry, but enjoy 
some scientific autonomy. He made a special effort to get this point of 
view into the evaluation report. He thought he had succeeded in 
preventing the applicability point of view from dominating the 
evaluation work, and said that in the end the panel members all had a 
good understanding of each other’s views and that the evaluation 
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report reflected a good balance of the different views of the parties to 
the research. 
 Dir. Gundersen said that Dir. Rainert was the natural leader of the 
panel. Dir. Gundersen himself had sympathy both for the arguments 
of scientific autonomy and the market arguments, and could not 
remember that there had been any disagreement about which kinds of 
arguments should be emphasised in the evaluation report. Neither 
Prof. Olson, nor Dir. Carlson, remembered any disagreements. The 
latter two were, like Dir. Rainert, definitely in favour of the market-
arguments as criteria for evaluating NIE. 
 The conclusions of the report are a mixture of the different views 
of the panel members. It states that NIE is the leading research and 
competence centre in its field in Norway. The Institute is also at the 
international front in several areas, but to maintain its leading position 
it needs increased general funds for basic, long-term research – tasks 
that are not taken care of by contract research. At the same time it 
says that the main challenge for NIE is to keep its position in the 
market, securing continued contracts from industry. Confronted with 
these mixed conclusions of the report, Prof. Svenson commented: 
‘Yes, those are [Rainert’s] and my opinions that appear there. So, I mean, we have not 
backed down.’ 
To sum up, the accounts say that the panel work gave the panel 
members a better understanding of each other’s point of view, but that 
they did not change their opinions.  
4.2.4 The basis and the criteria for the assessments 
In the letter of appointment to the experts it was emphasised by the 
Research Council that the consultancy report would provide the 
information on NIE’s relations to its customers and a market analysis. 
The task of the panel would primarily be to assess the quality of NIE’s 
activities on an international level. 
 However, few of the panel members seemed to be very interested 
in the data provided by the consultancy report, which consisted of 
questionnaires to 70 customers and phone interviews with 44 of them. 
The panel members dealing with the user side of the research, which 
turned out to be four of the five members, mainly used their prior 
knowledge of NIE and its sector as basis for their assessments. In 
addition some of them conducted informal interviews with those they 
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considered the central actors in the sector, or with their central 
contacts in the sector – ‘people that they knew could speak freely’ – 
about NIE. Annual reports, strategy documents and similar, were also 
useful background information. 
 The assessments of the scientific quality were mainly written by 
Prof. Svenson and based on publications, papers presented at 
international conferences and his prior knowledge of the research 
activity at NIE. As important criteria he emphasised intra-scientific 
novelty in terms of contributions to theory and the body of knowl-
edge. Publishing in journals that would make the work known to the 
world was also important, he said. 
 As mentioned, three of the other evaluators were in favour of 
more market-oriented criteria. Prof. Olson said: 
‘What [NIE] does is more what we often call applied research. As far as I understand 
that is also the object of [NIE], that they are to do research that is directly applicable, 
not something that is speculative, that will be applicable in 20 years. ...  Then extra-
scientific relevance gets high priority: applicability, use, effects. When evaluating [NIE] 
that may be the thing to emphasise. On the other hand, if you were to evaluate the 
technological university, one will have to make other emphases. ... 
Q: ‘What about pure intra-scientific criteria, do you ever look at that?’ 
A: ‘...  It is very difficult to make an objective evaluation of.. The best objective 
evaluation one can get of such research institutes, is to what extent they are able to 
compete on the international market. [In your own country] you always have a certain 
priority, you always have a certain privilege to get a commission in Norway, but if you 
get the same kind of commissions in France, England, Germany, the United States, 
then you have that [a good indication], because then one is leading. And to get such 
commissions it is important to publish, and that way prove that you are bright. ... and 
those publications say that you fulfil all those [scientific] requirements. And then of 
course those requirements are extremely important for doing a good job, that it really 
will become applicable and used. If you do not fulfil those requirements then the ... 
applicability will also be low. So that is very important.’ 
Dir. Rainert seemed to agree with Prof. Olson. As mentioned, he 
clearly saw the market as the ultimate evaluator of research. In 
addition, he also seemed to think that not only extra-scientific require-
ments, but also intra-scientific requirements had some relevance: ‘To 
get a whole, you need both’ he said. 
 Dir. Carlson said that he was only concerned with extra-scientific 
relevance. He emphasised the need to separate the different audiences 
for research, and decide whether applicability should be assessed in 
 
 111
relation to the specific commissioner, industry in general or society at 
large. He also stressed that scientists and users/customers apply 
different criteria when evaluating research, as they have different time 
horizons. Both ways of looking upon research could be found in the 
evaluation report, but ‘they were not particularly elaborated’ in this 
evaluation, he said. 
 Dir. Gundersen was concerned both with intra-scientific and extra-
scientific criteria. After saying that he would stress correctness, 
profundity, theoretical contributions and publication as properties of 
good research, he said that applicability was very difficult to assess: 
‘Who can tell whether research has applicability? Remember all the research which was 
not thought applicable before a long time had gone by. I am afraid that if you only 
emphasise applicability, you will not get the lead research that is needed to move a 
society forward. Because then you shut off the research to the current level of knowledge. 
... [The scientific criteria], they are important, and I am very afraid of that 
applicability. Of course they have to do research aiming at applicability, but one must 
not limit the research to that. ... We would never have invented penicillin if the objective 
had been to invent penicillin ...’ 
Q: ‘What kind of criteria were emphasised in the evaluation?’ 
A: ‘I would like to stress the applicability of what [NIE] does towards [my kind of 
industry], there applicability was strongly emphasised. Of course that is more goal-
oriented research and development, so there applicability plays quite another role. ... 
Something else that was strongly emphasised, was [NIE’s] international reputation. 
That was an important criterion. ... At least I was very concerned that the Swedes 
should offer opinions on that.’ 
 
4.2.5 Evaluation strategies 
As most of the panel members were not researchers themselves, they 
were not concerned with the ‘politics of evaluation’ – what kind of 
evaluation strategy would best serve the evaluees – a question that 
concerned all the evaluation panels that consisted of researchers. Prof. 
Svenson was the only one on the panel that evaluated NIE who 
expressed concerns about adopting a ‘soft’ evaluation strategy. He did 
so indirectly, emphasising that one ought to avoid giving money only 
to those who are best, because they might be best precisely because 
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they already have good working conditions. One should be careful 
not to strangle the important small details of the structure, he said.  
 In general, Dir. Carlson was critical to these kinds of evaluation, 
and also seemed to favour ‘harder’ strategies. Talking of cronyism, he 
said that because of personal connections evaluations tended to be 
too nice to the evaluees, which meant that it is hard to interpret the 
meaning of a positive evaluation. If some research got a negative 
evaluation, however, one could be sure that it was really bad. He also 
mentioned that Prof. Svenson had been less critical to NIE than the 
other panel members. 
 Also Dir. Gundersen was concerned about the weaknesses of 
evaluations. He said that evaluations tend to be biased because those 
who conduct them always have some vested interest in the subject of 
evaluation – in one way or the other. Knowing that what you write 
may entail consequences for those you evaluate, can very easily affect 
what you write, he said. 
 Prof. Olson, like Dir. Carlson, seemed to be in favour of ‘harder’ 
strategies than the one chosen for the evaluation of NIE. He thought 
that evaluating an institute alone gave no real measure for assessment. 
To know how good something is, you need to see it in relation to a 
comparable unit, he said, advocating comparisons as the basis for 
evaluation. 
 Dir. Rainert, on the other hand, did not seem to be concerned 
with the weaknesses of evaluation, nor that one should adopt ‘harder’ 
evaluation strategies. He said that the evaluation report might not have 
told the people at NIE something they did not already know, but that 
putting it into print would help them to take action to improve. In 
other words, evaluations serve their functions by giving incentives, 
and not necessarily new information. 
4.2.6 Reactions to the report 
The director of NIE was initially not in favour of having his institute 
subjected to an evaluation. He seems to have been satisfied with the 
result however. The report has been used in ‘marketing’ by NIE 
towards its customers. The minutes from the board meeting handling 
the evaluation report say that the report ‘tas til orientering’95 and that 
the Council should continue its work to clarify NIE’s strategic research 
role and strengthen and clarify its position towards the Ministry. The 
Council also asks for continuation of the work towards a more active 
Council policy regarding the basic funding for the institute (which 
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were channelled through the Research Council from a sector founda-
tion). 
 
4.3 Mixed panel evaluation of three social 
research institutes 
4.3.1 Background 
The Research Council was given the responsibility of channelling basic 
funding to a specific kind of social research institute. As part of their 
policy towards these institutes the Council decided that these institutes 
should be evaluated. There was no particular issue that called for an 
evaluation, but the Council perceived a general external demand for 
evaluating the institutes. 
 The stated purpose of the evaluation was to assess how the 
institutes functioned in their regional and national ‘network of 
knowledge’, how they fulfilled the needs of their public and private 
customers, and how research quality was taken care of and promoted, 
i.e. the Research Council wanted an evaluation both of structures, 
research quality and the use and applicability of the research. 
4.3.2 The selection of evaluators 
In addition to the usual expert panel, the Research Council appointed 
a seven member reference group for the evaluation. The Council 
selected the members of the evaluation panel without consulting the 
institutes to be evaluated, but the institutes were allowed to appoint 
their representatives to the reference group. The elected reference 
group included three Research Council representatives, the directors of 
the three institutes to be evaluated and a representative for the users 
of the institutes. The expert panel comprised three Scandinavians:  
 Professor Hubbard was an assistant professor at a social science 
department at a Norwegian university. She had experience from so-
called evaluation research96 and had also been involved with science 
policy studies. She was known to central staff within the Research 
Council who considered her particularly suited to the task. She had 
only limited prior information about two of the institutes to be 
evaluated (gained through personal contacts). 
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 Professor Overton was a social science professor at a Swedish 
university. He was considered by the other panel members to be the 
one on the panel most competent to evaluate the quality of the 
research conducted by the institutes. He had extensive evaluation 
experience and a good Scandinavian network. He had no prior 
information about the institutes to be evaluated, but knew a couple of 
the people working there from other contexts. 
 Mr. Ostman was a Swedish civil servant who had been engaged in 
research administration. He had undertaken some policy evaluations 
and was considered the most competent member to evaluate the 
applicability of the research. He had good prior connections to the 
Norwegian research community, but he only knew two of the 
researchers in the institutes to be evaluated. Ostman was known to the 
Council from previous work, whereas Overton seems to have been 
proposed by Nordic contacts of the Council. 
4.3.3 The terms of reference 
The mandate given to the panel was quite comprehensive. As 
mentioned, structures, research quality and the use and the applicabil-
ity of research should be assessed. In the terms of reference, the panel 
was asked to assess four topics: 
- ‘Whether the organisation, administration and way of financing are appropriate 
according to the objectives of the institute. 
- The institutes’ portfolio of projects over time, in relation to their objectives and the 
possibilities in the market. 
- How research quality is taken care of. 
The assessments of quality should encompass both the products of research and the 
research communities themselves. This implies assessing the relationships between the 
building of competence and short-term assignments, staff possibilities for professional 
development and their regional and national research networks. 
- How the institutes take care of mediation and contact with users, and how the 
contractors benefit from contact with the institutes.’ 
 
These topics were given no ranking, and should therefore be consid-
ered as equally important. However, as the present study is concerned 
with how research quality is assessed, the presentation will be clearly 
biased, primarily dealing with assessments of research quality. 
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4.3.4 The evaluation work 
The panel met nine times, including three site visits and three 
meetings with the reference group. At their first meeting, which was 
mainly administrative, the panel decided that Professor Hubbard 
should serve as chair of the panel. They selected one of the institutes 
for an ‘exploratory site visit’ and discussed what kind of secretarial 
services they would need.  
 The panel first met the reference group at their fourth meeting, 
just prior to the visits to the institutions. The reference group primarily 
had an advisory and informative mission, but its members, especially 
the directors of the institutes, also seem to have had some concrete 
impact on the emphasises of the evaluation report. The minutes of the 
meetings show that the directors of the institutes were very eager to 
provide information that was likely to moderate the statements of the 
report. 
 In addition to the material provided by the reference group, the 
evaluation panel applied a broad spectrum of information sources for 
their work: questionnaires to the institutes, site visits including 
interviews with administrators, researchers and customers, research 
publications selected by the institutes, their annual reports and other 
documents, government reports and general statistics. 
 The panel members modified the terms of reference they were 
given. In the preface to their report they state that they have put more 
emphasis on contributing to the general debate about these kinds of 
institutes than to give final assessments of the three institutes to be 
evaluated. As stated in the preface, the intention has been to evaluate 
this kind of institute ‘as an idea, as it is expressed by’ the three 
institutes to be evaluated. 
 Only four pages of the report concern quality assessments. Even 
here there are no concrete assessments of the research conducted by 
the various institutes. All statements are general and more concerned 
with explaining the situation of the institutes and give advice on how 
the research quality could be improved than assessing the research.  
 The closest one gets to an assessment is a conclusion saying that 
‘the quality criteria are promoted and taken care of relatively poorly’. 
The indicators of this, the report says, are that the researchers seldom 
publish in peer-reviewed journals and that quality promotion is 
sometimes put aside to acquire research contracts. This statement is 
clearly ambiguous. It may be interpreted as saying that the panel has 
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reviewed publications from the institutes and found that they do not 
meet the standards of good research, but do not want to say this 
directly; or it can be read as though the panel has no opinion of the 
actual quality of the research, but simply want to point out that the 
structures underlying the production and publications of the research 
are not likely to promote high quality research. 
4.3.5 Evaluation strategies 
Hubbard, who wrote the report, was clearly in favour of a ‘soft’ 
evaluation strategy. She said that the panel members were quite 
conscious that they did not want to compare the institutes. She was 
personally very interested in looking at working conditions and 
resources, she said, emphasising that it is meaningless to look at 
results without taking resources into consideration. When asked 
whether it would not also be more difficult to evaluate results than 
resources she said: 
‘It is also more difficult to assess research quality than to interview people about how 
they are getting on. I think some accused us of shirking the most difficult task. ... But 
first you have to map resources, then you can look at quality. ... It is not very useful to 
say that a product is so and so bad if you can not also say something about how it can 
be improved.’ 
Hubbard was also concerned that evaluation reports should not be 
‘misused’. It would be absurd, she said, if a report written after a two-
day visit to an institute should determine that institute’s future. Her 
own soft approach can be interpreted as a strategy to prevent such 
use. 
 Overton expressed mixed views on evaluation. On the one hand, he 
held the view that the function of evaluation is to stimulate 
competition that would entail increased activity and also to build up a 
long-term mutual understanding of what is good and bad research. On 
the other hand, he seemed to agree fully on the approach chosen for 
the evaluation in question. Comparisons are hard to make, he said, 
and make no one happy, except for those getting the best scores. He 
also stressed that it is not easy to evaluate research quality. He 
compared it to evaluating a violinist: 
‘It is correct, every note, but it lacks talent, and you can hear that. So, there are some 
aspects that are difficult to assess – in which assessments are very subjective in research 
just as in art.’ 
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It seems that Overton agreed to the same evaluation strategy as 
Hubbard, but for other reasons. A soft approach was preferable, not 
primarily to prevent misuse of the report, but because it was the 
easiest way to handle the task. 
 Ostman did not express any specific opinions on evaluation 
strategies. Questioned about why the panel emphasised the working 
conditions and resources of the institutes without really evaluating 
their research output, he answered that they did initially talk about 
how to evaluate research quality, but soon found an interest in 
understanding the institutes’ situation. At the end of the evaluation 
process they were satisfied with the approach they had adopted, and 
they also had no time to go into evaluating output. 
4.3.6 The basis and criteria for the assessments 
The evaluation report does not mention any reviews of publications. 
Nevertheless, Hubbard and Overton looked at some of the publica-
tions, and it also appears that they had some discussions on how to 
evaluate publications in applied social science. At least they both 
answered the same when asked about what they emphasised when 
reviewing the publications. They said that they checked whether a 
researcher was up to date on his/her topic or not.97 
 Hubbard said that most criteria for evaluating research quality are 
interrelated, so that it would be difficult to say which are the most 
essential criteria for good research. When asked what she looked at 
when reading the few publications from the institutes that she picked 
for review in her own area of competence, however, she answered 
that she looked specially at the reference lists to see whether an 
appropriate literature review had been done.98 The main concern of 
the evaluation was the research environments, she said, whether the 
working conditions of the institutes were appropriate for fulfilling their 
tasks. Their main sources of information were informal interviews with 
the evaluees, annual reports and other documents from the institutes. 
 Overton emphasised that the quality of the research was not the 
most important output from the institutes. It was the relevance and 
applicability of the research to its region that was important. An 
important criterion to him was the researchers’ attentiveness to their 
customers. When reviewing publications from the three institutes, he 
paid attention to methods and the authors’ knowledge of related 
research in the area. He said that the publications were probably the 
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most important documentation for the evaluation, but an evaluation 
with such an encompassing mandate could not be done without 
interviewing the evaluees. Overton also arranged for some close 
colleagues to review some of the publications. These reviews were 
informal and are not mentioned in the report. 
 Ostman evaluated the applicability of the institutes’ work and did 
not take part in the assessments of research quality. As indicators of 
applicability he used the institutes’ ability to get assignments and earn 
money, in addition to the information from his interviews with 
selected customers. 
4.3.7 The decision making of the panel 
Overton stressed that even though Hubbard did nearly all the writing, he 
was sure that they had talked about every aspect of it and agreed in 
advance. According to his memory they had long discussions before 
they decided to look more at resources than output. He said: 
‘I can’t remember any major opposing views at all. We found solutions that all of us 
could accept. We are all quite talkative and have our views, so the group functioned 
thanks to our common opinions. None of us are people who back down easily if we 
think others are wrong.’ 
Hubbard said that it would be impossible to tell who was the most 
active on the evaluation panel, adding that the report was very much 
teamwork resulting from very inspiring ‘brain storming’ meetings. 
Asked about how they decided not to compare the institutes, she said: 
‘That was not a major topic of discussion. We talked about it and then we said that... 
or we were rather in agreement that we should not look too closely at each of the 
institutes. We very quickly agreed that we should not have separate chapters on the 
various institutes, as one very easily could imagine this report to have. But that was not 
the way we wanted it.’ 
Q: ‘We?’ 
A: ‘I think I mean the three of us in the group. In any case I did not notice that the 
others disagreed.’ 
When asked about contact with the reference group, Hubbard said 
that the role of the reference group had been more to confirm the 
panel’s choices of approach than to influence the direction of its work. 
The need to emphasise resources (i.e. input) more than output, was 
for instance confirmed by the reference group, she said. 
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 Ostman also confirmed the picture of teamwork and agreement in 
the evaluation panel. The meetings were very intensive and it was 
hard to remember who said what as they all ‘followed each other’s 
thoughts’, he said. 
 There is no reason to settle for this very general description of an 
idyllic teamwork with no discrepancy in opinions, however. The 
minutes from the meetings of the panel can, together with some 
interpretation of the interviewees’ statements, tell a more nuanced 
story. 
 According to the minutes, how to evaluate research quality was 
not a topic until the second meeting – a meeting at which Overton 
was not present.99 The minutes from the second meeting state that it 
was decided that research quality should be evaluated indirectly by 
looking at publication channels, co-publications and to what degree 
publications were peer reviewed or not. Direct review of publications 
is too big a task, the minutes state. 
 The minutes of the third meeting, however – a meeting at which 
Overton was present – say that a selection of research reports should 
be assessed in relation to the national and international research 
frontier in the area. These reviews should be made by experts in the 
various areas.  
 The interviewees gave partly conflicting information on the 
question of the degree to which such reviews were actually con-
ducted. Overton said that this was his task, and that he asked close 
colleagues, colleagues whose opinion he trusted, to review those 
publications which were outside his own field of competence. 
Hubbard said that she reviewed a few publications in her own field of 
competence, and that Overton chose some people to look at some 
publications, but that this was done to a much lower degree than 
initially planned. Ostman said that assessing research quality was a 
task they all renounced really, and that they did not fulfil the mandate 
at this point. 
 The report says that the institutes themselves chose the publica-
tions to be reviewed, but says nothing about who actually reviewed 
them, or whether all the chosen publications were reviewed, or only 
publications in certain areas. 
 All in all, it seems that we can conclude that assessments of 
publications were done on a smaller and less systematic scale than 
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planned at the third meeting. Anyhow, the results of reviews are 
included in the report in a very vague and indirect manner. 
 Various explanations can be provided for this lack of explicit 
assessment. Firstly, the fact that Overton, the panel member said to be 
responsible for the quality reviews, did not attend several of the panel 
meetings must have had some effect on what was done, and not 
done, in this area.100 We have seen that Overton expressed views on 
evaluation that would be consistent with a ‘harder’ evaluation strategy 
than the one chosen in the report. He said that the function of 
evaluation was to stimulate competition that would entail increased 
activity and also to build up a long-term mutual understanding of what 
is good and bad research. We have also seen that the indirect 
approach for assessing research quality chosen at the second meeting, 
at which Overton was not present, was changed to a direct approach 
at the third meeting where Overton was present. The fact that Overton 
was not present at the last two meetings might have been a significant 
factor behind the indirect approach to evaluating results in the final 
report – however the interviewees themselves denied the importance 
of Overton’s absence. 
 A second, and more comprehensive, explanation for the lack of 
explicit assessments, is more in line with those of Overton’s views on 
evaluation that calls for a ‘soft’ strategy, and not the ‘hard’ view just 
referred. Overton stressed three problems to which indirect quality 
assessments and no comparisons would be the solution: It is difficult 
to evaluate research quality, it is difficult to compare it, and in 
addition comparing makes no one happy, except for the one given 
the best scores. Bearing this in mind, Overton certainly had no reason 
to object to the approach chosen by the panel. 
 A third explanation, complementary to the two others, is the 
explanation given by Hubbard and Ostman, which emphasises that 
they simply adopted the approach that they found the most interesting 
– trying to understand the conditions under which the institutes were 
working. Hubbard was especially interested in this aspect, and as she 
was both chairing the evaluation panel and writing the report her 
interests in ‘evaluation research’ were the natural basis for the work. 
 There is also a fourth complementary explanation, which has 
already been mentioned above as an interpretation of Hubbard’s 
views on misuse of evaluation reports. A ‘soft’ approach explaining 
the situation of the ‘evaluees’, instead of assessing them, is probably 
the best strategy if one wants to assure that an evaluation is used by 
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the funding authorities, not to cut the resources of the evaluees, but to 
improve their situation. 
 In addition, there might be an element of collective shirking (the term 
is introduced in Section 3.2.1) behind the lack of explicit assessments 
on research quality. Shared responsibility101 for assessments might have 
resulted in less effort devoted this seemingly unattractive task. There is 
however no evidence for such a group effect. The individual shirking of 
Overton from several of the panel meetings seems, on the other hand, 
an important factor for explaining the lack of explicit assessments. 
4.3.8 Reactions to the report 
The institutes which had followed the evaluation process from the 
reference  group seemed  satisfied  with  the evaluation report. Except 
for a general focus on their problems and being asked by the 
Research Council to co-operate more closely with their neighbouring 
higher education institutions, the report had no direct consequences 
for their situation (according to Research Council staff responsible for 
the evaluation). 
 The Council, which also had broad representation on the refe-
rence group, found the report valuable, but not exactly what they had 
asked for or expected. Partly as a response to its experience with this 
evaluation, the Council set up a committee to clarify the criteria 
appropriate for evaluating applied social science. 
 
4.4 Peer evaluation of three humanities sub-
fields 
4.4.1 Background 
The question of evaluating studies in the humanities came up about 
six years after the first evaluation of fields within the natural sciences 
in Norway. In the meantime, the research councils’ obligations to carry 
out evaluations had been expressly stated by the Government. The 
Council for Research in the Humanities started to initiate field 
evaluations partly as a response to this demand and partly because the 
idea that this kind of evaluation was an important task for any 
research council, had gained general acceptance within the Council. 
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 As a model for their new kind of evaluations the Council for 
Research in the Humanities looked to the previous Norwegian field 
evaluations and adopted the peer review panel approach used for the 
evaluations of the science disciplines. 
 Policy considerations influenced the Council’s selection of fields to 
be evaluated. The Council had objections to commence reviewing 
areas of research where they expected to receive a mainly negative 
evaluation. That would entail much negative publicity and produce 
resistance towards evaluations in the research community, they 
thought. At the same time the Council wanted to evaluate areas they 
thought needed evaluation, i.e. they wanted evaluations that would be 
constructive in the way that the evaluation report could be used to 
improve the standards of research. In this way they ended up 
evaluating fields in which they thought there was something to be 
done, but in which the situation was not too bad. These policy 
considerations illustrate a point made more or less explicitly by several 
of the interviewees (but not particularly in this case) that ‘they just told 
the Research Council what they already knew’. 
4.4.2 The selection of evaluators 
The selection of panel members was made by Professor Hummel, a 
member of The Council for Research in the Humanities. He informally 
consulted two of the researchers in the discipline that he knew well 
and trusted, for their views on candidates for the panel. The condi-
tions for the panel composition set by the council were that the panel 
should have a highly competent, non-Norwegian member from each 
of the three sub-fields to be evaluated, and both male and female 
members. The council also wanted a Norwegian co-ordinator for the 
panel. This ought to be a professor from another area in the humani-
ties who had some research policy experience. 
 One foreign professor and several Norwegian professors who 
were asked to be on the panel, declined, and the Council ended up 
with the following four panel members: 
 Professor Hummel was a well-known researcher with extensive 
knowledge of the Norwegian research communities. He said that as he 
had written the terms of reference and selected the panel members 
himself, it was an unsatisfactory solution that he served as a panel 
member, but as all the other pertinent candidates for a co-ordinator 
refused had declined, he felt it was the best possible solution. He 
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stressed that the desired distance between the panel and the Council 
would be difficult to obtain. 
 Professor Bargel had his main competency in sub-field A. In 
addition to some Norwegian acquaintances, he had some prior 
information on the Norwegian scene through his work on committees 
for appointing professors in Norway. He also had prior experience 
from an OECD panel evaluating higher education systems. 
 Professor Lawrence had his main competency in sub-field B. He had 
contacts with the two major Norwegian departments in the discipline 
and had visited Norway several times. He had been subjected to 
evaluation himself, but had never been on the evaluator’s side in this 
kind of evaluation before. 
 Dr. Miller had her main competency in sub-field C. She described 
herself as the youngest and least eminent of the panel members. She 
had little prior knowledge of the Norwegian research community and 
thought the evaluation would be an interesting experience and might 
prove useful for future connections in Norway. 
4.4.3 The terms of reference 
‘- To assess within an international perspective the scientific quality of the activity of 
Norwegian groups in [these] studies during the past decade. 
- To assess the general ability, past and present, of the research groups to absorb new ideas 
and methods, and to participate in international collaboration and in the development of 
important new areas of research. The assessments shall take into due regard the research 
groups’ extensive obligations to train future teachers ... and to provide them with the 
necessary ... skills. 
- To assess the groups’ resources, in terms of personnel and funding. 
- If inadequacies are found, to make proposals as to what existing efforts should be 
strengthened or abandoned, what new areas should be embarked upon, and what resources 
are required to do so, taking into consideration the general need for fundamental 
knowledge on the one hand, and national requirements on the other hand. 
- To give advice as to what ought to be the minimum size of the total Norwegian effort in 
the field ... at the university level, and in what areas or groups this effort should eventually 
be primarily concentrated.  
- To review the role of the Research Council in the development of the field up to now. 
- To make recommendations for the future.’ 
 
Being interviewed, Hummel, Miller and Bargel said that the terms of 
reference had been ‘stretched’ by the panel. They had not only 
evaluated research activities, but also focused a lot on teaching and 
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curricula. This seemed to be mainly an effect of Professor Bargel’s and 
Dr. Miller’s concerns, and Bargel’s previous OECD evaluation of 
education systems. 
4.4.4 The evaluation work 
The site visits lasted one week and included departments at Norway’s 
four universities. In addition to the site visits the evaluation panel  
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gathered for a planning meeting ten months before the site visits, and 
an editing meeting three months after the site visits. 
 The Council for Research in the Humanities provided their 
research co-ordinator for the area as secretary to the panel. He had the 
job of gathering information and statistics requested by the panel. The 
panel was very concerned with gathering information, and the list of 
required material that was one of the results of the panel’s first 
meeting, include age, geographic mobility and degrees of the faculty 
members, statistics on students and their careers, curricula, reading 
lists and teaching methods, resources for research, teaching and 
administration, interdisciplinary and international contacts, compara-
tive information from other Scandinavian countries, in addition to 
important publications within the last five years, information on 
present research projects, reports from chair appointing committees, 
reviews of publications, et cetera. Some of this information was obtained 
through a questionnaire to the involved units and some from already 
available survey data. 
 Tasks were divided between the panel members according to 
their field of research. The assessments written by individual panel 
members (that is, the assessments of the quality of the research on 
various topics) encompass only six of the report’s total 47 pages. The 
rest of the report covers descriptions of the gathered material – mainly 
drafted by the secretary and the co-ordinator, and revised by the rest 
of the panel – and conclusions and recommendations that were 
written more as teamwork by the whole panel. 
 The part of the report that dealt with the research assessments 
mentions the most eminent researchers by name. The explicitness and 
the level of details of the assessments vary from topic to topic. 
Professor Lawrence offered the clearest evaluative statements. His 
paragraphs on area B are written in a way so that one understands 
which departments are best and which are not so good.102 He also 
says that achievements and publications are very unevenly distributed 
among faculty members. 
 This is also stressed in Dr. Miller’s account of area C. In addition, 
she mentions the two departments where this problem is most serious. 
Otherwise her text mainly describes gaps in area C and gives advice 
on how to establish the kind of research which is lacking. Being 
interviewed, Miller said she compensated for her position on the panel 
as the most ‘junior’ and least experienced evaluator by working 
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‘terribly hard’. ‘I took care to be ultra-conscientious’, she said, and 
added that she ‘read everything they had published’.103 
 Professor Bargel’s account of area A is the least detailed. He is 
mostly concerned with describing general problems and none of the 
departments subjected to evaluation are mentioned in his text. Half of 
his text deals with the differences between major approaches to A-
studies. In this connection the only Norwegian scholar in the field 
apparently interested in the approach that Bargel thinks to be the most 
fruitful, is mentioned. 
4.4.5 Evaluation strategies 
The various views on evaluation and evaluation strategies expressed 
by the panel members while being interviewed correspond with these 
differences in evaluation styles. 
 Professor Bargel was concerned that the purpose of the evaluation 
should be to improve the field subjected to evaluation. In his opinion, 
the recommendations were the essential part of the report. He paid 
careful attention to what Professor Hummel (i.e. the co-ordinator of 
the panel and a member of the Council for which the evaluation was 
undertaken) said about what would happen to the report. To ensure 
the policy relevance of the report and that the recommendations could 
be acted upon without resistance from the departments, he tried to be 
updated on the Government’s policies and to write the report in such 
a way that it would not provoke the researchers. Commenting on the 
last point he said: 
‘You don’t get very far in any evaluation without comparing ... [but] the best way of 
dealing with comparisons ... is not to make too much fuss about it. I think it is better 
that a good deal is implicit rather than explicit. Because I think it alienates people if 
they are compared too brutally with each other. And moreover we realised that – this is 
a fundamental point about the whole report – that we wanted to have a report that 
would generally influence what people want to do, and wouldn’t put them off or provoke 
them into feeling that it was a waste of time. So from that point of view, we could have 
been a good deal tougher, I think, in some of the things that we said. But I don’t think 
that would necessarily be a very helpful way of doing it.’ 
Dr. Miller also argued against explicit comparisons, stressing the 
negative effects of ranking: 
‘Initially we thought that we would have a general comment and then comments on 
specific universities: 1,2,3,4. And then we decided that that might not make sufficiently 
clear which problems were shared and which ones were exclusive. ... [And also] because 
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then that is like ranking. Of course [this department] is better than [that department]. 
But we didn’t like [the first department] to say: OK, well we don’t have any problems. 
Let them solve their problems. ... We were not asked by [Hummel] to specifically 
decrease a ranking element, but what we did decide was to variate more, so that we were 
saying, strengths here, weaknesses there by topic. ... I suppose I thought that we might 
end up with what appeared to be the implicit ranking that everyone had ... And we 
didn’t feel that that was that productive, because there were some really quite strong and 
interesting eyes at [the lowest ranking department], for example.’ 
Professor Lawrence who, as mentioned, offered the clearest evaluative 
statements on the various departments in his section of the evaluation 
report, was the only one on the panel who didn’t stress the need for a 
‘soft’ evaluation approach to produce a report that could be acted 
upon with the co-operation of the departments. On the whole 
Lawrence wasn’t over-enthusiastic about these new kinds of evalua-
tions either. He said that more and more evaluations go on, and they 
take a lot of time which people might spend doing more worthwhile 
things. He made an exception for cases like Norway however, saying 
that one probably needed an outside view once in a while to 
overcome the kind of cronyism that is inevitable in a little country like 
Norway. 
4.4.6 The basis and criteria for the assessments 
Like most of the other cases for my study, the evaluation panel on the 
humanities areas did not have any discussion about what criteria to 
adopt when evaluating the research. Professor Lawrence put it this way: 
‘We tried to be more practical than theoretical about it. You can ask what is research 
quality and how do you judge it, but we didn’t get involved in those things, because the 
reason why we were chosen by them [the Research Council], presumably was that they 
trusted our judgement in these matters.’ 
He said that scientific criteria, like correctness and profundity, may be 
difficult to assess. When assessing one needs some kind of evidence 
and pure scientific criteria is not a matter of evidence. The evidence at 
hand for the evaluation was number of publications in important 
journals, number of books, and then one could judge these publica-
tions in terms of useful contributions to the field. His main concern 
was with results, originality, novelty and to a certain extent the extra-
scientific relevance of the research. The properties of the surroundings 
and the properties of the researchers he found irrelevant for quality 
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judgements, but said that lacking other evidence one might look to the 
reputations of the researchers, that is, the opinions of other peers. 
 He said the main sources of information were the questionnaire 
material and the publications. The site visits were important to the 
degree that they covered the gaps in the questionnaire material. With 
a more precise questionnaire they might not have needed the site 
visits, he said. 
 Professor Bargel said that all the different criteria on my list were 
inter-related, but that one couldn’t do without the ‘purely scientific 
criteria’. As the main consideration of the evaluation, in addition to 
scientific criteria, he mentioned capacity to communicate with scholars 
and students and ‘produce people who have got out of their university 
work a kind of education which will fit them to do a variety of jobs in 
society and make their lives richer.’ He was also concerned with the 
relation between the potential for publications and the actual produc-
tivity, talking of productivity in terms of the quality of the publications, 
not the amount. He stressed that he was not concerned with citation 
impacts and the like. The various sources of information were all 
important, he said; the statistics, the departments’ answers to the 
questionnaire, the site visits and the publications. 
 Dr. Miller also found all the categories of criteria and all the various 
sources of information important. She mentioned in particular 
dissemination of results, originality and influence on the direction of 
the discipline. In addition she emphasised tenacity – a goal-oriented 
motivation to finish work and publish. 
4.4.7 The decision making of the panel 
The panel seems to have had no problems reaching agreement. 
Commenting on this, Lawrence gave a general explanation of why most 
academic evaluation panels run smoothly: 
‘In practice there is not very much confrontation in these [kinds of] meetings. If there 
had been some confrontation then the whole committee would have been [unable] to 
work. So we had to trust one another’s judgements. And when we disagreed with one 
another we disagreed quietly and mildly, and whoever was in the minority would give 
way, I think. I think that of course people vary in their strength of their judgements, the 
strength of their opinions. And so I think there were certain things that [Professor 
Bargel] had very strong views about, and we didn’t really try to persuade him out of 
that, and then in other cases, [Dr. Miller] had very strong opinions about something 
and we don’t [disagree] with her. We never had a strong area of disagreement. We 
never had somebody taking a very strong view on one side, somebody else taking a very 
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strong view on another side. That would have led to some discord, but I don’t think it 
ever arose. ... I have spent so much of my life in this sort of situation. About 20 or 30 
committees for appointing people to jobs or chairs. ... All I can say is people decide to 
work together and the situations where people decide to oppose one another firmly almost 
never arise. Does that mean that we are all being too nice to one another? Maybe, I 
don’t know. We have to get through the job, we can’t argue for hours. We have to say: 
‘OK, you have a good opinion on that, I’ll accept your opinion.’ It is a system that 
works.’ 
Professor Bargel said that they all made comments on each other’s 
drafts and that nobody’s part of the report was written solely by one 
person. They had no confrontations on the panel, but their emphases 
were a bit different. He said he himself put more emphasis on the 
‘interpenetration’ of the various studies: 
‘... how to get the whole thing working in one integrated piece. So that was my own 
bias, would I say, in relation to the way in which I viewed people and structures. But I 
didn’t think we disagreed really basically about people at all. I don’t think we would 
have made any different verdicts on relative standing of the different institutions. I think 
we agreed basically on that.’ 
Dr. Miller stressed that they had all been equally active in the group: 
‘We were almost religiously equally divided. I noticed myself in fact, suddenly looking at 
my watch, to be sure that we were each saying about the same amount. And I noticed 
that other people were speaking in a kind of measuring way, not too much, not too 
little.’ 
Commenting on the different emphases of the panel members, she 
said that she had a sense of Hummel and Lawrence being more 
concerned with scientific criteria than Bargel and herself. 
 On the whole, the discussions in the group seem to have had a 
decisive influence on how the report presented assessments, and the 
emphases of the recommendations. Here Bargel and Hummel seem to 
have been the leading persons. The text from each of the panel 
members was revised so that comparisons became less explicit. There 
are still some differences between the sections written by the various 
panel members in the final report, however – the sections still vary in 
the explicitness of comparisons. Concerning the assessments of 
research, each panel member used his own basis and criteria without 
much intervention from other members, and as they all reached very 
similar conclusions, basis and criteria became no object of discussion.  
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4.4.8 Reactions to the report 
After the evaluation report had been published, there was a hearing 
where representatives from the various departments as well as 
Hummel and Bargel were present. Bargel said that at this meeting he 
encountered considerably more scepticism of the evaluating process 
than they had come across on their site visits. Hummel, on the other 
hand, who had seen the immediate reactions after the release of the 
report, said that it had calmed down before the hearing. He had been 
quite surprised by the first reactions, because he thought that before 
publishing the report they had removed everything that could make 
people ‘jump’. He thought the report was quite meek and tame. His 
explanation of the strong reactions to the conclusions of the report 
was that the Norwegian researchers lacked a broad international 
perspective on their work. They lived with their own local measures 
and thought that their work was excellent and that their way of 
running a department was the only acceptable way of doing it. (The 
report had recommended that the chair of a department should be 
responsible for fostering a culture of productivity in the department.) 
 Asked about the follow-up of the recommendations of the report, 
Hummel said that he thought it had had some effects, but he did not 
know any details.104 He thought I would need to pose the question to 
each of the units subjected to evaluation. Such a survey would exceed 
the scope of this study. Of more importance in this context is the fact 
that – at least to some degree – it was up to the evaluees to initiate 
and monitor the implementation of the evaluation. 
 
4.5 Peer evaluation of a natural science 
research programme 
4.5.1 Background 
The programme in question had been given special priority by the 
Government. Large public funds had been invested, and the Govern-
ment required that the Research Council conducted an evaluation of 
the results of the programme. Five other programmes of the same type 
were evaluated simultaneously. All these programmes were very broad 
and included various programme areas. They were special research 
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programmes – they were the research priority areas of the Norwegian 
Government. 
 The natural science programme in question covered an applied 
field, and evaluations of the relevance and applications of the 
research, as well as its scientific quality, were organised. A peer 
review panel was appointed to assess the scientific quality of those 
areas of the field where the major part of the research effort had been 
canalised. A consultancy firm and an applied social science institute 
got the task of evaluating the relevance and applications of the 
research in the whole field. The research policy process and the 
development of the programme were evaluated by another applied 
social science institute. 
 Four different evaluation reports were written: one peer review 
report, two different reports on relevance and applicability,105 and one 
report on the development of the programme and the research policy 
process. The peer review report was finished some months before the 
three other reports. A fifth report that summarised the peer review 
report and the applicability/relevance reports was also produced by 
the consultancy firm. 
 The fifth concluding report describes the development of the 
sector, its problems and the role of research. The report concludes 
that the programme had not yet succeeded in realising some of the 
main objectives, like transferring competence to industry, increasing 
the profitability of industry and improving the ability to compete with 
other countries. It states that it seems that the priorities have lacked an 
overall strategy and that they have not been in sufficient accordance 
with the needs of the market. All in all however, the general priorities 
seem adequate, and one is well on the way to reach the objectives of 
the programme, the report states. The report also points out which 
programme areas get the best, and which get the worst, scores from 
industry, and it says that four of the eight programme areas have not 
been given sufficient priority. 
 A summary of the peer review report (written by the peer panel 
itself) is also included in the fifth report, but the conclusions of the 
peer panel – which are not in accordance with the consultancy firm’s 
findings when interviewing people from industry – are not discussed 
in relation to the other findings of the report. However, the findings of 
the different reports are brought together on the last page of the 
concluding report where recommendations for future efforts are given. 
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4.5.2 The selection of peer panel members 
The peer evaluation was organised by the Research Council’s advisory 
committee for research in the field. This committee appointed a panel 
of five foreign researchers and a Norwegian co-ordinator. Candidates 
for the panel were mainly proposed by members of the advisory 
committee, but they consulted members of the relevant research 
communities more informally. The central criteria for appointing panel 
members were seniority and reputation – people whose judgements 
would be trusted. 
 The Norwegian co-ordinator, Professor Evensen, was familiar to the 
Council as the co-ordinator of a similar evaluation task. He did basic 
research partly relevant to the field, but had never been involved in 
the programme. A letter from the advisory committee to the peer 
panel says that Professor Evensen is to review important papers 
written in Norwegian. Eventually he did not review any papers. His 
tasks by his own choice were mostly administrative. 
 The expertise of the five foreign peers covered different parts of 
the programme. All of them had prior knowledge of the research 
going on in Norway and some of them had collaborated with 
Norwegians:  
 Professor Brown had extensive relations to Norway. He had, for 
instance, worked on a joint project with Norwegian colleagues for a 
couple of months in Bergen (about 30 years before the evaluation). At 
the time of the evaluation he had retired and was that person on the 
panel who had most time to spare for the evaluation work. He stayed 
on in Norway a week after the site visits to edit the report. 
 Dr. Bernard was engaged in mainly applied research. He had not 
been to Norway before, but knew some of the Norwegian researchers 
from conferences and meetings. Two of the Norwegian researchers 
had been on review panels that had evaluated Dr. Bernard’s pro-
gramme. 
 Professor Porter had had some relation with Norway. He had trained 
several of those who were now senior in the field. He had also 
published some papers jointly with Norwegian colleagues. 
 Professor Cage belonged to a different discipline than the rest of the 
panel. Cage had some prior knowledge of the research going on in 
Norway. He had also had a prior visit to one of the institutions subject 
to evaluation. 
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 Professor Smith did not participate in the site visits in Norway as he 
was ill. His contribution to the evaluation report was based on 
publications and written with the assistance of Professor Brown. 
(Smith did not find it convenient to be interviewed by me, and as he 
was peripheral in the process, I did not insist.) 
4.5.3 The organisation of the peer evaluation 
The terms of reference of the panel comprised three main questions: 
‘1. How does [the] Norwegian [research in the field] compare to that of other 
nations in terms of scientific quality (from a limited number of 
representative fields, aspects, etc.)? 
2.  Is Norway a leader in certain areas of [the field]? More importantly, are 
there areas where Norway has a special advantage? 
3. Are there important areas where [the] Norwegian ... research has a weak 
international standing and, if so, why?’106 
 
As the programme consisted of about 600 projects and eight different 
programme areas, a complete peer review of all the research would 
be an immense task. Only selected topics from five of the eight 
programme areas were subjected to peer review. The selection was 
done by the Research Council’s advisory committee for the field which 
selected some central topics from the programme areas to which the 
major part of the finance had been given. The ‘most appropriate 
institutes to represent this research’ were then identified and included 
in the evaluation. This meant the institutes to which the majority of the 
money had been channelled within these topics. 
 Each of the five peer evaluators were chosen because of his 
competence within one of the five topics (also called subjects or 
subject areas) to be evaluated. Prior to the site visits they got a list of 
published articles – and a parcel of selected papers for review – 
within their subject area from each of the relevant institutions. Each 
institute involved had been asked to send 10 to 20 of their best 
publications within each area under review. The total number of 
reviewed articles varied from about 30 to more than 60 for each 
reviewer. In a letter to the panel members, the chairman of the 
advisory committee says: 
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‘A sample of 10-20 publications/reports will be selected within each subject from a 
reference list complied by [the project group consisting of personnel from the consultancy 
firm and the social science institute]. Selection will be made primarily as a cooperative 
effort between the research institutions and the project group, and the publications will 
be forwarded to the members of the review group according to their speciality. The 
members may request additional publications from the reference list. The members 
responsible should then compose an individual report on the quality of the research in 
accordance with item [1)] in the mandate.’ 
This text does not specify the criteria for selecting publications, but all 
the interviewed reviewers meant that the institutions to be evaluated 
had selected the papers to be reviewed, and that they had selected 
their best publications. This crucial selection criterion is not mentioned 
in the evaluation report, nor are the selected papers listed. Professor 
Cage wanted to include a list of the reviewed papers to his chapter of 
the report, but he was not allowed to do this. He was not given any 
reason for this. Being interviewed, the Norwegian co-ordinator, 
Professor Evensen, and the chairman of the advisory committee could 
not remember this, but expected the reason for this decision to be 
mostly editorial, that the various chapters should have about the same 
sort of content – either all or none of them should include a list of 
reviewed papers.  
 The panel had a ten-day trip to the various Norwegian research 
units. The group split up at different sites much of the time – each 
member visiting the units doing research within his area of responsi-
bility. The panel members wrote separate chapters on their own 
subject areas, with no, or very little, involvement from the other panel 
members.  
 The interaction between the panel members in producing the 
report was concentrated around composing the first four pages of the 
evaluation report, containing the general conclusions of the peer 
evaluation. These conclusions included half a page with very positive 
answers to the three questions set out in the mandate, general 
assessments (of the organisation of the research, the research facilities 
and the staff, careers and publishing trends), a discussion of the 
balance between basic, strategic and applied research, and recom-
mendations for future research priorities. 
 The report’s main criticism of the programme is that there is not 
balance between the efforts in basic and applied research. It states that 
future success must depend upon a stronger foundation of basic 
knowledge. ‘[G]ood results that may have been obtained by luck or 
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intuition, can lead to disaster without a knowledge of the underlying 
mechanisms.’ The paragraph on the importance of basic research ends 
by saying that the imbalance between basic and applied research is 
the most serious criticism of the report. The importance of this 
message is further stressed by the fact that this clause is the only one 
in the whole report that is underlined. 
 In addition, the Research Council is advised to prolong the 
contract periods, establish a central steering committee for the whole 
programme and secure a better accordance between the hiring of staff 
and the investments in new space and equipment.107 As mentioned, 
the answers to the three questions set out in the mandate were very 
positive. The report states that Norwegian research in the field 
compares favourably with other nations, Norway leads in many 
aspects of the field, has several potential advantages, and there are no 
areas of the field where Norway has a week international standing.108 
4.5.4 The basis and criteria for evaluating the research 
As there were clear-cut divisions of task in the panel and little 
interaction, it was up to each of the evaluators to decide the basis and 
criteria for evaluation. When being interviewed all the evaluators said 
that the site visits were essential to the evaluation.  
 Professor Brown, who edited the report, considered himself to be 
the least applied researcher of the panel members. He said that the 
criteria for evaluation would depend on what kind of research one is 
evaluating – pure, strategic or applied – and that applicability would 
be an important criterion when evaluating this applied research 
programme. But one would always depend on basic research to 
understand causes and secure success, he said. He stressed novelty 
and originality as important criteria, but seemed to think that all the 
criteria on my list would be relevant for evaluating either applied or 
basic research. 
 Commenting on the emphasis of the report Professor Brown said: 
‘You take a particular institute and look at a particular programme, probably there is 
one paragraph on it [in our report]. ... There wasn’t time to go into great depth. And 
that is one of the reasons why, to some extent, that we tended to spend more time on 
these overall problems of space and pure and applied research: the more general things 
which came over to us. I think it would have been quite unfair to criticise a particular 
programme ... when [one] had only spent 20 minutes looking at it.’ 
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Dr. Bernard said that all the criteria on my list, except the properties of 
the researchers and the properties of the surroundings, were 
important. When asked what he thought the most important, applica-
bility or originality, he said that he would probably put applicability 
on top. ‘Originality always impresses me, but applicability is what 
drives me’ he said. He thought that an article in a reviewed journal 
was sure to be original, correct and consistent. When evaluating, he 
did not ‘second guess’ the publications, he said. Evaluating the 
programme he looked at output in relation to resources (input). As an 
indicator of high quality, in addition to publication in reviewed 
journals, he mentioned attracting students from abroad. He empha-
sised the informal information from the site visits as important. He had 
no questionnaire for the site visits and took no notes. When stressing 
the importance of the site visits he added that the site visits would not 
make much sense without his prior knowledge of Norwegian research 
and having read the publications. 
 Professor Porter said that all the listed criteria were important in 
some way or the other, and he was not willing to rank them. When 
evaluating he put emphasis on the quality of the people and the 
quality of their research. As an indicator of quality he mentioned the 
journal in which the results were published. The best research was the 
innovating and exiting one, he said – the research solving a real 
puzzle. The site visits were the most useful source of information for 
his assessments. But he said that in most cases the publications had 
given a correct picture of what was good and what was not so good. 
 Professor Cage was the most systematic of the evaluators. He had 
his own list of criteria and a questionnaire for the site visits. These lists 
were printed in his chapter of the evaluation report. His list of criteria 
was extensive. The emphases were on novelty and originality, 
relevance to the sector, and scientific criteria like accurate descriptions 
of methods and logical links between cause and effects. Where the 
work was published was also on the list. With regard to the list of 
criteria I confronted him with during the interview, Professor Cage 
said he would put correctness and applicability on top. He said that 
properties of the researchers were the least important. Reputation is 
irrelevant as a criterion, he said. It would only back established 
reputation. That would be dangerous with regard to young people, he 
thought. 
 Professor Cage said that the evaluation would have been difficult 
without prior knowledge of what was going on in Norway. He held a 
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different view from Professor Porter on the relation between publica-
tions and site visits as sources of information. When arriving Norway 
for the site visits Professor Cage had already written his review of the 
publications. This report was very different from the final report, he 
said. He therefore assumed that the site visits were more useful than 
the publications. (The content of his text that deals with the publica-
tions is actually not changed very much in the final report, but 
emphases are different and a few points are added, and one comment 
on the lack of international collaboration is omitted.) 
4.5.5 Evaluation strategies 
There are two sources of information on the strategies adopted by the 
reviewers. Firstly, the texts each of the panel members composed for 
the report, and secondly, the views on evaluation strategies expressed 
in the interviews. Reading the text one finds that the evaluation style 
differs from chapter to chapter (each panel member wrote and signed 
a chapter on his area). Some chapters are mainly descriptive, while 
other chapters contain more evaluative statements. All the chapters 
give rather general assessments and, for instance, do not mention the 
names of any of the researchers subjected to evaluation. When asked 
why this general approach was adopted, the reviewers gave various 
reasons. 
 Professor Brown thought that the chairman of the advisory 
committee and Professor Evensen had been concerned that people 
should not be mentioned by name. The signal reaching the panel was 
that this was a new venture for the evaluees and that one should not 
make it too difficult for them. Comparing this approach with his 
experience from other countries, Professor Brown said: ‘I think this 
was our Norwegian way of doing things. Softly, softly, softly sort of 
approach’. He also said that there wasn’t time to go into great depth 
(quoted above). 
 Dr. Bernard felt that it was unnatural to mention names, and could 
not remember this as a topic for the panel discussions. Doing 
evaluations he would always try to be constructive, he said. He also 
said that he – on the basis of the limited time available for this kind of 
review – would not like to write anything that could have an impact 
on careers. He saw the purpose of the report as something quite 
beyond criticism or praise of the people active in the programme. 
Such evaluations are conducted because governments are under 
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pressure to prove that they are spending their money wisely. As 
foreign expertise usually carries more weight than a statement from 
the scientific communities having obtained the money, one risks what 
happened in this case, he said; the foreign reviewers learnt far more 
from the review process than the Norwegians that read the report. 
 Professor Porter seemed to share Bernard’s views on the purpose of 
the evaluation – it was a question of accountability towards the 
Norwegian tax-payers. He perceived the evaluation as a sector review, 
and said this kind of review was very different from a review of an 
institution. Sector reviews are to be general and not name anybody, 
whereas reviews of institutions are more specific and can name the 
researchers being evaluated.109 As to the approach of the evaluation 
report in question, he said that they were very gentle, but that they 
spoke their minds. 
 Professor Cage thought that it had been clear from the outset that 
the assessments should be general and not of individuals. It was clear 
from the papers they had received from Norway before the evaluation, 
he said. He also thought that one would need much more time for the 
evaluation if one were to make a just assessment on individuals. One 
should always be careful when putting things in writing, he said, as it 
could cause tremendous damage to somebody’s reputation. He also 
said that they didn’t have the time to find out anything new. This 
supports what Bernard said, that the reviewers learnt more than the 
Norwegians from the evaluation. 
 The variations in the text of the evaluation report produced by the 
different reviewers are generally in accordance with the interview 
data. Professor Brown – who said that the panel adopted a soft 
approach not to make it difficult for the researchers and that there also 
wasn’t time to go into details, so they tended to concentrate on 
general issues like space and the balance between pure and applied 
research – also produced the most policy-oriented text. After descrip-
tions of the various research projects and topics, some general 
comments on their usefulness and potential and their good quality, he 
expressed concern about the lack of funds for basic research and a 
general lack of project management. 
 Dr. Bernard and Professor Porter, who expressed very similar 
views on the more ‘symbolic’ purpose of the evaluation, both wrote 
short, general and ‘soft’ assessments that were in accordance with this 
view – that the purpose of the evaluation was to see whether it was 
worth spending money on the programme. However, their approaches 
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were different. Professor Porter’s chapter is mainly descriptive. He 
gives accounts of the different research groups, their facilities and 
where the work is published. His comments contain both direct and 
indirect assessments. An example of the first is: ‘[the reviewed papers 
of this group] were all of good international standard.’ Examples of the 
latter are: ‘the ... group has an international reputation’ and ‘[the 
articles of this group] were published in journals of the highest 
calibre’. All the four units evaluated by Professor Porter get good 
assessments and it is difficult to read any rankings of the units from 
his comments. Dr. Bernard, on the other hand, makes it quite clear 
which of the two institutions he evaluated to be the best in his subject 
area. This conclusion does not seem to be unexpected, as this subject 
had been given very low priority at one of the institutions.  
 The most systematic of the evaluators, Professor Cage, who set up 
his own list of criteria and had a questionnaire for the site visits, wrote 
one of the most descriptive chapters. His chapter is by far the longest 
of the report. It contains descriptions of the facilities, listings of the 
topics of the site visit presentations, descriptions of the topics of the 
reviewed papers, and also statistics on the language and security 
classification of the research reports. Comments and assessments can 
scarcely be found in the sections presenting the different research 
units, but are gathered in a discussion section at the end of the 
chapter. This makes the evaluative statements in the chapter particu-
larly general. 
4.5.6 The decision making of the panel 
As mentioned, there was little interaction between the panel members 
when composing the report, except for writing the four pages 
containing the general conclusions and recommendations. When 
asked about how they reached agreements on these general conclu-
sions and who was the most active panel member, the interviewees 
offered various replies. I will begin with Dr. Bernard’s account which 
was by far the most outspoken: 
‘I think in the committee there was a definite division of power.... I think that most 
people deferred to [Porter] or to [Evensen] as the senior members, or the members with 
probably the biggest international or national or whatever reputation in their field in 
science. I think another member of the committee, [Brown], would like to think he 
would rank very highly. So there was kind of jockeying for influence.... In the case of 
[Brown] – he very early on in the evaluation came to the conclusion, that .. to a single 
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conclusion: that there was not nearly enough basic research going on in Norway. So it 
seems to me that the rest of the tour he spent his time trying to prove his theory. ... I 
think most people were in general agreement, I think.. The one that I remember as the 
one being most forceful, is [Brown]. I think I was much softer, in the opinion on basic 
research, but that is probably because of a personal bias for applied research. I mean, I 
am realistic enough to realise that applied research depends upon some basic research.’ 
Q: ‘And [Porter], in what way was he active in the group?’ 
A:  (Laughs) ‘Well, to be honest with you, there seemed to be some friction between 
myself and [Brown]. [Porter] seemed to be sitting back smiling, watching this and 
instigating things every now and then.... I think everybody agreed that there should 
probably be a little bit more basic research. It was a matter of degree, some people 
thought there should be much more.’ 
On the whole, this account is compatible with what Professor Brown 
said, but Brown stressed that it was very easy to agree on the 
recommendations: 
‘[Cage] might well think that applicability was the most important thing, and I suspect 
[Porter] would be somewhere in between. [Porter] would be interested in some more 
pure work on [certain subjects]. But his money is in [an area] which is essentially in 
applied. I would say I was the least applied of the group. So I would tend to be more 
interested in innovative, original science. The ... research [in our field] do tend to divide 
into two groups of people.’ 
Q: ‘Was it your idea to write about the balance between pure and applied science?’ 
A: ‘I think I felt strongest. But I think the others.. If you talk to [Porter] he would 
agreed 100% with that....’ 
Q: ‘[How did you put together] the recommendations?’ 
A: ‘That actually went very smoothly. Just occasionally I think.. I think there was a 
point where [Cage] were..  ... What happened was that we each put forward what we 
thought would be good for future research in our own field. If you take number seven ... 
[Cage] would have put that in. And it wouldn’t have been for us to argue that it 
shouldn’t go in. So we each had our input into that. But of course these are incredibly 
general, very very non-specific goals. ... 
Q: ‘Which are yours?’ 
A: ‘[Number] one would have been mine, two would have been mine, and then I would 
have a say in eight. [Cage] would have had ten and eleven and seven. And [Bernard] 
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would have done three, [Porter] four and five and six. You could have put in twenty 
things. That was a very easy thing to agree on.’ 
None of the other interviewees contradicted Brown’s information on 
who were the instigators of the different recommendations. It appears 
that not only the individual chapters, but also most of the recommen-
dations were the sum of the contributions from the various reviewers 
– and not ideas or conclusions arrived at through discussions or 
negotiations on the panel. The only point where there seems to have 
been divergent views and discussions bringing about (tacit) compro-
mises was the question of what emphasis should be put on the 
recommendation for more basic research. 
 A ‘reconciling’ reconstruction of the process based on the 
divergent versions offered by the informants, would be that the panel 
members held partly conflicting views about the need for more basic 
research to underpin applied research. They had no open confron-
tations on this issue, however, so it was not that clear that they were 
two against two on this issue: Brown and Porter were more strongly in 
favour of recommending more basic research than were Bernard and 
Cage.110 As nobody made any direct objections to a strong recommen-
dation for reallocations of funds to basic research there were no 
difficulties in reaching agreement – however there might have been 
some indirect argument and tacit negotiation on the issue, which 
moderated the statements in the report somewhat. The final conclu-
sion was generally framed, and did not claim that basic research was 
more crucial in some areas (e.g. the areas of Brown and Porter) than 
in others – which might have been the outcome in case of more open 
discussions about the issue. 
 When it came to writing the various area evaluations, there was 
hardly any interaction between the panel members at all. The co-
ordinator and the organiser of the evaluation offered their opinions on 
the drafts, but the evaluators read each other’s drafts without com-
menting on them. Porter was concerned with making use of his broad 
area of competence and talked with the other panel members about 
issues concerning their field of competence, but he did not offer direct 
comments on their drafts. 
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4.5.7 Reactions to the report 
There was no formal hearing or forum where the evaluated units 
could give their reactions to the evaluation report. As the report was 
rather general and did not capture great attention or interests in the 
research community, there does not seem to have been any need for 
such commenting either. 
 The evaluation was used as basis for a policy report from the 
advisory committee of the field. The advisory committee recommen-
ded a restructuring of the programme to improve the co-ordination of 
the programme, and pointed out central research questions based on 
the evaluation report and other sources. The panel’s recommendation 
for more basic research has been central in later policy processes. It 
has still been difficult to trace concrete effects of the report on 
distribution of funds. 
 
4.6 Peer evaluation of a multidisciplinary 
research programme 
4.6.1 Background 
The background of this programme and its evaluation were similar to 
that of Case 5. The programme had special priority from the Govern-
ment and it had asked the Research Council to evaluate its results. 
However, it was not the same research council that conducted the two 
evaluations, and they were organised in different ways. The evaluation 
of this multidisciplinary programme was divided in two: one report on 
the development of the programme and the research policy process – 
produced by an applied social science research institute – and one 
peer review report. The Research Council’s secretary for the pro-
gramme served as secretary for the peer panel, and as a link between 
the two different evaluations. As for Case 5, this study only deals with 
the evaluation conducted by the peer panel. 
4.6.2 The selection of evaluators 
The research institutions involved in the programme were not allowed 
to propose members for the panel. The Research Council asked the 
other Norwegian research councils involved in the programme and a 
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Swedish research council to propose candidates for the peer panel. 
The panel was finally appointed by the chairman of the Council 
organising the evaluation. The five members appointed to the panel 
were all Nordic professors in the disciplines concerned with the 
multidisciplinary programme to be evaluated.  
 One of the five, Professor Davidsen, was a Norwegian scientist 
holding a chair at a foreign university. As the only Norwegian of the 
group Professor Davidsen also served as a co-ordinator for the panel. 
The panel members had separate specialities within the topics covered 
by the multidisciplinary programme, but some of their topics were 
overlapping. Davidsen’s area of specialities within the programme to 
be evaluated for instance overlapped with the specialities of Professor 
Jensen, while Professor Ellis’ area was more clearly limited, as she had 
her training from another discipline than the rest of the panel and had 
very few common research interests with the rest of the group. 
 The two remaining panel members, Professor Carlin and Professor 
Ulberg, had their training in the same discipline as Jensen and 
Davidsen, but they both had their special competence within specific 
areas of the programme to be evaluated which did not overlap with 
the competence of any of the other members of the panel. In addition, 
Carlin had a broad interest and competence in most of the topics of 
the programme. He and Jensen were the only ones who felt a bit ‘at 
home’ in Ellis’ area. 
 All the panel members had prior knowledge and relations to the 
research communities in Norway, as they were all part of Nordic 
research networks. Ulberg was the one with the least prior knowledge 
and fewest connections to Norway. 
4.6.3 The terms of reference 
‘... give an assessment of the preliminary scientific results of the 
research and communication, including effects on research training 
and recruitment, and characteristics of the results regarding productiv-
ity, quality, novelty and (potential) applicability ...’ The panel was also 
asked to evaluate the programme’s success as a policy tool and to give 
advice concerning future priorities. 
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4.6.4 The evaluation work 
The panel met five times and in total was assembled for eight days. At 
their first meeting the panel members divided the subject areas of the 
programme between them, and set up a questionnaire to be sent to 
the research groups active in the programme. They were very 
concerned that they should only include research that had been 
sponsored through the programme.111 
 During the visits to the various institutions active in the pro-
gramme, all the panel members took part in the meetings – regardless 
of whether they concerned ‘their’ area or not. Including the Norwe-
gian co-ordinator, they all wrote their separate chapters of the report 
on the topics which they had been assigned at the first meeting.  
 The various drafts were put together and edited by the co-
ordinator with assistance from the secretary and a draft for the report 
was distributed to the panel members for comments. This draft was 
then discussed and revised at a final meeting. Just after this meeting 
the panel presented their preliminary report (orally) at a public 
conference that was arranged to publicise the programme. The final 
editing was then carried out by the co-ordinator, Davidsen, and the 
secretary, with some assistance from Carlin who worked at the same 
place as Davidsen. 
4.6.5 The basis and criteria for the assessments 
Professor Davidsen emphasised intra-scientific relevance as the most 
important criterion for the evaluation. In addition, results and extra-
scientific relevance had importance. Properties of the researchers and 
the surroundings were not relevant in such a context, he said. He 
added that though intra-scientific relevance was the main criterion for 
the assessments, reading the evaluation report one might get the 
impression that extra-scientific relevance was the main criterion. 
 As a basis for the assessments, Davidsen emphasised the publica-
tions from the programme and the interviews with the research co-
ordinators. He also made a few informal contacts with people in the 
research community to gain information. He did not seem to think that 
the site visits were crucial to the report. He said that the rankings of 
the various research groups would have been the same without the 
site visits. However, he thought that some groups probably had 
received a more favourable assessment than they would have without 
the site visits. 
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 Professor Carlin said that there were three different types of 
research in the programme: research to map the diffusion of problems, 
research analysing the causal mechanisms of problems, and research 
to reduce the problems. Different kinds of criteria for evaluation 
would have differing degrees of importance for these various kinds of 
research. He thought that the various panel members had adopted 
criteria appropriate to the different areas of the programme. 
 ‘Pure scientific criteria’, such as methods, would be of importance 
for all the research in the programme. He seemed to mean that when 
evaluating the extra-scientific relevance of a programme that had not 
yet had the time to have extra-scientific impacts, more scientific 
criteria – like connections to previous research, adequate methods, 
good analysis and presentation of results, and possibility of replication 
– could be used as indicators of future applicability of the research. 
When evaluating the programme he was also concerned about the 
properties of the researchers and organisational criteria, like recruit-
ment, reinforcement of networks and the quality of the co-ordinators. 
 As a basis for the assessments, he mentioned his prior knowledge 
of the research areas, the publications of the programme and informa-
tion gained during the site visits. He also had separate conversations 
(i.e. without the presence of the rest of the panel) with some 
researchers in one of the areas in order to gather specific information. 
 Professor Ulberg strongly emphasised publication in international 
journals, stringency and theoretical contributions as important criteria 
for evaluating research. He said Davidsen and Carlin had made him 
modify the emphasis on international publications in the evaluation of 
a specific research topic. International publication was not adequate 
for this topic, they had said. 
 In addition to publications, Ulberg stressed the interviews with 
research co-ordinators as important for the assessments. He also asked 
for the opinions of colleagues in his own country on the status of the 
Norwegian research. 
 Professor Jensen said that different criteria applied for the various 
kinds of evaluations. Each type of research and research institution 
had to be assessed according to its specific purpose. For the pro-
gramme in question, extra-scientific relevance was primary, he said. 
However, research institutions with different kinds of tasks were 
involved, and they had to be evaluated accordingly. The university 
departments could be assessed on purely scientific criteria, but the 
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applied institutes had to be evaluated according to applicability for 
their customers. 
 As a basis for his assessments, Jensen said that the site visits were 
essential. He also used opportunities for informal information. He did 
not put much emphasis on reading the publications of the program-
me. He said it was not realistic to do a systematic evaluation of all the 
written material, and only read thoroughly those items he thought 
especially interesting. 
 Professor Ellis said that results – in terms of theoretical contribu-
tions, productivity and publications – were the main concern when 
assessing research programmes. That the results had to fulfil scientific 
criteria – like consistency and profundity – was self-evident. Regarding 
the importance of intra-scientific and extra-scientific relevance, she 
was concerned that small countries should concentrate their research112 
on topics that were special to their country and not do all kinds of 
analyses that are ‘fashionable’ internationally at the moment (but she 
emphasised that it was very important to be internationally oriented in 
the way that one was up-to-date on the research from other countries 
and participated in the international research community). In that way 
one could become really good at particular areas and ‘export’ high 
quality research to the international research community. This would 
both yield good research and relevance for society at large. She 
mentioned originality, continuity and cumulativity as features of good 
research. Publications were the most important basis for the evaluation 
report, but the overall impression provided through the site visits was 
also very useful for the report, she said. 
4.6.6 Evaluation strategies 
Davidsen seemed to be in favour of more outspoken evaluations. He 
was concerned about the pressures placed upon evaluators to adopt 
‘soft’ evaluation strategies.  
‘People place quite strong restrictions upon themselves when writing [evaluations] ... I 
don’t know if one should. Research communities are small ... I don’t think one really 
wants to express one’s opinion if a project is bad. One doesn’t get further than vague 
statements. Then it is up to the reader. Reading vague statements makes one 
understand that maybe this is not so good. ... Due to various ... considerations – for 
instance you don’t want to scorn the adviser or the whole group – you wrap up your 
critique, for instance use the structural context to explain why some institutes are better 
than others.’ 
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Carlin said that the approach of the report was a subject of discussion 
for the panel. He and Ellis tended to favour an approach that was 
more detailed on the project level, while the others made more overall 
statements, he said. When editing the report these differences in 
approaches were moderated in favour of the overall style. Carlin 
thought that the final report was neither a good policy evaluation, nor 
a good micro-evaluation, but that this was probably the most useful 
approach seen from an outsider’s point of view. 
 Jensen said that it was not reasonable for a visiting panel to produce 
an evaluation of the results of research. It should be on a more 
general level, on the development of the field and so on. He said that 
he had adopted a much softer evaluation strategy than Davidsen, 
whom he thought had adopted an unduly harsh approach on his 
drafts. He thought it more constructive to point out what was good 
than to criticise specific researchers or groups. He added that he 
thought the responsibly of the co-ordinator of a panel (i.e. Davidsen) 
should be to co-ordinate and edit, not to write on one area of the 
evaluation. 
 Ulberg said that peer panels tended to write kind evaluations, as 
they normally were asked to evaluate their friends and international 
colleagues. He said that if the politicians asking for the evaluations 
would choose to interview the peer panel in an informal setting, 
instead of reading an evaluation report, they might get to hear some 
‘truths’ that would not be put into print. 
 Ellis seemed to be in favour of a ‘soft’ evaluation strategy, not 
causing unnecessary harm to people. At the same time she said that it 
was very annoying when colleagues expected her to write favourable 
assessments of their research so that they could obtain a position they 
had applied for. She said it was easier to do evaluations in foreign 
countries in the sense that she did not have to worry so much about 
reactions to the report. 
4.6.7 The decision making of the panel 
The evaluation report produced by this panel is the least vague among 
the six cases studied. There is no explicit ranking of the concerned 
institutes and research projects, but it is not difficult to read out of the 
text which units were better. This panel was also the one with the 
most explicit disagreements among its members. These disagreements 
seem mainly to include two of the panel members, Professor Davidsen 
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and Professor Jensen, and concerned the assessments particularly of 
one of the institutes active in the programme. That both Davidsen and 
Jensen were quite willing to talk about the matter, and also provided 
me with copies of their correspondence on their controversy, also 
demonstrates that the controversy was open and explicit.  
 Being interviewed, Professor Davidsen was quick to say that the 
starting points for the discussions on the panel were not reflected in 
the final report. He said that from the discussions during the site visits 
he had got the impression that there were no major disagreements 
between the panel members. Disagreements didn’t come to the 
surface until the panel members had read each other’s drafts, he said. 
Particularly one of the panel members had been critical to his first 
draft, saying it was too harsh in its assessments, Professor Davidsen 
told me, and continued: 
‘The others didn’t take a clear stand. ... So it was an internal discussion between two 
persons in the group. It was solved of course.’ 
Q: ‘How?’ 
A: ‘I moderated my critique. There weren’t very many other possibilities. There were 
some rather clear accusations that personal conflicts had influenced the [my] draft. I 
thought that that was a totally unreasonable interpretation of course.’ 
Later on I got the story from the point of view of the other party to 
this disagreement, Professor Jensen. He started giving me his views on 
evaluation, research policy and the importance of applied research. He 
had an extensive background in academia, research administration 
and sector research (applied research), he told me, continuing: 
‘I was the only person on the panel with that kind of orientation. The others were 
classic, pure university people who weren’t concerned about applicability when assessing 
the research. That was what brought about some very strong tensions. I, for instance, 
from my point of view, could not make sense of the assessments [Davidsen] gave the 
Norwegian research. It was nonsense113 because there is a pure research orientation and 
then there is an applied research orientation. ... The others used traditional criteria – 
number of publications in prestigious international journals. I revolted against that in 
the group.’ 
Later on, talking about writing the report he said: 
‘I thought [Davidsen] was too close to the Norwegian scene and it was very clear to me 
that he had old enemies in Norway who should be punished through this evaluation. ... 
There I intervened and said that if that was to be into print I should be allowed to 
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write naughty things about some people ... within the [B area].114 I had chosen the 
strategy of pointing out what was good and not so bad. ... General critical comments on 
individual researchers serve no purpose.’ 
The data leave no doubts about the nature and outcome of the 
decision making. This is an example of group decisions resulting in 
moderated evaluation statements. The nature of the disagreements 
between Jensen and Davidsen are rather complex. Professor Jensen 
gave three reasons why he could not accept Professor Davidsen’s 
assessments. He disagreed with the underlying criteria used by 
Davidsen (applied research should not be evaluated by the criteria of 
basic research), he suspected that Davidsen’s draft had a personal bias 
(that he wanted revenge on old enemies), and he disagreed with 
Davidsen’s evaluation strategy (harsh criticism will harm people and 
serves no good purpose). The last was also a consideration of fairness. 
The report would not be fair unless one used the same evaluation 
strategy for all the concerned units.115 
 Davidsen said that because of the accusation against him he had 
no other choice than to moderate his assessments. These accusations 
were made in writing in a letter from Professor Jensen, dated a week 
before the final meeting. The letter was distributed to all the panel 
members. In addition to criticising the draft report, Jensen in this letter 
said that he could not accept it and threatened both to write a 
dissenting minority statement to the report and to rewrite his own 
chapter of the report, giving the ‘B area’ harsher criticism.116 
4.6.8 Reactions to the report 
The Research Council made a plan for the continuation of the 
program on the basis of the evaluation report. The main ideas of the 
report were influential: further support especially to some ‘young 
underdeveloped areas’, and giving priority to the most qualified 
groups. The program structure was also simplified, as suggested, but 
in another way than the report recommended. 
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5 Case comparisons: analysis 
with emphasis on common 
features 
The structure of this chapter follows the scheme of analysis (Table 3.1) 
starting with the last column then going ‘backwards’ to see in what 
way the process or the organisational constraints may explain the 
outcome. First, the outcome – in terms of the assessments and criteria 
of the six evaluation reports – is analysed (5.1). Then, the effects of 
approaches and processes are analysed. Lastly, the influence of the 
organisational constraints on the process and the outcome is dis-
cussed. Overviews of the data are given in Tables 5.2 to 5.7 – the 
scheme of analysis with data from each of the cases. 
 
5.1 The evaluations reports 
5.1.1 Assessments ‘between the lines’ and focus on various 
units 
All the reports have some descriptive parts. They describe research topics, 
resources, composition of staff, and similar, of the units under review. 
One might also expect all research evaluation to contain explicit 
assessments of the research, but as mentioned, Case 3 is an exception and 
avoids this.117 Half of the cases have substantial explaining elements. In 
Case 2, the evaluation of an engineering institute, the report explains 
why certain structures are essential for the institute. In Case 3, the 
evaluation of social science institutes, the report places particular 
emphasis on explaining why the framework conditions of the 
institutes are unsatisfactory. In Case 6, the evaluation of a 
multidisciplinary programme, the report to some degree explains why 
some projects and units involved in the programme have been more 
successful than others. 
 A central common characteristic is that the reports emphasise what is 
positive and are very careful with negative assessments – except 
indirectly, for example, by stating that more resources are needed or 
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simply by omitting evaluative statements on the not-so-good units or 
projects. They all avoid explicit grading or ranking of the evaluated 
units. This is done to varying degrees. The report of Case 3 gives the 
reader no idea of which institute is the better or the worse. In the 
other cases such information might be read between the lines, Case 6 
being the most explicit. 
 Regarding the ‘unit of analysis’ of the various reports, the two most 
similar are the two field evaluations. They both evaluate sub-fields by 
looking at the research groups at the various institutions in the field 
and are the only evaluations mentioning individuals, i.e., the best 
researchers are mentioned by name in the report. Their common 
approach may be explained by the fact that both panels were 
provided with copies of previous evaluations of research fields. 
 The two institute evaluations assess different levels. The panel 
evaluating the engineering institute assesses the institute’s expertise in 
various areas pointing out which are the best and which need to be 
strengthened. The evaluation of the social science institutes evaluates 
‘the kind of institutes’ without assessing the various units or their 
research areas. 
 The two programme evaluations also differ. In Case 6 the 
programme areas are evaluated by looking at the projects sponsored 
by the programme at the various units/institutes involved, while in 
Case 5 the field and the sub-fields as such – not the program-
me/programme areas – are the primary subject of evaluation. The 
emphasis on assessments on the level of research units or projects 
varies between the reviewers in Case 5 (and also in other cases, but 
not as clearly as in Case 5 where there was no editing of the individ-
ual drafts).  
 The conclusion to draw from this lack of correlation between the 
scope of evaluation (discipline/field, programme or institution) and 
the units focused upon in the evaluations, is that the scope of the 
evaluation does not necessarily influence what levels or units the 
panels focus on when assessing the research (see Section 5.3). 
However, when the given scope is related to a given model or 
institutionalised ‘unit of analysis’ (for instance, from previous reports), 
the scope might be important for the units focused on in the reports 
(as for the field/discipline evaluations that were provided with copies 
of previous reports, see Section 5.3.1).  
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5.1.2 Tacit criteria and ‘evaluee-supporting’ conclusions 
When it comes to the question of whether the assessments are based on 
the evaluators’ own opinions and direct assessments or opinions of 
other informants/indirect indicators, there are more clear differences 
between the various kinds of evaluations. The two mixed panel 
evaluations of applied institutes (Cases 2 and 3) both depend explicitly 
on information from external experts or users in addition to the panel 
members’ own judgements. The two field evaluations, on the other 
hand, both appear to be based only on the panel members’ own 
(direct) assessments. No external experts were explicitly consulted. 
The programme evaluations give a more mixed picture. The evaluators 
in Case 6 and most of the evaluators in Case 5 said that they based 
their assessments on their own direct judgements. The exception was 
one applied scientist evaluating applied science in Case 5 who 
emphasised indirect indicators. 
 In general, the applied-oriented evaluators found it important to 
consult other experts or take the general viewpoint (i.e. the ‘reputa-
tion’) into account, while academics seemed to think that their own 
assessments were sufficient. Some academics also said that letting 
others influence the assessments they had been asked to conduct 
would be wrong; one of them also referred to a kind of ‘Matthew 
effect’. Evaluations based on reputation reinforce present differences 
in status and possibilities of obtaining funds for the researchers/units 
under review, and might do so without any basis in the actual 
standard of their research. Yet, if academics have an impression of 
breaking some tacit rule when basing their assessments on the 
opinions of others they might hesitate to be frank about their evalua-
tion practices. The data might therefore say more about differing rules for 
academic and non-academic research evaluation than about 
substantial differences in actual practice. 
 Few of the reports explicitly state which criteria underlie the 
assessments (as mentioned, Case 3 and one of the areas in Case 5 are 
the exceptions). Central parts of the interviews with the evaluators 
dealt with the question of the bases of the assessments. A list with the 
following concepts was given to the interviewees as a starting point 
for talking about evaluation criteria: 
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Table 5.1 List of criteria given interviewees 
 
Pure scientific criteria:  consistency, correctness, stringency, profundity, 
etc. 
Results: theoretical contributions, productivity, publi-
cations (how much, where) 
Intra-scientific relevance: relevance of subject, novelty, originality, cumul-
ativity, citations 
Extra-scientific relevance:  applicability, use, effects 
Properties of the researchers: achievement, motivation, ambitions, reputation, 
international position 
Properties of the surroundings: equipment, freedom, group size, financing, 
organisation  
 
Confronted with this list the evaluators reacted differently. Some talked 
about the bases of evaluation in terms of evidence and clear criteria 
for good research, and gave the impression that evaluation work is a 
straightforward and easy task for them. Others said evaluation work is 
difficult and/or that they base their judgements more on feelings or 
impressions of the quality of the research, and were not willing to set 
up a list of criteria. The majority answered somewhere in between 
these two positions. 
 Evaluators within the social sciences and the humanities (Cases 3 
and 4) were generally more reluctant to rank or point out central 
criteria than evaluators from other areas. The reactions of evaluators 
from other areas varied more. Some evaluators in Case 1 (natural 
science fields) seemed quite certain in their choice of criteria, not 
hesitating to point out a few criteria as the most important, while 
others on the same panel emphasised that the criteria were inter-
related and that they were all important in some respect. 
 The evaluators of the engineering research institute (Case 2) were 
less concerned about pointing out specific criteria, but they had firm 
(and divergent) opinions about the general bases and objectives of 
evaluating research. Some emphasised the market as the final 
evaluator while others emphasised the need of quality assessments by 
peers. 
 Most of the evaluators of the natural science programme (Case 5) 
had less firm opinions. One panel member emphasised that criteria 
depend on the kind of research under review, another said that 
scientific quality is difficult to assess, a third said the criteria were 
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difficult to rank, a forth had no difficulty pointing out his central 
criteria. 
 The reactions of the evaluators of the multidisciplinary research 
programme (Case 6) were also mixed. Two of them said that criteria 
depend on context. Others on this panel had no problem doing a 
general ranking of the criteria/pointing out the central ones. 
 Trying to conclude something about the criteria underlying the 
various evaluations despite such ambiguities, we see that output (i.e. 
results), and intra- or extra-scientific relevance seem to be central 
dimensions in most of the evaluations (see Tables 5.2–5.7). Some kind 
of output and intra-scientific relevance was central to all evaluations, 
except Case 3. The members of this panel did not think that intra-
scientific relevance was central for the evaluation of applied social 
science, neither did they assess the research output explicitly. Extra-
scientific relevance, on the other hand, was, as expected, a dimension 
in all evaluations dealing with applied research (Cases 2, 3, 5 and 6).  
 Getting down to the criteria for assessing these dimensions the picture is 
more obscure. As mentioned, there are some differences in clarity 
between the cases. Some of the panel members evaluating natural 
sciences emphasised criteria like novelty and profundity (see 
especially Case 1), while panels dealing with humanities/social science 
were more often unwilling to pick out specific criteria. This may 
indicate a somewhat clearer basis of assessments within the natural 
sciences studied than within the social sciences and the humanities 
(Becher 1989; Whitley 1984). Another possible explanation is that 
natural scientists (in the studied research fields) think that assessments 
should be criteria-based, and therefore speak in terms of perceived 
common criteria, like novelty and profundity, even though the nature 
of their assessments might not be substantially more based on explicit 
criteria than assessments in social science or humanities. The fact that 
panels of natural scientists did not discuss the basis or criteria of 
assessments while the social science panel did, gives little help in 
answering the question. That the natural scientists were experienced 
in this sort of evaluation task and found no reason to discuss the basis 
of this, is compatible both with obscure, tacit and personally based 
assessments, and with clear and standardised assessments. However, 
the variations in answers and the way answers were framed, indicate 
tacit and personal assessments also in natural science fields studied. 
 As the criteria to use were not explicitly discussed (except in Case 
3) on the evaluation panels, the panel members were often unaware 
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of the different opinions among the panel members about the basis of 
assessments. Yet, some informants were good at guessing other panel 
members’ emphases. This indicates some reliable ‘prejudices’ about 
colleagues’ opinions or some kind of tacit communication between the 
panel members about the basis of assessments. In Case 3, which 
ended up not assessing quality, the panel seems to have had the most 
profound debate about how to assess the quality of the research under 
review, indicating that criteria are discussed when assessments are 
conceived as difficult and also that such discussions may stress the 
problems and blur explicit assessments rather than promoting them.118 
 In accordance with the ‘gentle style’ and overall positive assess-
ments, the conclusions of the reports are positive and can generally be 
said to praise the research under review. The degree of praise varies 
as mentioned. The report in Case 3 is too vague to be said to praise 
(or criticise) the research or the units under review, but still gives a 
positive impression of the units. The report in Case 5 is by far the 
most positive – distributing close to unstinted praise. All reports 
contain some policy recommendations, mostly in terms of more 
resources to particular areas/efforts. Four of the reports also empha-
sise the importance of basic research. The reasons for such positive 
and ‘evaluee-supporting’ conclusions are analysed below. 
 
5.2 The evaluation approaches and processes 
5.2.1 Methods: site visits and reviewing publications 
The primary sources of information varied for the six evaluations. All 
the evaluation panels conducted site visits and reviewed research 
publication. Case 3 might be said to be an exception when it comes to 
reviewing publications. The panel only made some sporadic reviews 
and the evaluation report does not directly refer to the evaluators’ 
opinions on the research/publications. All panels also received various 
kinds of written information from the research groups, either at the 
site visits or mailed in advance (overview of publications, staff, 
resources, organisation, strategic documents, etc.). Other methods 
adopted were questionnaires to the evaluees (Cases 3, 4 and 6), 
interviews with external informants (Cases 2 and 3), and statistics on 
input and output indicators (Cases 3 and 4). A reference group 
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consisting both of external and internal119 informants was appointed in 
one case (Case 3) and served as an information and discussion forum 
for the evaluation panel. 
 What does the information sources say about the focus of the 
evaluation? In the four cases using questionnaires to evaluees and/or 
information from external informants, site visits and review of research 
publications must in some sense be less dominating information 
sources than in the two cases not using such information (the two 
natural science cases, Cases 1 and 5, in which publication review and 
site visits were the only major sources). However, the implications of 
such additional information sources vary. In Cases 4 and 6 (one field 
and one programme evaluation) the questionnaire information largely 
complemented the peer review part based on publication review and 
site visits, while in the two institute evaluations (Case 2 and 3) the use 
of a variety of information sources meant less emphasis on the review 
of scholarly quality. 
5.2.2 ‘Peer-supporting’ evaluators 
As mentioned, the evaluation panels treated the evaluees ‘gently’. 
Positive aspects are emphasised and one has to read ‘between the 
lines’ to discover negative aspects. Four of the evaluations (Cases 1, 2, 
3 and 5) also defend the research they evaluate against heavy external 
pressure by recommending more resources for basic research. 
Generally the evaluators were concerned about the potential use of 
their evaluation report, i.e., they considered the political context of the 
evaluation while writing their reports. 
 Most peer evaluators saw their role as a helper primarily for the 
research under review, not the Research Council itself. The evaluees 
were their primary allies, not the body commissioning the evaluation. 
Not all evaluators held this point of view, and their emphasis on the 
need of protecting the interests of the evaluees varied. But as experts 
promoting a gentle approach were represented on all panels, no 
report contained any kind of harsh criticism. Evaluators seeing their role as 
helpers of the evaluees were one reason for the vague reports. When putting together the reports 
the peers avoided details that would not serve the kind of policy they thought appropriate. 
 The peer evaluators were in this respect ‘allies’ of the evaluees. 
They wanted to help the ‘needy’ units, as well as securing support to 
good units.120 In such a situation vagueness serves a political end, i.e. 
giving the evaluators some control over the potential allocative use of 
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the evaluation report – at least ‘preventing’ funding authorities from 
using the report to cut down funds – by emphasising the evaluees’ 
needs of more resources. 
 Assessments on a departmental/group level may also bring up the 
problem of avoiding to rank good researchers in a ‘bad’ depart-
ment/group according to its low average. One solution to this problem 
was to avoid explicit ranking or comparisons of groups/departments, 
and in this way avoid an evaluation report that would appear as unfair 
for some of the evaluees (and also avoiding comparisons/ranking of 
groups departments that might be used for reallocations that would 
punish good individual researchers in departments/groups that in sum 
were below average). Another way to handle the problem was to 
mention the good individual researchers by name in the report, and 
thereby direct assessments more to the individual level than the 
departmental level. 
5.2.3 Interaction/discussion: Controversies handled through 
compromises 
Disagreements on the panels were an additional reason for vague 
reports. The resolving of disagreements invariably resulted in more vague reports. 
Dissension in a public evaluation was seen as undesirable by the 
panel members. Dissension might be seen as detrimental both to the 
authority of the report and to outsiders general confidence in the research 
area under review,121 i.e. the peer reviewer’s research area. One way 
to reach agreement on the final draft was to avoid all critical 
comments that not all panel members could agree on, resulting in 
(more) positive reports, as in Cases 1 and 6. In these two cases, the 
party promoting the most negative evaluation yielded, and a consen-
sus report was obtained despite the lack of agreement among the 
panel members. In Case 6, one panel member won partly by threat-
ening to write a dissension. In Case 1, the negotiations were far more 
tacit and dissension was never an alternative. Those least willing to 
invest time and effort on the evaluation process ‘yielded’. The panel 
member most willing to invest time and effort was the one working in 
the sub-field subjected to controversy, and he got the final say – 
writing a positive assessment and apparently without perceiving that 
two other panel members had opinions clearly diverging from his. In 
Chapter 4 it was suggested that this situation can be understood as a 
Chicken Game where the winner has not perceived the controversy 
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(discussed in Section 3.2.4). With regard to the controversy in Case 6, 
it was suggested that part of the explanation of the outcome was that 
the parties had asymmetrical preferences (as illustrated in Figure 3.2).  
 In both cases (1 and 6), the yielding of the most negative panel 
members resulted in less criticisms in the evaluation reports. The 
panel members held divergent views on what, if anything, might be 
criticised. They all had a possibility to dissent to other’s assessments, 
but a wish to avoid dissension. The result was more positive but 
somewhat vaguer reports, i.e. reports with less distinction between the 
various units under review in terms of good or bad research. In both 
these situations there was some overlap of competencies that allowed 
some intervention from other panel members. In situations with less 
overlap the pull toward kind conclusions may be even stronger. 
Because scholars are likely to defend their own kind of research, a 
panel member defending a unit or area under review is likely to be 
closer to this research than the potential opponents are likely to be, 
most likely giving the ‘defender’ the last word, as the potential 
opponents do not know the area under controversy well enough to 
legitimately contest the defender’s assessments (e.g. the tacit disagree-
ment between the A-B experts and the C-D experts in Case 1). In 
general it may be supposed that more is at stake for the defenders 
than for the (potential) opponents. 
 Another way to handle disagreements was to include the various 
divergent opinions in the final reports, without presenting them as 
divergent or saying that they represented the views of particular panel 
members (see especially Case 2). This corresponds to the tacit 
dissension outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation that was 
described in Section 3.2.4 – an outcome where everybody gets his/her 
opinions included in the report (and no one yields or attacks). This 
kind of ‘agreement’ resulted in more pluralistic reports containing all 
opinions represented on the panel, but not necessarily any clearer 
conclusions, as the various opinions were not seen in relation to each 
other. 
 What group effects on the panels can be identified? Four kinds of 
group effects were discussed in Chapter 3:  
(1) The interaction has qualities that enhance the review work, for 
example that more ideas/information are considered by each 
member, or that the group members gain new insights through 
dialogue. 
 
 159
(2) The group members try to impress each other and therefore work 
harder (or appear tougher) than when working alone. 
(3) Shared responsibility results in collective shirking. 
(4) The group situation leads to uniformity/groupthink, including 
impairment of critical thinking, less rigorous review and suppres-
sion of minority opinions/false consensus. 
 
If we limit the analysis to group effects regarding the assessments of 
the research under review, there is little evidence for the first kind of 
effect. As the processes on the evaluation panels were characterised 
by division of tasks, little interaction on assessments and mostly tacit 
compromises in case of disagreements, the opportunities for dialogues 
leading to new insights were limited. In Case 1, one panel member said that 
he always learnt a lot in these kinds of panel meetings with so many 
different views represented. However, this was the only panel member 
mentioning such learning. (Other panel members put emphasis on 
what they had learned from the research under review.) This does not 
mean that dialogue on the panels did not affect the assessments. In 
Case 6, for example, panel interaction lead to modified emphasis on 
publication in international journals and more overall and less detailed 
assessments. In general, there was much more dialogue on how to 
solve the evaluation task and on the policy conclusions, than on the 
assessments of research as such. Especially in Case 3 the data give the 
impression of fruitful dialogue on the bases for evaluation and the 
content of the evaluation report. In Case 2, on the other hand, it was 
stated that the panel members obtained a better understanding of each 
others’ points of view through the dialogue, but they did not change 
their opinions. 
 In the case with some overlap of competence and open 
confrontation on the panel (Case 6), one panel member worked harder to 
get his point of view into the report. The same was the case with the 
peer representative on the only panel with a majority of non-peers 
(Case 2) who made a special effort to get his point of view on the 
importance of scientific autonomy into the report. In both cases the 
special efforts affected the outcome. This phenomenon is not 
equivalent to the group effect (2) above. More weight was attached to 
good argumentation, but not necessarily to more thorough review 
work. The latter phenomenon, a more thorough review to make a 
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good impression, seems to have appeared for a panel member in Case 
4 – a ‘junior’ panel member with no prior experience with this kind of 
evaluation. 
 The material contains two cases of individual shirking (Cases 2 and 
3), but nothing pointing towards collective shirking, except maybe for 
Case 3 where review of research quality was reduced to a minimum. 
 The phenomenon of groupthink, which by its very nature is hard to 
detect, has not been identified in any of the cases. It can be 
concluded, however, that the kind of setting and processes found – 
division of tasks and little interaction on assessment – tell us that 
groupthink was not very likely to dominate the evaluations.  
5.2.4 Contextual norms 
The evaluators’ accounts say a great deal about what is seen as the 
correct way of conducting research evaluation in various contexts. 
Some of the contextual factors are obvious. The restricted time and 
large scope of the evaluation set limits as to what could be done, and 
reduced the evaluators’ ambitions to do a rigorous review of the 
evaluation material. Compared to micro-level evaluations (like grant 
review and manuscript review) the reviews were rather superficial. 
One evaluator of a programme evaluation (Case 6) said, for instance, 
that he looked through the research publications and read the 
abstracts but had no ambition to go through it all. In another case, the 
scope of the evaluation was seen as far too encompassing and only a 
little part of the programme, consisting of more than 600 projects, was 
selected for review (Case 5). The detail of review also vary between 
members of the same panel, indicating that in addition to scope and 
other contextual factors, various individual factors influence the rigour 
of the reviews (group effects may also influence the rigour of review, 
as explained above). 
 The combination of peer evaluators and public reports also seems to 
foster some contextual rules. As the evaluations might be acted upon 
by authorities outside the scientific community, to consider the 
possible effects of the evaluation report was seen as part of the task, 
and most of the peer evaluators were careful not to write anything that 
might harm the resource situation of the evaluees. As mentioned, 
several interviewees emphasised that they tried to offer an evaluation 
that would serve the institutions – to point out the positive sides and 
be very careful with negative assessments. In this way the interests of 
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the field/institute/programme or specific researchers were taken care 
of by strategic emphases in the evaluation report.  
 The strength of such contextual norms may vary between 
disciplines and between countries. Some non-Nordic evaluators 
interviewed said that they perceived Nordic evaluations as less 
outspoken than evaluations in their own countries. As panels consist-
ing of Nordic experts were not ‘softer’ than the international panels, 
this would indicate that non-Nordic experts with a more outspoken 
evaluation tradition complied to ‘Nordic norms’ – adopting a less 
outspoken style. If so, the site of the evaluation was more important 
than the nationality of the experts. However, the data does not allow 
any conclusions on national differences. Several non-Nordic experts 
emphasised general needs to be careful in making negative assess-
ments – arguments having nothing to do with complying to local 
norms. Some of these experts were from the same country as experts 
saying Nordic evaluations were less outspoken. 
 In Section 3.1 several central contextual considerations for peer 
evaluators were discussed. Most of these can be found in the accounts 
of the interviewed peer evaluators and help explain both the ‘gentle’ 
approach and the ‘evaluee-supporting’ conclusions of the evaluation 
reports. Section 3.1 points to various reasons for scholars for being 
loyal to their scientific community and/or paradigm. The strongest 
factor is perhaps the identity with a field, and/or a ‘school’ or 
paradigm – internalised through training and social interaction. There 
might also be more concrete (but maybe not much more conscious) 
concerns linked to protecting your field and/or ‘school’, regarding 
career etc. – guarding the value of your invested talent. Such loyalty 
and identity may explain a broad range of peer review behaviour. 
Firstly, scholarly viewpoint and identity matter, and might be decisive, 
for judgements on the adequacy and value of research. Secondly, 
loyalty to a field is likely to make the evaluator consider the effects of 
assessments and recommendations, as these will regard his or her field 
and colleagues (the evaluees). If a peer evaluator has to choose 
between loyalty to the evaluees or the body commissioning the 
evaluation, loyalty to the evaluees is the likely choice as they repre-
sent his or her field, at least if the evaluees share the evaluator’s 
scholarly viewpoint. 
 Many of the interviewed peer evaluators seemed to understand 
their gentle approach as a result of obvious, legitimate norms of 
 162 
government-commissioned research evaluations: the peer evaluator’s 
role is to help promote the research in the field under review. 
However, in the interviewees’ accounts of the motives of their 
antagonist panel members, we have seen that gentle and/or positive 
evaluations may also be understood as biased and subjective – i.e. not 
an indisputable, legitimate approach. This was notably not anyone’s 
understanding of his/her own assessments, but his/her understanding 
of another panel member’s assessments.122 
 Whereas none of the evaluation processes studied resulted in 
harsh reports, other kinds of contexts might have led to such results. 
The context that is the most likely to lead to an evaluation report 
distributing harsh criticism is an evaluation within a research field 
containing various ‘schools’ that define good research in clearly 
conflicting ways – and there is no co-operation or loyalty between the 
parties – where the evaluation panel belong to another ‘school’ than 
the evaluees and consider the evaluees as non-constructive antagonists 
competing for the same resources as their own ‘school’. In such cases 
there is no particular reason why an evaluator should not put his/her 
opinions into print without polishing them (se also Section 6.5.2). In 
the cases I have studied, however, these kind of ‘unpolished’ reports 
were avoided because the panels contained persons covering all 
relevant ‘schools’ concerned. As mentioned, compromises between the 
evaluators (overt or tacit) removed harsh comments from the final 
reports.  
 Cases 1 and 6 would have contained rather clear criticism if the 
more ‘negative experts’ on the panel had written the assessments 
alone. ‘Negative experts’ include those who did not mind pointing out 
what they did not think worth supporting. ‘Tough’ peer evaluations do 
occasionally appear in Norway. Two examples are an evaluation of 
Norwegian work research (NORAS 1992) by a one-man ‘panel’, and an 
evaluation of computer science (NAVF 1992), both provoking critical 
response from the evaluees (see also Section 7.4). One might end up 
in a tautological argument claiming that these evaluations were harsh 
because the ‘panels’ were homogenous, if the indicator of a homoge-
nous panel is that the panel is able to agree on harsh criticism. It is a 
fact however, at least according to the hearings/reactions to the 
reports, that these evaluation ‘panels’ did not contain representatives 
from the traditions that were criticised. 
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5.3 Organisational constraints 
Having studied the content of the six evaluation reports and the 
various evaluation approaches and processes, the question remains in 
what way organisational constraints affected the evaluation processes 
and products.  
5.3.1 The scope and subject of the evaluation 
The first factor in the scheme of analysis (Table 3.1) is the scope of the 
evaluation task. The size and number of institutes, fields or programmes 
selected for evaluation might influence both the evaluation process 
and the content of the evaluation report. As differences in scope are 
not evident in the evaluations studied, case comparisons regarding this 
issue are not easy. Selecting my cases I expected the two field 
evaluations to be larger and more encompassing than at least the 
single-institute evaluation. Measured in number of faculty or projects 
under review, there is no evidence that the work-load for each 
evaluator varied substantially with the various kinds of evaluation 
(evaluations of institutes, programmes or fields). The number of 
researchers or ‘R & D person-years’ at the three institutes in Case 3 (85 
person-years) are close both to the number of R & D person-years at 
the one institute evaluated in Case 2 (about 100 person-years) and to 
the number of permanently employed faculty in the fields evaluated in 
Cases 1 and 4 (71–100). The size of the two programmes (Cases 5 and 
6) are more difficult to measure in number of researchers. One 
programme contained 349 projects, the other 602 projects. For the 
largest programme (Case 5) only some subject areas were selected for 
review and as the evaluators reviewed 30-60 articles each, the scope 
of the evaluation did not differ considerably from the other cases.123 
However, judged by the responses from interviewees, it is somewhat 
more difficult to get an overview of large national programmes than a 
field limited by a set number of people in a set number of depart-
ments. With this exception, the size of the evaluation task should be 
considered a constant in the present study, i.e. a variable that is not 
likely to have affected any variation in processes or outcomes of the 
six cases. Therefore, we cannot conclude anything about how the size 
of the evaluation task for instance affects what unit/level of assess-
ments the panel adopt, except for the obvious conclusion that the 
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assessments of these evaluations are all more macro-level, and not as 
detailed when it comes to the assessments of research outcomes, as 
for instance peer review for scientific journals. 
 There are variations in the object of the six evaluations that would 
naturally relate to the unit/level of assessments – whether institutes, 
programmes or fields are being assessed. However, no clear relation 
between the scope/object of the evaluation and the unit/level of 
assessments can be found in the material. The scope/object of the 
evaluation in terms of institutes, programmes or fields, does not 
necessarily influence what levels or units the panels focus on when 
assessing the research. As mentioned, the two field evaluations use the 
same units/levels, while both the institute evaluations and the 
programme evaluations differ. The research councils might still have 
some influence over such a basic feature of the panels’ work. The two 
field evaluations were commissioned by the same research council 
and they had a common ‘model of reference’. Both panels were given 
access to copies of previous evaluation reports and were in that way 
informed on what kind of report the Research Council expected. These two 
evaluations both evaluate departments/research groups, they mention 
individual researchers and have some degree of implicit comparisons. 
It is clear that the standard set by previous evaluations by the Research Council 
in these two cases more or less directly influenced the approach adopted by the 
evaluation panel. 
 The two institute evaluations and the two programme evaluations, 
on the other hand – differing in their choice of units of assessments – 
were commissioned by different research councils, meaning that the 
councils in these cases have given different signals about what they 
wanted, given no such signals, or that such signals had no influence 
on the work (see the discussion on the effects of the terms of 
reference in the following section). A very plausible alternative in all 
four cases is that as there was no tradition for the kind of evaluation 
in question, the commissioning body did not know precisely what it 
wanted and therefore gave no signal on what the units of assessment 
should be. 
 When it comes to effects of the kind of research discipline under 
review there is no unambiguous evidence that evaluations are more 
standardised in any of the areas. As mentioned, the natural scientists 
gave somewhat clearer statements on criteria and basis of evaluation 
than the evaluators from the humanities/social sciences, but this might 
just mean that the latter were more inclined to talk about the tacitness 
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and ambiguities of evaluating research, not necessarily that the natural 
scientists’ evaluations were more standardised. 
 There are some obvious differences in the standards used 
assessing basic or applied research. Extra-scientific relevance is 
considered only when assessing research to which funding is given for 
applied purposes. In these cases the terms of reference also ask for 
such assessments. Yet, some of those reviewing applied research used 
the same ‘standards’ as for basic research, and one evaluator who 
represented the user-side thought that the standards of basic research 
were fundamental also for applied research. In Cases 2, 5 and 6 basic–
applied was the main dimension of disagreement between panel 
members. 
 In conclusion, the commissioning bodies seem able to influence 
the aspects to be considered and assessed by the panel (i.e. topics such 
as extra-scientific relevance, but not necessarily the ‘standards’ used for 
assessing it) as well as the unit of analysis of the evaluation report 
(e.g. research groups, research areas, programmes, institutions) 
provided that clear signals or instructions are given on these matters. It 
should be noted that influence on the unit of analysis was obtained 
when providing the evaluation panel with copies of previous evalua-
tion reports that provided a ‘model of reference’. 
 In the following section the role of the commissioning body is 
further investigated in terms of the effect of the terms of refer-
ence/mandate of the panel, the information/signals given on the 
purpose of the evaluation and its planned used, and the working 
conditions given the panel in terms of time and resources. 
5.3.2 Terms of reference, planned use of the report, and the 
time and resources for the panel work 
According to the evaluators the terms of reference had no or little effect on 
the work in the groups. However, those not ‘following’ the mandate 
were very concerned to justify their approach. In one case (no. 3) a 
central question of the mandate was obviously not addressed. In 
another case (no. 4) the evaluators deliberately exceeded the terms of 
reference, extending its tasks to an evaluation of teaching (in addition 
to evaluating research). Studying the reports we see that most 
questions of the mandate are directly addressed, and the evaluators 
interviewed seemed concerned that the Research Council should be 
satisfied with the result. I conclude then, that the mandates did steer
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the work of the panels, but that the panel members in retrospect were 
only concerned about the mandate if there had been problems 
following it. On the other hand, the terms of reference generally gave 
no particular guidelines on the evaluation process, nor the standards 
or criteria for evaluation, except stating that the research should be 
evaluated in an international perspective or that extra-scientific 
relevance was to be assessed (see also the exception of Case 6, 
below). The mandates’ potentials for steering the focus of the assessments were therefore 
limited. 
 The major difference in signals given the panels concerning the 
planned use of the report seems to be between programme evaluations and 
non-programme evaluations. In the case of the two programme 
evaluations it was clear to the panels that their evaluation was likely to 
influence future funding of the programme. Realising the possible 
consequences of their reports affected the two panels’ approach and 
reports differently. In Case 6, the panel was particularly concerned 
with answering effect questions: whether the various projects would 
have been realised without the programme, which units were most 
able to use grants effectively, et cetera. In Case 5, the panel members 
conceived the mandate as formulated to make them answer general 
questions relevant to the future funding of the programme, and not 
requiring a study of effects of grants or comparisons of research units. 
They found the answers to the mandate obvious and answered them 
briefly, generally and positively. Here differences in the terms of reference seem vital 
to the divergent approaches chosen by the panels. In Case 6 the panel was asked to 
evaluate the programme’s success as a policy tool, whereas the terms 
of reference in Case 5 contained no such question (see Sections 4.5.3 
and 4.6.3).  
 In both field evaluations on the other hand, the panel members 
had divergent impressions of the commissioners’ purpose with the 
evaluations. The general impression was that the fields under review 
should get help to improve, and/or that the Research Council had a 
general need for information about the activities in the research fields. 
There were divergent opinions on what effects a field evaluation 
report might or should have. Some panel members took it for granted 
that the report would have funding implications, others were much 
more cynical about the Research Council’s ability or willingness to 
implement their recommendations. One of the latter emphasised that 
he tried to avoid the ‘need for more money’ part of the recommenda-
tions to make it more acceptable to the commissioning body. 
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 Also the members of the panels of the institute evaluations had 
divergent views on the purpose of the evaluations. Most said they did 
not know what kind of evaluation report the commissioning body 
expected. There was a clear difference between the two panels in 
their perceptions of possible consequences. Most evaluators of Case 2 
said the evaluees were initially concerned that the evaluation might 
have negative consequences for the institute (a fear at least one of the 
evaluators shared), while the panel of Case 3 seemed to conceive the 
commissioning body as wanting to help the institutes to improve – at 
least they saw the evaluation as a general and undramatic event. 
 Looking at the importance of time and resources124 available for the 
work, few seemed concerned about the time limitations, but 
emphasised that they could, of course, have reviewed the material 
more thoroughly if they had had more time. In Case 6 for example, 
one panel member said that it was not realistic to do a systematic 
review of all the written material, and he only read thoroughly those 
items he thought especially interesting. In Case 5 the time limits as 
such had concrete consequences for the process and the report. Here 
the panel was expected to finish the report during the site visits in 
Norway, and had no time for discussions on the individual drafts or 
for co-ordination and editing of the drafts into a common report. The 
only interaction was on the general conclusions and recommen-
dations. Lack of concluding discussions (due to a dinner invitation) 
combined with later absence of one central person in a controversy 
also influenced the assessments of one area in Case 1 (see Section 
4.1.7). Individual time restrictions also had consequences in Case 3. 
Part of the reason for the lack of assessments of the research in this 
case was the absence of one of the panel members from several of the 
panel meetings. In general, it should be noted that limitations in time 
and resources may partly explain the vague assessments and absence 
of explicit negative criticism. The thoroughness of the review may be 
understood as too limited to allow well founded negative statements 
on the research under review. 
 Four of the six panels had a Norwegian co-ordinator.125 In the 
cases with mainly non-Scandinavian panels (Cases 1, 4 and 5), panel 
members emphasised the co-ordinator as a valuable source for inside 
information and general information about the Norwegian system. All 
panels had one or more secretaries to their disposal. The panel 
members seemed satisfied with the secretarial resources they were 
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offered (except for the case where the secretary did not come from 
the Research Council.) The extent to which the secretaries were set to 
gather information varied. The secretary’s role in editing the panel’s 
report seems most important in the case where there were no formal 
chair or co-ordinator of the panel (Case 2). 
5.3.3 The composition of the panels 
The composition of the panels seems to have been of vital importance 
for the review process and for the outcome of review. The heteroge-
neity of the panels, for instance, inhibited the evaluators in 
commenting on each others’ drafts, and in most cases there was no 
real potential for positive group effects (mutual insights gained 
through discussions, more information and a larger spectrum of ideas 
being considered by each panel member, or panel members acting as 
mutual motivators/supervisors, see Section 3.2 and 5.2.3). Only two 
cases (Cases 1 and 6, see below) had any group interaction on the 
research assessments as such, in neither case did interaction result in 
any changed opinions on assessments.  
 The discussion in Chapter 3 implies that the degree of overlapping 
competence between the panel members influences both co-operation and 
conflict on a peer panel. As professional platform is one of the main 
bases of peer review and peers have restricted fields of competence, 
overlapping competence is needed both for co-operation and (open) 
conflict between peers. Experts without any overlap in competence 
will have little to gain from co-operating on assessments, and poor 
possibilities of (authoritatively) questioning each other’s assessments.  
 The data from the six cases support the suggested link between 
overlap in competence and co-operation/conflicts on assessments. The 
two cases with some overlap of competence, Cases 1 and 6, were the 
only cases with interaction on the research assessments, and the only 
cases where panel members clearly disagreed on assessments of the 
research.126 In the other cases there were no apparent overlap of 
academic competence and therefore less possibility to disagree or co-
operate on such judgements. It should also be noted that the division of 
areas under review (task division) between panel members seems to 
have been evident in all cases except Case 6, which turned out to be 
the only case with open controversy between panel members. 
 Another issue is prior relations between evaluators and evaluees. There seem 
to have been obvious differences in the scope of the evaluees’ 
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international network of the various cases.127 However, those with the 
broadest international network were those getting the broadest 
international evaluation panel. There is no case of a panel with no 
connection to any of the evaluees. In all cases some evaluees were 
known, others were unknown to the panel. The closeness of 
connections varied, and depended on the way the panel was selected. 
Some cases where the evaluees were given the possibility to propose 
panel members ended up appointing some evaluators with loyalty 
relations to evaluees (Cases 1 and 2 in particular). Two of those using 
only underhand or ‘administrative’ contacts for proposals for panel 
members ended up with evaluators having less close connections to 
the evaluees (Cases 3 and 4). In Case 6, it seems to have been 
especially difficult to find evaluators with ‘due distance’ to the 
evaluees. Here evaluees were given no influence on the selection, but 
the council still ended up with some evaluators with close prior 
knowledge of, and connections to, the evaluees. The reason may be 
the close Scandinavian relations in the area and that evaluators had to 
be able to read Norwegian. The ‘administratively selected’ non-Nordic 
panel of Case 5 also had close prior knowledge of the evaluees, but 
here the interviewees did not conceive prior connections to be a 
problem. 
 The selection of panel members may explain the potential for 
controversy on the panels. In Case 1, one of the sub-disciplines had a 
well-known controversy. The council accepted the parties’ own 
proposals for panel members, and all parties were therefore repre-
sented on the panel, giving an obvious potential for controversy. We 
might say that such an outcome was predictable to the Research 
Council as they were informed on the divergent views and approaches 
of the field and let the evaluees themselves propose the panel 
members. However, the Council did not know the scholarly view-
points of all the panel members they appointed in advance, and the 
disagreements on the panel were therefore only partly predictable to 
them. 
 In Case 2, researchers and users with very different views on the 
issues to be studied were put on the same panel. Here the selection of 
a mixed panel was a central feature of the design of the evaluation, 
and a broad representation of opinions is likely to have been the aim 
of the commissioning body. As the views of the various parties were 
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presented (mixed) in the evaluation report, the commissioning body in 
this respect might be said to have got what it wanted. 
 In both Case 1 and Case 2 disagreements were handled by tacit 
compromises. In Case 6, there were panel members with divergent 
evaluation standards and opposing opinions about the work under 
review, leading to confrontation and open controversy in the group. A 
conclusion was reached through straightforward bargaining. In this 
case it is hard to relate the potential for controversy directly to the 
selection of the panel members. The representation of divergent 
scholarly viewpoints on the panel does not seem planned from the 
part of the Research Council, neither was it an effect of evaluees’ 
(formal) influence on appointments, as the evaluees in this case were 
not asked to propose their evaluators. There is no evidence that the 
commissioning body had any advance information on the divergent 
opinions of the panel members. 
 The same goes for Case 5 where there were partly divergent 
views on one central topic (basic versus applied research). The 
Research Council had full control over the selection of panel members 
but seemingly no information on the various scholarly viewpoints 
within the panel on this topic, neither prior to the evaluation, nor in 
retrospect – as the various viewpoints in this case were not explicitly 
stated. What Cases 5 and 6 have in common, and which was the 
conscious choice of the commissioners, was that the evaluation should 
cover all fields of a broad research programme, requiring a broad 
spectrum of evaluator expertise and heterogeneous panels. Thus, 
another way to obtain broad representation on an evaluation panel – 
rather than letting the evaluees propose members – is to review a 
broad heterogeneous area of research and (‘administratively’) appoint 
a relatively large evaluation panel. 
 This is contrasted by the two panels with least variation in 
opinions (Cases 3 and 4) which were the panels with fewest members. 
The research under review was not perceived by the commissioner to 
require a particularly broad or large evaluation panel (three experts on 
each panel, whereas Cases 5 and 6 had five experts each). As in Cases 
5 and 6 the panels were put together without input from the evaluees. 
However, Cases 3 and 4 differ from Cases 5 and 6 when in comes to 
advance knowledge about the experts. Most of the selected experts 
were already known to the commissioning bodies, who do not seem 
to have had broad representation of opinions as a notable criteria for 
selecting the panel members. (This does not imply that a limited 
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representation of opinions was a conscious choice, only that a broader 
representation might have been the result if this was seen as important 
by the commissioning body – provided that experts with divergent 
opinions were known to the commissioning body.) 
 We conclude then, that the commissioning bodies to some degree 
‘designed’ panels which were characterised either by consensus or by 
divergent opinions. Panels unanimous in their opinions (allowing 
consistent and clear conclusions128), were obtained by appointing a 
small group of experts already known to the body organising the 
evaluation, or its trusted advisers (Cases 3 and 4). Broad representa-
tion of opinions on the other hand (resulting in nuanced, but non-
critical, reports with vague conclusions), was obtained by letting all 
parties involved getting their candidate onto the panel (Cases 1 and 2). 
A larger group of experts appointed administratively by a commis-
sioning body without substantial background knowledge about the 
experts also resulted in broad representation of opinions (Cases 5 and 
6). In generalising such conclusion, the diversity of the field/subject of 
evaluation must of course be considered. The broad representation of 
opinions in Cases 5 and 6 resulted foremost from a decision to cover a 
broad heterogeneous field, and not from the administrative appoint-
ments without background knowledge. Nevertheless, more back-
ground knowledge on potential experts might have given other 
results. Combined with a commissioner thinking that ‘the best experts 
are those complying to standard traditional peer review criteria of 
basic research’, this would certainly have given a more narrow 
representation of expert opinions on the panel in Case 6. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The analysis has sought insight and understanding of the constraints, 
processes and outcomes of a particular kind of evaluation: research 
council-commissioned expert evaluations of research units, fields and 
programmes. The central features found in the evaluations reports 
studied are vague assessments (‘between the lines’), tacit criteria and 
conclusions and recommendations supporting the researchers under 
review. The processes on the evaluation panels were generally 
characterised by division of tasks, little interaction on assessments and 
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mostly tacit compromises in case of disagreements among panel 
members. 
 The time and resources available for the panels set important 
limits both for collaborative/overlapping assessments and for the 
thoroughness of review. We have seen that focus on the composition 
of the panels is important, especially for understanding the (lack of) 
interaction on assessments and also often for vague assessments in the 
evaluation reports. Overlapping competence is found to be vital both 
for co-operation and for open conflict between academic experts. 
 The commissioning bodies to some degree (more or less uncon-
sciously) ‘designed’ for a consensus panel or for a panel with 
divergent opinions. The appointment of a small group of experts 
already known to the body organising the evaluation, or its trusted 
advisers, gave unanimous panels. Broad representation of opinions on 
the other hand, was obtained by letting all parties involved getting 
their candidate on the panel. 
 In general, the mandates’ potentials for determining the focus of 
the assessments were limited. However, when clear (enough) 
mandates, ‘models’ or instructions were given, the commissioners 
seemed able to influence the aspects being considered and assessed 
by the panels, and also the unit of analysis of the evaluation reports. 
We have seen that the different approaches of the two panels 
evaluating research programmes can be explained by differing 
mandates. In two other cases the commissioners provided the panels 
with copies of previous evaluation reports, and the access to these 
previous evaluation reports clearly influenced the approach adopted 
by the panels. On the other hand, one panel did not address a central 
question of its terms of reference and another panel deliberately 
exceeded the terms of reference. In the two later cases the panel did 
not perceive the terms of reference adequate to the situation or task, 
and the commissioning body accepted the approach adopted by the 
panel. 
 An important factor for understanding the evaluations is the ‘social 
norms’ to which the experts comply. The combination of peer 
evaluators and public reports seems to foster some distinct rules for 
such evaluations. The evaluators were concerned about the potential 
use of their evaluation report, i.e., they considered the political 
context of the evaluation while writing their reports. Most peer 
evaluators saw their role as an aid to the research under review and 
this was one reason for the vague reports. When putting together the 
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reports the peers avoided details that would not serve the kind of 
policy they thought appropriate. Disagreements on the panels were an 
additional reason for vague reports. The resolving of disagreements 
invariably resulted in more vague reports. Scholars are likely to defend 
their own kind of research, which is also the kind of research in 
which they have the most expertise. On heterogeneous panels the 
other party to the controversy seldom know the area under contro-
versy well enough to legitimately contest the ‘defender’s’ assessments.  
 An overall conclusion is that the composition of the panel is of 
great importance when designing an expert evaluation of research 
units, fields or programmes. The composition set the potential for 
interaction, divergent opinions and conflict – and partly for the 
vagueness of the assessments – in addition to the fact that the 
selection of panel members decide what scholarly positions and 
opinions are allowed access to the evaluation report. 
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Table 5.2 Case 1: Peer evaluation of research fields within the natural 
sciences 
Organisational 
constraints 
directly or indirectly set by 
the Research Council 
 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
Four sub-fields 
 
Kind of research: 
Basic (and some applied) 
Natural sciences 
 
Mandate: 
Focused and detailed 
questions, but no criteria 
specified. 
 
Time and resources:  
Deadline exceeded.  
13 months from 
appointment to report. 
Norwegian co-ordinator 
from nabouring field. 
Secretary from the 
Research Council. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Peer reviewers (recom-
mended by the evaluees) 
covering major areas and 
paradigms. 
No Norwegian peers. 
Heterogeneous group, but 
some overlap of 
competence/research fields. 
 
The reviewers’ constraints 
and dispositions: 
Most reviewers had 
friends/colleagues among 
the evaluees. 
Divergent research interests 
and competing ‘schools’. 
 
No concrete signals given 
concerning the planned use 
of the report. 
 
 
Methods: 
Review of publications. 
Site visits/interviews. 
Written information from the 
research groups (plans, 
resources, publ.lists). 
(Separate bibliometric 
study) 
 
Group discussion/ 
interaction: 
Division of research fields 
under review between the 
panel members mentioned 
in the letter appointing the 
panel. 
Common group discussions 
in the evenings. Separate 
‘sub-group’ meetings. 
Final editing by mail. 
 
Heterogeneous group 
without open discussion. 
Disagreements in the report 
avoided by tacit 
compromises. Majority 
yielding. 
 
Group effects: 
‘Peer supervision’/one 
member rewrote his 
assessments. 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Assessing 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
Sub-fields. 
The research groups. 
The institutions/ 
departments. 
Individuals mentioned. 
Implicit comparisons. 
 
Direct/indirect assessments 
Based on the evaluators’ 
own views/assessments 
 
Central criteria: 
- intra-scientific relevance  
- quality (novelty, 
profundity) 
- input and output  
(quantity in bibliometric 
appendix) 
 
Conclusions: 
Positive, praising. 
- Good/valuable research 
that deserves further 
support. 
- Particular areas should be 
strengthened. 
- Lack of large-scale 
projects. 
- Need of travel funds for 
small groups. 
- Obtain a better balance 
between basic and 
applied research. 
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Table 5.3 Case 2: Mixed panel evaluation of an engineering research 
institute 
Organisational 
constraints 
directly or indirectly set by 
the Research Council 
 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
One institute 
 
Kind of research: 
Applied 
Science/engineering 
 
Mandate: 
Twofold (market role/rele-
vance and research quality)  
No criteria specified. 
 
Time and resources: 
14 months from appoint-
ment to report. One panel 
member not time to partici-
pate fully. Secretary from 
the Research Council. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Mixed panel with majority of 
non-peers. 
The evaluees had 
substantial influence on the 
selection. 
All panel members from 
Nordic countries. 
No formal chair or co-
ordinator. 
More concern to cover the 
various user groups than 
the research areas. 
No apparent overlap of peer 
competence. 
 
The reviewers’ constraints 
and dispositions: 
One peer reviewer had 
friends/colleagues among 
the evaluees. 
Heterogeneous group: 
clearly divergent 
dispositions for the task. 
 
No concrete signals given 
concerning the planned use 
of the report. 
 
 
Methods: 
Site visit/information from 
the institute and department 
managers. 
Interviews with central 
external informants. 
Reviewing publications 
(done by one evaluator). 
 
No guidelines or common 
planning of methods for the 
evaluation.  
 
Group decisions/interaction: 
No clear division of tasks 
between panel members. 
Disagreements in the report 
avoided by tacit 
compromises. The different 
points of view edited into 
one ‘coherent’ report by the 
secretary. 
 
Group effects: 
One peer working harder. 
One peer shirking. 
Fruitful dialogue? Obtained 
understanding of each 
others’ points of view, but 
no transformation of 
opinions. 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Explaining 
Assessing 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
The institute and its different 
areas of competence. 
No individuals mentioned. 
Implicit comparisons of 
areas of competence. 
 
Direct/ indirect 
assessments: 
Based both on the 
evaluators’ own views and 
assessments made by other 
informants/ 
colleagues. 
 
Central criteria: 
- output 
- applicability 
- relevance for specific 
user groups 
- quality (scholarly 
reputation, novelty/ 
contribution to theory 
and body of 
knowledge) 
 
Conclusions: 
Positive, praising. 
- Make the institute 
more attractive for 
contractors. 
- More basic long-term 
funding. 
 176 
Table 5.4 Case 3: Mixed panel evaluation of three social research 
institutes 
Organisational 
constraints 
directly or indirectly set by 
the Research Council 
 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
Three institutes 
 
Kind of research: 
Applied 
Social sciences 
 
Mandate: 
Comprehensive 
(organisation, research 
quality, market relevance 
and user contact). Some 
specifications of criteria. 
 
Time and resources:  
10 months from 
appointment to report. 
One panel member not time 
to participate fully. 
Secretary from a non-
involved institute. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Peers from university 
departments and (one) non-
peer. 
Evaluees no direct influence 
on choice. 
All panel members from 
Nordic countries. Norwegian 
chair. 
All research areas and 
paradigms not covered. 
No overlap of peer 
competence. 
 
The reviewers’ dispositions 
and constraints: 
More interested in and 
qualified in ‘evaluation 
research’ than in quality 
assessments. 
Signals given concerning 
the planned use of the 
report: 
Input to Research Council’s 
policy generally. 
 
 
Methods: 
‘Evaluation research’ 
Questionnaires to the 
evaluees. 
Statistics on input and 
output indicators. 
Site visits/interviews. 
Interviews with customers. 
Reference group. 
Reviewing publications. 
(Superficial quality review.) 
 
Group 
discussion/interaction: 
Common group discussions 
and some division of tasks. 
No apparent controversies 
on the panel. 
 
Group effects: 
‘Fruitful dialogue’ 
(One panel member 
shirking.) 
 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Explaining 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
The ’kind of institute’.  
No individuals mentioned.  
No comparisons/ranking. 
 
 
Direct/indirect assessments: 
Based on the evaluators’ 
own views and assess-
ments made by other 
informants. 
 
Central criteria: 
- input/framework 
conditions 
- extra-scientific relevance 
- applicability 
- (quality indicators: 
methods, reference 
lists/knowledge of 
previous research) 
 
Conclusions: 
Vague assessments. 
Problems and explanations 
emphasised. 
Two alternative solutions: 
- More basic funds/time for 
basic research and/or co-
operation with other 
institutions. 
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Table 5.5 Case 4: Peer evaluation of three humanities sub-fields 
Organisational 
constraints 
directly or indirectly set by 
the Research Council 
 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
Three sub-fields 
 
Kind of research: 
Basic 
Humanities 
 
Mandate: 
Focused and detailed. 
No quality criteria specified. 
 
Time and resources: 
Seem sufficient. 
19 months from 
appointment to report. 
Norwegian co-ordinator 
from nabouring field. 
Secretary from the 
Research Council. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Evaluees had no formal 
input on the selection. 
All peers from non-Nordic 
countries. 
One peer per sub-field/no 
overlap of peer 
competence. 
 
The reviewers’ dispositions: 
Competence and interests 
exceeding the mandate. 
 
Oral/informal signals given 
concerning the planned use 
of the report (influencing 
panel’s concern for policy 
relevance). 
 
 
Methods: 
Reviewing publications. 
Questionnaires to the 
evaluees. 
Statistics on input and 
output indicators. 
Site visits/interviews. 
 
Group 
discussion/interaction: 
Division of tasks and 
common group discussions. 
Interaction on conclusions 
and presentation of 
assessments: one panel 
member moderated the 
explicitness of his 
assessments. 
Transforming opinions/tacit 
compromises. 
 
Group effects: 
One member working 
harder. 
 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Assessing 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
Sub-fields. 
The research ‘groups’. 
The institutions/depart-
ments. 
Individuals mentioned. 
Degree of comparisons 
varies from one reviewer to 
the other. 
 
Direct/indirect assessments: 
Mainly based on the 
evaluators’ own 
views/assessments. 
 
Central criteria: 
- input and output 
- quality 
- intra-scientific relevance 
 
Conclusions: 
Praising and criticising. 
- Recommending new 
positions, means 
encouraging 
productivity, 
interdisciplinarity, 
scholarships for 
graduates, improved 
teaching/curricula. 
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Table 5.6 Case 5: Peer evaluation of a natural science research 
program/priority area 
Organisational constraints 
directly or indirectly set by the 
Research Council 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
A large programme 
encompassing several fields 
and containing many sub-
programmes. 
 
Kind of research: 
Applied, strategic and some 
basic. Natural sciences. 
Two disciplines involved. 
 
Mandate: 
Concrete, easy answered 
questions.  
No criteria specified. 
 
Time and resources: 
Final report prepared during 
the 10 days of site visits in 
Norway. (5 months from 
appointment to report) 
Norwegian co-ordinator from 
neighbouring field. 
Secretary.  
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Evaluees no formal influence 
on the selection. 
All peers from non-Nordic 
countries. 
One peer per selected sub-
programme to be reviewed. 
No apparent overlap of peer 
competence. 
 
The reviewers’ constraints 
and dispositions: 
Colleagues among the 
evaluees.  
Divergent competencies and 
research interests. 
 
Evaluation supposed to affect 
the continuation of the 
programme/future efforts in 
the field. 
 
 
Methods: 
Reviewing publications. 
Site visits/interviews. 
 
Rigorous/superficial 
reviewing: varies between 
evaluators 
 
Group 
discussion/interaction: 
Firm division of tasks 
between panel members.  
Common group discussions 
about the general 
conclusions. 
Tacit compromises on the 
recommendations. 
Report edited by the panel 
member with most 
time/interest. 
Easy agreement due to firm 
task division 
 
Group effects: 
‘Jockeying for influence’ 
Division of tasks resulting in 
no group interaction on 
writing assessments. 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Assessing 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
(Emphases vary from 
reviewer to reviewer.) 
The field/sub-fields. 
The research 
groups/institutions. 
Projects. 
No individuals mentioned. 
Some implicit comparisons. 
 
Direct/indirect assessments: 
Most evaluators made direct 
assessments, one mainly 
used indirect indicators. 
 
Central criteria: 
(Vary between reviewers) 
Output, quality, reputation, 
intra- and extra-scientific 
relevance. 
 
Conclusions: 
Very positive/praising. 
- Pointing out areas for 
future efforts. 
- Underlining the need for 
basic research. 
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Table 5.7 Case 6: Peer evaluation of a multidisciplinary research 
program/priority area 
Organisational constraints 
directly or indirectly set by the 
Research Council 
The evaluation panel’s 
way of approaching their 
task 
 
The contents of the report 
 
Scope of the evaluation: 
A large programme 
encompassing several fields 
and containing many sub-
programmes. 
 
Kind of research: 
Applied, strategic, some 
basic. Multidisciplinary. 
 
Mandate: 
Comprehensive: Assess 
results and effects according 
to general quality 
requirements, the objectives 
of the program, applicability 
and productivity. 
The programme as a policy 
tool and recommendations on 
future priorities. 
 
Time and resources: 
10 months from appointment 
to report. Pressed for time in 
the final phase. Secretary 
from the Research Council. 
 
Selection of reviewers: 
Evaluees no formal influence 
on selection.  
Nordic researchers/peers 
broadly covering the various 
fields.  
Norwegian chair. 
Some overlap of competence. 
 
The reviewers’ constraints 
and dispositions: 
Divergent research interests. 
Divergent ‘allies’ among the 
evaluees. 
 
Evaluation supposed to affect 
the continuation of the 
programme/future efforts in 
the field. 
 
 
Methods: 
Questionnaires to the 
evaluees. 
Site visits/interviews. 
Reviewing publications. 
(Publications were reviewed 
with varying rigor.) 
 
Group 
discussion/interaction: 
Division of fields between 
evaluators agreed on in first 
meeting. 
Evaluators wrote separate 
chapters but commented on 
each others’ draft. 
Disagreements resolved by 
bargaining and logrolling. 
Open confrontation. 
 
Group effects: 
Worked harder (for ones 
point of view). 
No changed opinions. 
 
The report’s stylistic 
emphasis: 
Describing 
Explaining 
Assessing 
 
Unit of analysis/assess-
ments: 
Program areas/projects. 
The research groups/ 
institutions. 
No individuals mentioned. 
Some comparisons and 
implicit rankings. 
 
 
Direct/indirect assessments: 
Based on the evaluators’ 
own views. 
 
Central criteria: 
- output 
- quality (various 
specifications) 
- intra- or extra-scientific 
relevance (varies 
between reviewers) 
 
Conclusions: 
The least vague of the 6 
cases. (Implicit rankings) 
Positive, praising,  
some criticism. 
- Certain ‘young’ areas 
should be further 
developed/get further 
support. 
- Give priority to the most 
qualified groups. 
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6 Implications to be drawn for 
the understanding of expert 
panel evaluation 
What implications for the understanding of expert panel evaluation of 
research may be drawn from this study? This chapter focuses on the 
purposes and motives connected to research evaluation, the concept 
of bias, the nature of assessments and decisions and the way the 
evaluations define good research. In the last part of the chapter ideal 
types are used to illustrate central features and mechanisms of 
decision-making in expert panel evaluation. 
 
6.1 The purposes of, and motives for, 
evaluating research 
There are many parties to expert panel evaluations of research 
institutions, programmes and fields: the granting authorities demand-
ing evaluations,129 the research council allocating grants and commis-
sioning evaluations, the expert panels executing the evaluations and, 
not to forget, the evaluees. Figure 6.1 illustrates the parties involved in 
expert panel evaluations of research and how they relate to the 
research community and contractors of research. 
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Figure 6.1 Actors involved in research evaluation 
 
 
The parties often have various objectives for their participation, and 
they may also have divergent perceptions of the purpose for which 
the evaluation is being done. The official purpose may also be rather 
vague, not saying much more than that research institute A, research 
programme B or research field C and D ‘are to be evaluated with 
regard to its framework conditions and scientific quality’. This is a 
kind of purpose each party may specify one way or the other, for 
example that the purpose is to see how the research conditions may be improved, 
that the purpose is to see whether it is worth using money on this research in the 
future, or simply a general need for control of how public money is spent, i.e. an 
evaluation that will not be acted upon unless serious flaws are found. 
 There may be various goals connected to the official purpose of 
the evaluation, e.g. implications or variants of the official purpose 
(topic-connected goals130). One possible goal connected to the kind of 
research evaluation dealt with in this study, is to gather information as basis 
for policy decisions. This seems an evident implication of evaluation. Why 
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would a research council ask for an evaluation if not to get 
information, and why would it ask for this kind of information if not 
as basis for policy-making?  
 Many objections may be raised to such a seemingly self-evident 
implication of evaluation. The (non-official) purpose of an evaluation 
may be predominantly symbolic, e.g. to promote a picture of the 
commissioning body as a dynamic and responsible organisation, or an 
authority supervising the research community. There might not be 
many plans, intentions or possibilities (in terms of reserved resources) 
to any follow up – neither to learn from the evaluation nor to act on it 
(Brofoss 1997). 
 Evaluation may also be a ritual activity, adopted from other 
organisations or sectors without much consideration of any purpose 
other than those attached to ceremonies. A well-known idea in 
organisation theory is the combination of the two, i.e. a ritual used for 
symbolic purposes, like a ceremonial outfit put on to be fashionable 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977). Research evaluation may very well be 
something governments and research councils think they must do, 
because if they do not evaluate, they will be perceived as out of date, 
still committed to a ‘mediaeval’ understanding of government. 
 Nevertheless, evaluation as a mere symbolic activity, and to some 
degree as a mere ritual activity, is ‘parasitic’ on the purpose and 
meaning of evaluation. If no one cares about the results of an 
evaluation, and everybody knows that nobody cares and that the 
evaluations will have no implications whatsoever, the evaluation has 
no symbolic meaning either, and it is even hard to see what kind of 
ritual meaning it may have.131 
 The data regarding the evaluations dealt with in this study, 
suggest that gathering information for policy-making offers elements of the official purpose 
that are acknowledged by all parties.132 We will take this as a premise 
when discussing the ‘goal structure’ of the parties: the instrumental 
and ulterior goals of the various parties, and their possible non-topical 
goals (see note 130). Setting gathering information for policy-making 
as part of the official purpose does not exclude symbolic purposes or 
ritual functions from the analysis. As symbols and rituals do not make 
much sense as official purposes for the kind of evaluations dealt with 
here, the motives and purposes will not be discussed from such a 
point of view. 
 There may be several goals ulterior to the official purpose, i.e. goals 
for which the official purpose is instrumental. These ulterior goals may 
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vary between evaluations and also between parties to the evaluations, 
for example depending on their interpretation of the official purpose. 
Ulterior goals of evaluating research may be better research, better 
research conditions, better resource allocation, et cetera, all of which 
may be specified in various ways. Ulterior goals may also regard the 
aim of the research itself (e.g. increased knowledge of a phenomenon, 
economic growth, welfare or solving environmental problems). 
 Whereas ulterior goals are final purposes, instrumental goals are 
means to attain the official purpose. To appoint non-biased evaluators 
would be an example of a goal instrumental for evaluating research 
and gathering information for policy-making. Openly or obviously 
biased judgements will not do as a legitimate basis for policy-making 
(this is a premise for the acceptability of evaluations, see Chapter 2). 
Non-biased judgement was a norm the interviewed evaluators took for 
granted, but not always thought their fellow panel members had 
followed. Non-biased judgements and fairness/equity may be said to 
be topic-connected goals or goals that are an integral part of the 
official purpose.   
 As far as the official purpose implies non-biased judgements, any 
motive or purpose for evaluation that implies judgements or outcomes 
with a particular bias may be said to be anti-topical, i.e. logically 
irreconcilable with the official purpose. Opinions about what biased 
judgements mean, may vary considerably between parties. Political 
authorities may have a plain concept of bias as wrong conclusions and 
partial evaluators. Evaluators themselves may have a more nuanced 
concept of bias, e.g. judgements not consistent with prevailing peer 
opinions.133 
 There may also be goals of research evaluation that are neither 
topic-connected nor anti-topical. These may be called a-topical goals 
and include the kinds of goals that the panel members mentioned as 
motivating them to participate in the evaluations. Establish networks, 
learning about the research going on in Norway and travel to Norway 
and meet friends are examples of such a-topical goals. Goals that are 
(first) considered a-topical may prove to be counter-topical, i.e. to work to 
the disadvantage of the official purpose if furthered. Counter-topical 
goals of research evaluation include goals that lead to biased 
judgements. As biased judgement in itself is a rather meaningless and 
unlikely goal; goals leading to bias is a more interesting category. 
Goals that may bias outcomes include goals that demand a certain 
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conclusion of the evaluation, e.g. better conditions or more resources 
for certain research units. 
 What do the goal structures of the various parties look like? As 
mentioned, we may see gathering information as a basis for policy-
making, as the official goal, and non-biased and fair assessments as 
topic-connected goals, acknowledged by all parties. Implied instru-
mental goals, shared by peer panels, mixed panels and commissioning 
research councils, are unbiased evaluators and a report suited for 
policy-making. Further instrumental goals may be found in the terms 
of reference (the mandate) of the panels. These ask for information on 
the scientific quality of the research, and sometimes also the useful-
ness and payoffs. The terms of reference may be understood in 
different ways by the parties and depend on how the ulterior goal of 
the commissioning body is understood. If the evaluators and evaluees 
suspect the ulterior goal to be related to a more or less symbolic or 
ritual ‘need’ for evaluations, the terms of reference will be interpreted 
very differently from a situation in which the ulterior goal of the 
research council is believed to be better research conditions or better 
allocations of grants. As ulterior goals are not openly stated, the 
evaluators have the possibility to approach their task as if the ulterior 
goal is what they think it should be – they may, for example, suspect 
it is to cut research budgets, but act as if it was to improve the 
conditions for doing good research. 
 The most interesting point where the goal structure of the various 
parties may vary is the possibly counter-topical goals. As we have 
seen, this particularly includes goals that may lead to biased outcomes. 
All parties may have such goals. An aim of panel members to 
influence research policy and help the evaluees, e.g. maximise 
research budgets may, as we have seen, influence the content of the 
evaluation report. Similarly, of course, the evaluees want to maximise 
research budgets. They also want to improve, or at least maintain, 
their reputation, and will be eager to provide the evaluation panel 
with all the good arguments. It is normally part of the game that 
evaluees shall have good opportunities to talk their cause, though not 
put blinkers on the evaluators. The commissioning research council 
may also want to maximise research budgets and may frame the task 
of the evaluation panel in a way which will contribute to this. Political 
authorities, on the other hand, may want to evaluate research to get a 
basis for cutting research budgets. As far as the authorities have no 
possibilities of influencing the panel’s conclusions, this will not be a 
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counter-topical goal. However, a pronounced aim of cutting the 
budget, may develop into a counter-topical goal in the sense that it 
makes the evaluation panel bias the conclusions in favour of the 
evaluees in order to prevent budget cuts. On the other hand, if it is 
clearly stated and understood, a goal of cutting research budgets may 
also produce more thorough assessments and comparisons of units 
and analysis of the consequences of cuts in the relevant budgets. 
 What possible counter-topical goals did the evaluators have? We 
have seen that objectives of the peer evaluators that influenced the 
content of their reports included the goal of influencing research 
policy (more basic research and better research conditions, including 
better research budgets), and that of helping evaluees, at least to avoid 
negative effects of the evaluation. User-side evaluators, on the other 
hand, also often wanted to influence research policy in terms of better 
research conditions (which may imply increased budgets and better 
research or lower costs for the contractors). In addition to fulfilling a 
(perceived) demand for documentation of use of public funds, better 
research conditions also seemed to be a central objective for the 
research councils.  
 This does not mean that all categories of evaluators, as well as the 
commissioners of the evaluations, had non-topical goals that proved 
counter-topical, i.e. detrimental to the official purpose of the evalua-
tions. Recommendations on how to better research conditions 
certainly contain information well suited as basis for decision-making, 
and may be seen as part of the official goal. However, in some cases 
actors were said to have opinions or stakes that may have led to 
biased conclusions in terms of who should get increased research 
budgets or who should not profit from the evaluation.134 
 On a general level, we may say that the goals of the different parties to the 
evaluations seem to converge – improving research conditions was a central goal of all parties 
directly involved. This means that the evaluators’ search for a way of 
approaching their task which was compatible both with their 
obligations to the body commissioning the report and with ‘decent 
loyalties’ to the evaluees, need not be that hard.135 Evaluees are 
concerned about their reputation and budgets, while the research 
councils are concerned about their legitimacy and documentation that 
public money is spent wisely, but they have common interest in 
arguments for better research conditions and increased budgets. 
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 Evaluators might find it problematic to sympathise with the 
evaluees as well as producing the kind of report demanded by the 
research council (i.e. they perceive a ‘multi-principal’ problem), for 
instance because they suspect the research council to have reallocat-
ing purposes. The data indicate that this need not be a problem. The 
approach chosen by the panels studied is characterised by general 
praise, no (harsh) criticism and vague assessments on ‘not-so-good’ 
units, and arguments for the need of better research conditions. This 
approach seems to fit the interests of all directly involved parties.  
 The goal conflicts that did arise in the six cases, were internal to 
the evaluation panels and dealt primarily with the value attached to 
different kinds of research. Conflicts on the evaluations of basic contra 
applied research, and the evaluation of different research areas in 
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relation to each other, might be seen as based in panel members’ 
divergent policy aims. 
 
6.2 Peers and bias: a revised view 
As demonstrated above, defining bias in expert panel evaluation 
reports is a tricky matter. We may easily identify actors’ aims that 
might have led to biased assessments, but it is very difficult to say 
whether a particular assessment is biased or not. The mild assessments 
and the lack of ranking of the units under review that at first glance 
might be seen as a result of evaluators unduly biased in favour of the 
evaluees, may also be explained by contextual factors rather than 
individual bias of the evaluators. The number of comparable R&D-
units in a small country like Norway is rather limited. Each depart-
ment, institute or group has its particular research areas and 
approaches, and in many cases a recommendation saying that a 
particular unit should be given lower budgetary priority would be 
understood as if the kind of research done by the unit should not be 
done in Norway. As a peer panel will often include someone doing 
that kind of research, such a radical conclusion is rather unlikely. To 
oppose such conclusions may hardly be said to represent unaccept-
able bias; rather it is a predictable consequence of peers evaluating 
research units in a small country. Peer panels may of course criticise 
approaches not represented on the panel (and this they do, see Section 
1.4.1 (footnote), the end of Section 5.2.4 and Section 7.4), but in a 
heterogeneous panel harsh assessments by one panel member are 
likely to be substantially moderated by other panel members before an 
agreement on the content of the evaluation report is reached. 
 When scholarly viewpoint is decisive, the composition of the panel 
(for which the commissioning body is responsible) is deemed to 
influence the outcome – either ‘endanger’ units under review by 
excluding representation from certain research areas, approaches or 
‘schools’, or protecting units by including their proper peers on the 
panel. If panel members have no scholarly or personal loyalties to the 
evaluees, harsh criticism is much more likely. In the present study, the 
scholarly loyalties, as opposed to personal loyalties, definitely seem an 
important basis of potential bias. Scholarly viewpoint and interests, of 
course, include personal engagement, and personal and scholarly bias 
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(see Table 2.5) may be hard to separate. In fact, purely personal bias 
in peer assessments may be very difficult to identify if it does not 
counter one’s scholarly bias. And even if assessments are inconsistent 
with the evaluators’ scholarly viewpoint and scholarly interests, there 
might not be any kind of personal bias involved. If someone praises 
his ‘scholarly enemies’, it might be out of an ideal of generosity and 
pluralism – and not any personal interest or non-scholarly cognitive 
constraints. 
 In Chapter 2, it was suggested that the process might be a better 
indicator of bias than the outcome. A process of tacit negotiations and 
tacit compromises may mean a more narrow (perceived) representa-
tion of divergent opinions on the panel and less thorough review, 
than a process of open confrontation where a broader scope of views 
are explicitly discussed and seen in relation to each other.136 Such an 
argument, of course, gives no evidence that the studied processes of tacit 
negotiation and tacit compromises resulted in ‘biased’ evaluations. It is 
nevertheless thought-provoking that the only case found with open 
confrontation on the content of the judgements and an explicit 
compromise between the conflicting judgements of the panel 
members, is also that case with the most explicit assessments in the 
evaluation report. The conflicting assessments of two panel members 
caused open confrontation, which gave a more thorough discussion 
and more nuanced conclusions, but the evaluation report still contains 
clearly sharper assessments than in the other cases studied. 
 Neither tacit compromises nor vague conclusions need, of course, 
be biased. Tacit compromises (as such) are ‘biased’ in the sense and 
to the degree to which they represent a false consensus (e.g. Case 1 
where the majority yielded). There are various reasons for vague 
assessments, not all of which may be said to represent any bias. The 
assessments of an evaluation panel may be vague because:  
(1) there are no clear differences in the research under review when 
judged by the relevant criteria 
(2) the review has not been thorough enough, or the panel members 
do not have the competence needed to draw conclusions as to 
such differences 
(3) the panel could not agree on differentiated conclusions, or 
(4) policy considerations make the panel avoid such conclusions.  
 
The first kind of reason is an unbiased one. Reason (2) represents bias 
due to sub-optimal thoroughness and information seeking or lack of 
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competence (category C bias). The vague assessments in Case 3 may 
be explained this way (provided that there were differences). Reason 
(3), lack of agreement on differentiated conclusions, may be a result 
of ‘ bias’ due to scholarly viewpoint or scholarly interests of the 
members (Category A or B bias), and the composition of the panel. 
The lack of differentiated conclusions may here be a result of tacit co-
ordination between the panel members (see Ideal Type I below, 
Figure 6.2), or it may be a result of panel discussions that reduce 
individual ‘bias’ (e.g. the moderation of assessments in Case 6). The 
last kind of reason (4), that of taking the potential effects on budgets 
or status into consideration, may be bias due to scholarly interests 
(category B bias). As mentioned, this seems a relevant explanation of 
vagueness in several cases. 
  
Several informants dealt with the questions of bias and partiality, and 
gave diverse accounts on such questions. These vary between 
scientific (or ‘empiricist’) accounts and contingent accounts (see 
Section 2.2 and Gilbert & Mulkey 1984). Some stressed that they were 
impartial and objective, some meant that they (mostly other panel 
members) were partial and subjective. These conflicting accounts 
cannot be taken as evidence for partial or impartial assessments. The 
interview accounts still provide some central insight, as they refer to 
norms of impartiality and thoroughness, and problems with complying 
to such norms. On the one hand, there are panel members stating that 
the conclusions were really objective, that they always tell their frank 
opinion, had no ties to anybody and were free to have any possible 
opinion, or that they were able to be very independent minded. On 
the other hand, some state that other panel members had personal 
knowledge of evaluees and were less critical in their judgements than 
the rest of the panel (in one case the opposite: trying to punish 
enemies), had certain personal prejudices they tried to prove during 
the review, or had particular interests in certain fields. The accounts 
also include statements on problems doing a thorough review: that 
such assessments are a kind of art that necessarily is subjective, based 
on personal impressions, or on reputation. Others said that there was 
no time to go into depth, or that they were unable to give proper 
assessments.137 This double repertoire for accounts on impartiality and 
thoroughness inform us of an ambiguous situation where interpre-
tation of the rules differ: some evaluators think other panel members do 
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not comply to central rules, while finding that they themselves act in 
accordance with such rules (or at least want to present it that way). As 
suggested in Chapter 2, and further displayed in Chapter 5, there 
seems to be ‘informal’ rules for peer evaluation allowing pragmatism 
and prescribing some ‘social sensitivity’ in the assessments: rules that 
moderate the rules of impartiality and thoroughness – without being 
explicitly formulated. 
 Seen in relation to previous research (Gulbrandsen & Langfeldt 
1997; Langfeldt 1998), the data substantiate that peer judgements on 
research are tacit and subtle, and based on diverse and non-easily 
operationalised criteria. This may be said to imply that guarantees 
against biased judgements are impossible. On the other hand, peer 
judgements on research may be understood, by definition, as being 
based on tacit criteria and craft knowledge, and divergent judgements 
as a fruitful starting ground for a process that defines and consolidates 
the notion of good research – trying to clarify principles, while still 
accepting divergent assessments. This interpretation may legitimate 
controversies and foster a more open debate on criteria, as well as on 
the distinction between various kinds of bias and their (il)legitimacy. 
 
6.3 Tacit decision-making and tacit bases of 
assessments 
Various degrees of tacit decision-making on the evaluation panels 
were found. In all cases compromises were tacit in the sense that 
differences of opinions were not included in the evaluation reports. In 
only one case was it fully clear to all parties that there had been a 
controversy, and what it was about, as there had been explicit 
bargaining to reach a solution. In some cases it is clear that dissension 
in the report was avoided by tacit compromises; in other cases 
decisions were tacit, but views were not clearly divergent and the 
outcome did not have the character of a compromise. In most cases 
however, panel members gave divergent accounts on the extent and 
content of disagreements, and the existence of divergent views was 
not clear to all parties.  
 The typical decision-making process of these panels can be 
characterised as ‘sounding’, with heavy emphasises on reaching 
consensus, on ‘systematic’ use of vagueness and on avoiding the 
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definition of clear alternatives (see Section 3.2).138 Sounding reduces 
the potential for conflicts, avoids the definition of winners and losers, 
and makes it hard to reconstruct and document how ‘consensus’ was 
reached, as the actual decision rules and compromises are undefined 
and, as wee have seen, might be understood differently by the various 
panel members. 
 An extensive tacitness in rules, criteria and standards of judgements was 
also found. These were not discussed on the panels nor described in 
the evaluation reports, and neither were the informants able to 
describe them fully when asked about them. An important scientific 
norm is that processes are reliable, meaning that they always give the 
same result when they are properly carried out. If peer judgements on 
research necessarily depend on a personally incorporated body of 
knowledge and some kind of ‘personal taste’ (of the individual 
evaluator), peer review and peer evaluation is not, and cannot be, 
reliable in this sense. 
 This does not mean that there are no criteria for peer evaluation. 
The panel members had no problem in pointing out criteria for 
judging scientific quality, but they had problems explaining how they 
use these criteria when they evaluate research. Operationalisation of 
such criteria seems to be based on profoundly tacit knowledge. 
Furthermore, peer evaluators do not necessarily think in terms of for 
instance cumulativity, profundity or contribution to theory when 
making judgements about research quality. Nevertheless, when given 
a list with such terms, most of them could point out what they saw as 
important or not important, meaning that these kinds of criteria might 
be made explicit even if tacit at the moment of making judgements 
based on them. 
 
6.4 Realism or idealism? 
What is the role of the kind of expert panels studied in judging ‘good 
research’? The evaluations include limited reading of research 
publications, and the emphasis may be more on abstracts and 
publications lists when reaching conclusions on, for example, the 
output of a unit and the scholarly relevance of its research. This kind 
of evaluation is substantially less thorough than traditional peer review 
and based at least partly on the opinions of other experts (‘indirect 
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peer review’).139 This more superficial way of defining good research 
might be questioned from the point of view of realism. As argued in 
Section 2.2, thorough review may be expected to further valid results 
from this point of view (as well as from the point of view of idealism). 
According to ‘optimistic realism’, on the other hand, the judgements 
on research are obvious to competent evaluators, and an expert’s 
opinion can be seen as ‘true’ – regardless of the process preceding it. 
Contrary to this, we have seen that competent evaluators do not 
always agree. Adding all the studies finding divergent assessments in 
peer review, optimistic realism is a very problematic perspective to 
defend (e.g. Travis & Collins 1991; Cole et al. 1981; Mahoney 1977). 
 In terms of idealism, the question is whether the evaluations define 
what is ‘good research’. They define ‘good research’ to the degree that 
their assessments are embraced by others.140 The kind of general 
praise distributed in these reports, probably contributes both to the 
reputation of the evaluees and their self-image. The assessments has 
also been referred to and used by the research units when applying 
for grants. On the other hand, there is at least one case where 
assessments were questioned by the Research Council commissioning 
the evaluation, implying that the evaluations do not necessarily define 
‘good research’ authoritatively.141 
 Is realism or idealism the most relevant perspective, given the 
reports’ role in research policy? The evaluations studied had no 
defined purpose that demanded the kind of thoroughness aiming, for 
instance, at ranking or grading the units under review. For policy 
makers without expertise in the field, an important indicator of 
whether judgements are correct is whether they are stated by experts 
whose opinions are widely respected by other experts. To make 
widely accepted judgements an expert’s professional authority has to 
be unique and unquestioned, or he/she has to include (to some 
degree) the expected judgement of other competent evaluators 
(‘common knowledge’) and to pay attention to what are socially 
acceptable judgements (the ‘informal rules’ Table 2.3). In this respect, 
idealism seems appropriate for understanding the policy role of expert 
panel evaluation of research. A central official purpose of the evalua-
tions was to provide general information that may be referred to when 
discussing policy measures. Putting ‘common knowledge’ into print 
may be part of this (evaluators in Case 5 saw this as a major purpose). 
Further, the authority of the reports may be more important than the 
‘novelty’ of the information they contain. 
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 The means for obtaining acceptance of the reports differ. In some 
cases commissioning bodies appointed experts in whom they had 
confidence and whose opinions they wanted to hear, without asking 
for the evaluees’ opinions. In other cases the evaluees’ suggestions for 
panel members were taken into consideration by the commissioning 
body, and a broad  representation  of  opinions  was  ensured  on the  
panel. The former approach contributes to an evaluation outcome 
accepted by the commissioning body, while the latter contributes to 
acceptance by the evaluees. 
 
6.5 Decision-making on expert panel 
evaluation of research – illustrated by 
ideal types 
This section focuses on the central features and mechanisms of 
decision-making in expert panel evaluation. The insight gained from 
the study is illustrated in the form of ideal types. These ideal types are 
analytic constructs. They are based on the combined insight from the 
empirical and theoretical parts of the study. They do not represent 
actual cases, but are constructed by the author to pinpoint what is 
found to be the central features and mechanisms of decision-making 
in expert panel evaluation.  
 Four types are presented. They are chosen to illustrate the 
conditions for what is found to be central features of the processes 
and outcomes of expert panel evaluations of research. Types I and III 
are cases of strict task division and minority decisions (Type I on a peer panel, 
Type III on a mixed panel). Types II and IV are cases of group interaction 
and unanimous decision (Type II on a peer panel, Type IV on a mixed 
panel). The outset conditions, the process and the results for each 
type are first described separately. All four types are summarised in 
Table 6.1.  
 After the four ideal types, two ‘mixed types’ are presented. These 
do not have the ideal types’ ‘extreme’ outset conditions, and are more 
likely to describe actual evaluation processes. 
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6.5.1 Type I: Heterogeneous peer panel and general praise 
Context and composition of the expert panel 
In Type I the policy setting of the evaluation is not clearly defined for 
the members of the evaluation panel. The ‘official purpose’ which can be 
read out of the terms of reference (mandate) simply says that the 
scholarly quality and framework conditions of X are to be evaluated. 
No ulterior purpose for the task is openly stated by the commissioning 
body (e.g. that the evaluation is to serve policy making for better 
research in the areas, better research conditions or reallocations of 
resources). The task of the evaluation panel is consequently unclear 
with regard to the demands to provide a basis for specific policy 
decisions and the need to compare the units under review. 
 
The assumptions as to panel members are: 
1) The peer panel includes members from all areas under review, 
there is no overlap of research areas between the panel members 
and each member has clearly defined areas of competence. In 
none of the areas are there conflicts on research directions rele-
vant to the evaluation. 
2) Each panel member’s central interests/stakes in the evaluation are 
based on his/her scholarly outlook.  
3) Each panel member wants to give credit to those who pursue 
interesting research questions in a way which is promising from 
his/her scholarly viewpoint.  
4) Each panel member wants to influence research policy by 
elucidating flaws in research conditions and providing arguments 
for the need of better research conditions in his/her own area. 
 
Decision-making and result 
The heterogeneity of the panel reduces group interaction on assess-
ments. With clearly defined non-overlapping areas of competence 
panel members are not in a position to interfere with each others’ 
assessments and conclusions. Other panel members cannot provide 
authoritative arguments against assessments made by the panel’s 
expert in that area. This implies ‘minority decisions’ for each area 
following an implicit rule saying: ‘If you are not an expert in the area, 
bow to the judgements of anyone defined as an expert in that area’. 
Each panel member is thus in a monopoly situation when assessing 
his/her area, while committed to respecting the other panel members’ 
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assessments in their respective areas. The panel’s one expert in an 
area is given the responsibility of making and writing all assessments 
and conclusions concerning his/her area. 
 When assessing their own area they each have the choice 
between balanced and nuanced conclusions, or to put weight on what 
is good and promising. Panel members are not supposed to represent 
any particular scholarly interests, but it is commonly known among 
the panel members that they all take a special interest in promoting 
research in their own areas. Each evaluator’s minimum demand to the 
outcome is that the research in his/her area should not be given any 
‘worse conclusions’ or less praise than other areas under review. 
When assessments on the various areas are written simultaneously 
without any co-operation between the evaluators, such an outcome 
can only be reached if all evaluators choose the same strategy: either 
balanced and nuanced conclusions or weight on what is considered to 
be good and promising. Each panel member has reasons to expect 
that the other panel members wish to present their own area in a 
good light, and in case some of them do not choose that strategy, the 
better reasons for the rest to do it.  
 The constellation of interests, in the simple case of two panel 
members, may be sketched as below: 
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Figure 6.2 Ideal Type I: Constellation of interests 
       Member A 
 
 
 
Balanced and nuanced 
 
Positive 
 
Balanced 
and 
nuanced 
2 
2 
3 
1 
 
Member B 
Positive 
1 
3 
2 
2 
 
All parties have the same preference structure. They would prefer an outcome 
where their area is given more positive assessment than other areas (3). The 
worst outcome is the case where their area is given less positive assessment than 
other areas (1). In between come the cases where all areas are given equally 
positive or balanced assessments (2), between which the parties (need) have no 
preferences. (If they preferred equally balanced to equally positive (i.e. a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game),142 or equally positive to equally balanced, the 
outcome would still be the same). Regardless of the other party’s strategy each 
party then best furthers its interests by giving its own area a positive assess-
ment. 
 
The likely outcome of this game is that they all write very positive 
assessments of their own area. This is done by giving special credits to 
the area’s most eminent researchers, groups, et cetera.143 All evaluators 
also take care to elucidate and stress the need for better research 
conditions in their areas. 
 After reading each other’s drafts the panel members agree to some 
adjustments in wording so that each area is given ‘equal treatment’.144 
The result is an evaluation report that gives equal credit to the most 
eminent researchers in each area/unit under review, while not 
distinguishing between the areas, neither in praise nor in arguments 
for better research conditions.145 This means general praise to all 
areas/units, and no comparisons between them, but some implicit 
ranking within units/areas, as the ‘not-so-good’ are not mentioned in 
the report.  
 As the policy setting of the panel’s task is unclear, all panel 
members find such a diplomatic report a very good solution. There is 
nothing in the panel’s mandate that demands more outspoken 
conclusions, the chosen solution is in agreement with norms of 
 
 197
collegiality and not harming anyone unnecessarily, and all panel 
members have been equally allowed to forward the interests of their 
areas. 
6.5.2 Type II: Homogenous peer panel and clear ranking of 
units 
Context and composition of the expert panel 
In Type II, the policy setting of the evaluation is understood as 
providing a basis for reallocation in favour of the best units, and the 
panel members perceive this as an important task.  
 
The assumptions as to panel members are: 
1) All panel members take an interest in all research fields under 
review, and each member is considered qualified to assess 
research in all fields. The peer panel does not include members 
from all research directions under review, and there are no con-
flicting research directions represented on the panel. 
2) Each panel member’s central interests/stakes in the evaluation are 
based on his/her scholarly outlook.  
3) Each panel member wants to give credit to those who pursue 
interesting research questions in a way which is promising from 
his/her scholarly viewpoint.  
4) Each panel member wants to influence research policy by 
elucidating flaws in research conditions and providing arguments 
for the need of better research conditions in his/her own area. 
(Points 2–4 are the same as in Type I.) 
 
Decision-making and result 
All panel members want to give credit to those doing the most 
valuable research, and provide a basis for reallocation in favour of the 
best units and arguments for the need of better research conditions in 
these units, and they therefore see the need for differentiating 
assessments. As the panel is homogenous, with no conflicting interests 
or incompatible judgements, interaction, open discussions and 
reaching unanimous conclusions on assessments are unproblematic. 
 The panel therefore easily reaches agreement on assessments and 
conclusions that point out which units are the most qualified and 
promising, and also distributes some honest and outspoken criticism 
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to those not pursuing research ‘worthwhile’ from the panel’s point of 
view. Overlap of competence on the panel means shared responsi-
bility for the criticism, and increases panel members’ willingness to 
include outspoken criticism in the report. Not to openly break norms 
of collegiality and not to harm anyone unnecessarily, criticism is 
framed in a constructive way, including potentials, in addition to 
weaknesses and problems. 
6.5.3 Type III: Mixed panel and divergent criteria 
Context and composition of the expert panel 
In Type III the policy setting of the evaluation task is not clearly 
defined for the panel, and its members do not want to use more time 
on the task than strictly necessary.  
 
The assumptions as to panel members are: 
1) The panel consists of both researchers and user representatives. 
There is a clear division of tasks between peer evaluators and 
user-side evaluators, as well as clearly defined areas of compe-
tence between the peer evaluators, and between the user-side 
evaluators. There is no overlap of research areas between the peer 
evaluators, nor overlap of branches between the user-side evalua-
tors. However, there is no way to divide the object of evaluation 
clearly between the two groups of evaluators, as all (or a substan-
tial amount) of the units under review should be evaluated from 
both the point of view of scholarly criteria and from the point of 
view of user criteria. 
2) Each peer evaluator’s central interests/stakes in the evaluation are 
based on his/her scholarly outlook. Each user-side evaluator’s central 
interest in the evaluation is to ensure good conditions for research 
seen as relevant for their own branch. 
3) Each peer evaluator wants to give credit to those who pursue 
interesting research questions in a way which is promising from 
his/her scholarly viewpoint.  
4) Each peer evaluator wants to influence research policy by 
elucidating flaws in research conditions and providing arguments 
for the need of better research conditions in his/her own area. 
(Points 3–4 are the same as in Types I and II.) 
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Decision-making and result 
Peer evaluators on the one hand, and user-side evaluators on the 
other, have conflicting perspectives on the purpose of the research 
under review. This is understood by all panel members, but discus-
sions are conducted as if there are no such conflicting views between 
the two groups of evaluators. Decision-making among the peers and 
among the user-side evaluators is as the decision-making of Type I: 
The heterogeneity within each group of evaluators (peers and user-
side), as well as the limited time they want, or can, use on the task, 
reduce group interaction on assessments, and the panel’s one expert 
in an area/branch is given the responsibility of making and writing all 
assessments and conclusions concerning his/her area or branch. This 
implies minority decisions for each area and for each branch following 
an implicit rule saying: ‘If you are not an expert in the area/branch, 
bow to the judgements of anyone defined as an expert in that 
area/branch.’ No expert wants the research in his/her area/branch to 
be given any less praise or priority than other areas/branches. Each 
panel member therefore writes very positive assessments of their 
area/branch and especially credits its most eminent researchers or the 
most branch-friendly researchers (as this is what they expect the other 
panel members to do, similar to the situation in Figure 6.2).  
 Such a procedure, with separate and uncoordinated area and 
branch assessments from peers and user-side evaluators is likely to 
result in divergent assessments on at least some of the research under 
review. The panel members see no need, nor want to spend time on 
discussing the divergent assessments or the divergent criteria underly-
ing them. The result is a report where divergent assessments (due to 
separate peer and user-side assessments with divergent views on the 
purpose of research) are all presented in the report, but not seen in 
relation to each other or discussed in any way. As the common 
strategy of the panel members is to praise the kind of research he/she 
thinks valuable, while being careful with negative criticism,146 the 
report contains praise to all research deemed as good from one point 
of view or the other (as all relevant points of view are represented on 
the panel). 
 With regard to the assessments of the research in various 
branches, and in various areas, the area assessments are more co-
ordinated than the branch assessments. User-side evaluators do not 
see any argument or need for adjustment in formulations securing 
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‘equal treatment’ of areas or branches regardless of whom is the 
evaluator. The peer evaluators see such a need, but have no separate 
forum for discussing such adjustments.147 After reading each other’s 
drafts the peer evaluators individually do some adjustments in 
wording so that their area is not given any worse assessments than the 
area evaluated by the panel member most generous with superlatives. 
The result is an evaluation report that gives equally (clearly) positive 
assessments to all areas under review, and does not distinguish or 
compare between the areas, neither in praise nor in arguments for 
better research conditions. Formulations of the assessments of branches 
vary more, as user-side evaluators do not adjust their assessments. 
 As in Type I, the policy setting of the panel’s task is unclear, and 
all panel members find the balanced and diplomatic report a good 
outcome. There is no defined object of the task that seems to demand 
more outspoken conclusions, the chosen solution is in agreement with 
norms of collegiality and not hurting anyone unnecessarily, and all 
panel members have been equally allowed to forward the interests of 
their area/branch. In addition, they have avoided time-consuming 
group discussions and negotiations on the conclusions of the report. 
6.5.4 Type IV: Mixed panel and unanimous criteria 
Context and composition of the expert panel 
In Type IV the policy setting of the evaluation is understood as 
providing a basis for reallocation or better use of resources, and this 
task is perceived as important by the panel members.  
 
The assumptions as to panel members are: 
1) The panel consists of both researchers and user representatives. 
There is no clear division of tasks between the two categories of 
evaluators, nor within them. 
2) No panel member represents relevant scholarly or branch interests. 
3) The evaluators have no clearly diverging perspectives on research 
or judgements of the research under review, and no pre-set ideas 
about how to evaluate the kind of (applied) research to be 
reviewed, neither in terms of criteria nor perspectives based on 
scholarly viewpoint or branch interests. 
4) Each evaluator (peers and users) wants the evaluation to give 
credit to those who pursue interesting and promising research 
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questions from the point of view of the ‘general objective’ of the 
research under review. 
 
Decision-making and result 
The decision-making is similar to Type II, with the difference that the 
evaluators start out without pre-set ideas about criteria and perspec-
tives for their work. All panel members want to give credit to those 
doing the most valuable research, and provide bases for reallocations 
in favour of the best units, and they therefore see the need for 
differentiating assessments. As the panel is quite ‘homogenous’, with 
no conflicting interests or incompatible judgements, interaction, open 
discussions and reaching unanimous conclusions on assessments are 
unproblematic. 
 In the panel discussions, suggestions about what best supports the 
‘general objective’ of the research under review, are put forward – 
what research directions, areas, branch orientations and quality criteria 
that are most important. All suggestions are easy to combine and sum 
up to that direction D research within area A, for branch B, scoring 
high on quality criteria C and C’, is the kind of research that best 
supports the ‘general objective’ of the activity under review. This view 
is accepted by all panel members. With this common perspective the 
panel easily reaches agreement on assessments and conclusions that 
point out which units are the most qualified and promising, and also 
distributes some clear criticism to those not pursuing research 
worthwhile from this unified point of view. Criticism is framed in a 
constructive way, advising on how to better fulfil the criteria. 
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Table 6.1 Overview of ideal type expert panel evaluations 
 Context Decision-making Result 
 
Type I 
 
Heterogeneous peer 
panel. 
 
Policy setting not 
clear. 
 
All relevant research 
areas represented 
on the panel. 
No overlap of 
competence. 
No conflicting 
research directions. 
 
Strict task division. 
 
 
‘Scholarly bias’ for all 
areas under review. 
 
Minority decisions on 
each area. 
 
 
General praise. 
 
No comparisons. 
 
Type II 
 
Homogenous peer 
panel. 
 
Important policy 
setting. 
 
Some relevant 
research directions 
not included. 
Overlapping 
competencies. 
 
Group interaction on 
assessments. 
 
‘Scholarly bias’ for 
some research 
directions.  
 
 
 
Unanimous decisions. 
 
 
Praise and criticism. 
 
Comparisons 
(rankings) of units. 
 
Type III 
 
Mixed panel. 
 
Policy setting not 
clear. 
 
All relevant areas 
and branches 
represented on the 
panel. 
No overlap of 
competence. 
 
Strict task division. 
 
‘Scholarly’ or ‘user’ 
bias for all kinds of 
research under 
review. 
 
Minority decisions on 
each area and branch. 
 
 
General praise. 
 
No comparisons. 
 
Divergent views 
presented, but not 
related to each other. 
 
Type IV 
 
Mixed panel. 
 
Important policy 
setting. 
 
No one represents 
relevant scholarly or 
branch interests.  
No clearly diverging 
perspectives or 
judgements. 
 
No predefined bias or 
criteria. Group 
interaction resulting in 
agreements on 
common criteria for all 
the research under 
review. 
 
Unanimous decisions. 
 
 
Praise to those 
fulfilling the criteria 
agreed on, advise to 
others on how to fulfil 
them. 
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6.5.5 In between the ideal types 
The ideal types are extreme cases. They pinpoint the logic and 
mechanisms of research evaluation, but in their pure form they are 
unlikely to (perfectly) describe actual evaluation processes. A total 
lack of overlap of competence between panel members, as in Types I 
and III, as well as the situation with no divergent opinions in Types II 
and IV, is unrealistic. A more normal situation is likely to include both 
some overlap of competence and some disagreements, and conse-
quently a process of discussions, negotiations and compromises before 
agreeing on the content of the evaluation report – not the ideal type’s 
simple processes of either unanimous decisions or minority decision.  
 The ideal types are far from ‘ideal’ in the normal sense of the 
term. The reports of Types I and III give information about the 
research under review, an overview that might be useful to outsiders, 
but give no new information to those familiar with the area/branch. 
On the other hand, they are fair in the sense that there is no bias 
towards particular areas or branches. Type II is unfair in the sense that 
some directions and areas are evaluated on their own premises, while 
others are not. Whereas Type IV, with no pre-set opinions and criteria, 
makes any outcome possible, i.e. the process is decisive, and for 
instance ‘groupthink’ and other related group effects may result in an 
outcome based on one-sided/narrow criteria.  
 However, the ideal types offer ample possibilities for ‘in-between-
types’, some of which are much closer to the kind of evaluation those 
commissioning the evaluations would hope for (see Section 3.3). One 
possible mixed type between Type I and Type II is a heterogeneous 
peer panel with nuanced assessments, and between III and IV we may 
find a mixed panel with nuanced assessments. 
 
Heterogeneous peer panels with nuanced assessments 
Context and composition of the expert panel: The peer panel set to do the 
evaluation represents a broad spectrum of scholarly viewpoints, at the 
same time as the evaluators have some overlapping areas of 
competence. A central policy interest of the panel is to provide a 
report that might be used for reallocation in favour of the best units. 
 As in Types I and II, the panel members’ central interests/stakes in 
the evaluation are based on their own scholarly outlook. They want to 
give credit to those who pursue interesting, valuable and promising 
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research from their scholarly viewpoint. In addition, they want to 
influence research policy by elucidating flaws in research conditions 
and providing arguments for the need of better research conditions in 
their own area (point 2–4, Types I and II). 
 
Decision-making and result: The combination of overlapping expertise and 
divergent scholarly views facilitates and increases the need for group 
interaction. Furthermore, the panel members see a need for 
differentiating judgements, as they want to write a report that can be 
used as bases for reallocation in favour of the best units. To reduce 
the risk of an outcome not taking proper care of their research area, 
the panel members choose a strategy of open confrontation of 
conflicting judgements. When this includes in-depth discussions and 
open negotiations on the criteria of assessments and the content of the 
report (for instance, due to deliberate ‘chairing’ of the decision-
making), the panel may reach compromises (and possibly moderated 
opinions) that integrate the divergent scholarly viewpoints and 
interests. If successful, the result is an evaluation report with differen-
tiating judgements pointing out which units are the most qualified, 
and containing nuanced assessments stressing both strengths, 
potentials, weaknesses and problems of units and areas – an approxi-
mately unified view of a heterogeneous group of experts.  
 There is also the possibility that the negotiations define some of 
the viewpoints represented on the panel as ‘winners’ and others as 
‘losers’. This may be because some are better negotiators, or more 
willing to enter into hard negotiations, or because some scholarly 
viewpoint is held by a majority of the panel. Another possibility is that 
when confronted with the difficulties of reaching agreement on 
differentiating assessments the panel members give up the aim of 
providing a report that can be used for future priorities and allocations 
in favour of the best units, and end up with the same kind of minority 
decisions as in Type I. 
 
Mixed panels with nuanced assessments 
Context and composition of the expert panel: The policy setting of the evaluation 
task is understood as providing bases for reallocation or better use of 
resources, and the panel see this as an important task. The panel 
consists of both researchers and user representatives, and represents a 
broad spectrum of perspectives on the research under review. There is 
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some overlap in competence and no clear division of tasks between 
the panel members. 
 Each panel member (peers and users) want to give credit to those 
who pursue interesting and promising research questions from the 
point of what they perceive as the objective of the research under 
review. 
 
Decision-making and result: To make a report that may provide a basis for 
better use of resources/reallocation, the panel see the need for 
reaching agreement on differentiating assessments. Overlap in 
competence, both within and between the two categories of evalua-
tors (peers and users), facilitates group interaction on assessments. 
Divergent views on the purpose of the research under review as well 
as divergent assessments are discussed openly, and the panel 
members (jointly) try to formulate conclusions and recommendations 
that integrate the divergent views, while at the same time provide 
differentiating assessments. Through in-depth discussions and partly 
by open negotiations, they may reach agreement on an integrated 
perspective on the various goals and criteria for assessing the research, 
as well as agreement on nuanced assessments of the units. If not, they 
may end up with a negotiation result giving priority to a few branches 
and scholarly viewpoints, or minority decisions as in Type III (see the 
previous ‘mixed type’). 
 
6.6 Summary  
The chosen approach of the studied evaluation reports is general 
praise, no harsh criticism and vague assessments on ‘not-so-good’ 
units, and arguments for the need of better research conditions. This 
approach seemed to satisfy all directly involved parties. This means 
that there need not be a problem for evaluation panels to sympathise 
with the evaluees as well as producing the kind of report demanded 
by the research council. 
 Scholarly ‘loyalties’ (much more than personal loyalties) seem an 
important basis of potential bias in the evaluation reports. Scholarly 
viewpoint is decisive for assessments, which implies that the composi-
tion of the panel influences the outcome. 
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 The panel members gave diverse accounts on questions regarding 
bias and partiality. The data display an ambiguous situation where 
evaluators sometimes state that other panel members did not comply 
with central rules, while they themselves acted in accordance with 
such rules. 
 Mild assessments and lack of ranking of the units under review 
need not be an indicator of evaluators unduly biased in favour of the 
evaluees. There are a number of possible reasons for vague assess-
ments, of which some do not include scholarly or personal bias. 
Further, in our case vague assessments may be explained by contex-
tual factors of evaluating research units in a small country. The 
number of comparable R&D units in Norway is rather limited. In many 
cases, ranking units and recommending that ‘bad’ units should be 
given lower budgetary priority would imply a recommendation that 
the country should not have this kind of research. Academic interests 
play a role when such considerations underlie mild and vague 
assessments. Such interests may be said to be expected to be part of a 
peer panel’s considerations, and not defined as undue bias. There 
seem to be ‘informal’ rules for peer evaluation allowing pragmatism 
and prescribing some ‘social sensitivity’ in the assessments: rules that 
moderate the rules of impartiality and thoroughness. 
 The data substantiate that peer judgements on research are tacit 
and subtle, and based on diverse and non-easily operationalised 
criteria. Rules, criteria and standards of judgements were seldom 
discussed on the panels or described in the evaluation reports, and the 
informants were not able to describe them fully when asked about 
them. An important scientific norm is that processes are reliable, 
meaning that they always give the same result when they are properly 
followed. As peer judgements depend on a personally incorporated 
body of knowledge and some kind of ‘personal taste’ of the individual 
evaluator, it cannot be reliable in this sense. 
 Idealism seems appropriate for understanding the policy role of 
expert panel evaluation of research. A central official purpose of the 
evaluations was to provide general information that may be referred to 
when discussing policy measures. Putting ‘common knowledge’ into 
print is sometimes part of this. The studied evaluations had no defined 
purpose that demanded the kind of thoroughness aiming, for instance, 
at ranking or grading the units under review. For policy makers 
without expertise in the field, an important indicator of whether 
judgements are correct is whether they are stated by experts whose 
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opinions are widely respected by other experts. To make widely 
accepted judgements, an expert’s professional authority has to be 
unique and unquestioned, or he/she has (to some degree) to include 
the expected judgement of other competent evaluators (‘common 
knowledge’) and pay attention to what are socially acceptable 
judgements. 
 The typical decision-making process of the panels is found to be 
‘sounding’, with heavy emphasises on reaching consensus, ‘systematic’ 
use of vagueness and avoiding the definition of clear alternatives. 
Sounding reduces the potential for conflicts, avoids the definition of 
winners and losers, and makes it hard to reconstruct and document 
how ‘consensus’ was reached. 
 Ideal types (analytic constructs) have been used to illustrate what 
the study finds to be central features of the decision-making in expert 
panel evaluation. A heterogeneous peer panel with representatives 
from all involved areas and no overlap of competence, operating in an 
unclear policy setting, gives each panel member a monopoly situation 
over his/her area and results in a report that gives equal credit to the 
most eminent researchers in each area under review, while not 
distinguishing between the areas, neither in praise nor in arguments 
for better research conditions (general praise and no comparisons, 
Type I). A homogenous peer panel, not including representatives from 
some of the relevant research directions and operating in an important 
policy setting, on the other hand, gives group interactions on assess-
ments, unanimous decisions and differentiating assessments pointing 
out both the best and the worst research (outspoken criticism and 
ranking of units, Type II). 
 Another kind of expert panel evaluation is ‘mixed panel reviews’ 
including both peers and branch/user representatives. A mixed panel 
in the same kind of setting as Type I described above – representa-
tives from all involved areas and branches, with no overlap of 
competence, operating in an unclear policy setting – will similar to 
Type I yield a strict division of tasks and minority decisions on each 
area/branch under review. In the case of a mixed panel, the research 
is evaluated from both an academic and a user/branch point of view. 
When each expert has a monopoly on assessments on his/her area or 
branch, the setting implies that divergent views, and possibly diver-
gent assessment on the research are presented in the report (Type III).  
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 The last presented ideal type (Type IV) is also a mixed panel 
evaluation. As in Type II the policy setting is perceived as important 
by the panel members. The expertise of the panel members is general 
and there is no clear division of tasks between the two categories of 
evaluators, nor within the categories, and all evaluators start out 
without pre-set ideas about criteria and perspectives for their work. 
There are no conflicting judgements nor conflicting interests on the 
panel and agreements on differentiating assessments are easily 
reached. The outcome heavily depends on the process, and assess-
ments may be narrow-minded. 
 These ideal types are extreme cases and unlikely to describe 
actual evaluation processes. A total lack of overlap of competence 
(Types I and III), as well as no divergent opinions (Types II and IV), 
is unrealistic. Moreover, the ideal types are far from ‘ideal’ in the 
normal sense of the term. They either provide no new information, are 
unfair or very process-dependent. 
 Possible ‘good’ evaluation processes placed in between the ideal 
types’ extreme outset conditions have also been sketched. Moreover, it 
has been suggested that open controversies and open debate on 
criteria should be seen as criteria of good evaluation processes, and 
divergent judgements as a fruitful starting ground for a process that 
defines and consolidates the notion of good research.  
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7 In conclusion 
The central findings and conclusions of the study are summarised in 
Section 7.1. Section 7.2 offers a retrospect discussion of research 
design and analytical tools. Policy implications are discussed in 
Section 7.3. Section 7.4 deals with unanswered questions. 
 
7.1 Central findings and conclusions  
Expert panel evaluation of research institutions, programmes and 
fields is a central method for funding authorities to get information 
wanted for formulating research policy. This kind of evaluation is 
particularly interesting as a decision-making process on the borderline 
between politics and science. 
 Problems with identifying good research are studied, including the 
concept of bias and partiality in peer judgements. Furthermore, the 
focus is on the organisational and group constraints on evaluation 
processes. The empirical part of the project consists of in-depth 
studies of the work of six expert panels, concentrating on the bases of 
judgements and the decision-making. The role of the commissioning 
research council and the influence of the organisational setting on the 
panels’ decision-making also receive special attention in the analysis. 
 The answers to the central questions posed at the outset of the 
study (Section 1.3) are summarised below (the questions are used as 
headings). Empirical findings with focus on the major weaknesses and 
sources of bias are summarised at the end of the section. 
7.1.1 Are there neutral criteria of good research? 
The question is critical. If there is nothing that constitutes good 
research as such, everything is equally valid and it does not make 
much sense to speak of neutral criteria. It is obvious that everything is 
not equally valid in research – research is assessed and some contri-
butions are praised, others refused. We may therefore say that there is 
a notion of good research. The question is how the notion of good 
research is constituted – what status does the notion have? 
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 This question has no conclusive answer. What constitutes good 
research, and whether there are identifiable neutral criteria for good 
research depends on whether we rely on realism or idealism.148 Realism 
denotes the view that reality exists independently of being experien-
ced or conceived. The realist view of research quality means that there 
are standards which are constitutive of good research, unrelated to 
what evaluators might define as good research. In this view, good 
research might be something quite different from what the research 
community defines as good research. However, according to realism, 
there are no clear indicators of correct evaluations (unless we adopt the 
naïve assumption that peer review consistently reveals the ‘truth’ about 
research quality). Idealism, on the other hand, means that experience 
and thought constitute reality. An idealistic concept of research 
evaluation implies that the meaning of ‘good research’ is constituted 
through the evaluation process. According to idealism, acceptability by 
the actors involved may serve as a good indicator of properly based 
evaluations.  
7.1.2 What does ‘unbiased’ evaluation imply? Is it attainable, 
and is it definitely desirable? 
Four categories of sources of bias in research assessments have been 
identified (analytically). According to realism all four categories must be 
said to be bias: research interests, personal interests, the constraints of 
a professional platform and general/personal cognitive constraints. 
Personal/general cognitive constraints and personal interests are likely 
to be defined as bias also according to idealism.149 
 Peer judgements on research are found to be tacit and subtle, and 
based on diverse and non-easily operationalised criteria. This implies 
that guarantees for unbiased judgements are impossible. The attain-
ability and desirability of unbiased assessments depends on whether 
we take the point of view of realism or idealism. Realism says that 
there is something that is constitutive of ‘good research’; idealism says 
that ‘good research’ is constituted culturally and socially. From the 
point of view of realism all kinds of bias are undesirable. From the 
point of view of idealism some sort of professional bias may be 
desirable (based in professional preconceptions of good and valuable 
research). 
 Idealism, with the view that peer review is part of a continuous 
process defining quality, implies that low inter-reviewer consensus on 
 
 211
an evaluation panel is no indication of low validity of the assessments. 
In fact, lack of consensus may indicate that the panel as a whole is 
highly competent to make valid assessments because the panel 
represents a large scope of the various views on what is good and 
valuable research. In this view, the evaluation process may be a better 
indicator of peer review validity than the outcome of the evaluation. 
What is desirable here is broad representation of divergent judgements 
within the evaluation panel, and open debate on criteria and assess-
ments. There is no apparent reason for this not to be attainable (see 
the discussion of ideal types Chapter 6). 
 Attainability of unbiased judgements appears different from the 
point of view of realism. Realism says that there is something that is 
constitutive of good research, but it does not say what it is. The 
evaluator’s task is to know the answer. In a realistic perspective, 
procedural rules are in themselves irrelevant for whether an evaluation 
is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Rules specifying standards for ‘right’ assessments 
and how to reach the ‘right’ conclusions may be essential as means to 
a correct evaluation, but there are no clear indicators of correct 
outcomes (see the preceding question). The indicators pointed out by 
idealism (peer acceptability and broad representation of views) are 
irrelevant from the point of view of realism.  
7.1.3 How is good research identified, and what ‘professional’ 
and social norms affect judgements? 
Peer review depends on tacit knowledge and craft skills internalised 
through socialisation processes – rendering some unity in the basis of 
peer review. Informal hierarchies, ‘gatekeepers’, dependence on 
judgements made by others, and the overlap and dependencies 
between research areas also contribute to unity. Moreover, there 
seems to be a common ‘language’ for peer review – a certain set of 
criteria that reviewers (more or less explicitly) pay attention to. In this 
way there are limits as to what may be seen as acceptable evaluations. 
We may add that to keep within such limits an evaluation at least has 
to appear to be rigorous and based on impersonal criteria of scientific 
merit. 
 We cannot specify rules, standards or (exhaustive) criteria of peer 
review, however. Studies of peer review find low inter-reviewer 
agreement, indicating that evaluators either use different criteria, 
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emphasise the various criteria differently or interpret the criteria 
differently – all leading to divergent assessments. Reliance on tacit 
knowledge, craft skills, and the lack of explicit criteria, emphasises 
that there will normally be a large grey area of acceptable evaluations, 
i.e. evaluations not clearly definable as lax or partial. 
 The data display an extensive tacitness in criteria and standards of 
judgements. Criteria were not substantially discussed on the panels or 
described in the evaluation reports, nor were the informants able to 
describe them fully when asked about them. The panel members had 
no problem pointing out criteria for judging scientific quality. They 
had problems explaining how they use these criteria when they 
evaluate research. Operationalisation of such criteria seems to be 
based on profoundly tacit knowledge. 
 Various rules and norms affecting judgements have been identi-
fied. On the one hand there are social norms prescribing impartiality 
and thoroughness, and on the other there are (informal) rules allowing 
pragmatism and prescribing some ‘social sensitivity’ in the assess-
ments. The interviewees’ accounts reflect this ambiguity. The 
objectivity of the assessments was emphasised. At the same time it is 
clear that promoting the research in the field under review was 
understood as an obvious and legitimate mission of government 
commissioned research evaluations. Most of the evaluators were 
careful not to write anything that might harm the resource situation of 
the evaluees. In addition, the context called for a pragmatic approach 
to thoroughness. Limited time and a large scope of evaluation material 
set limits as to what could be done and reduced the evaluators’ 
ambitions to do a rigorous review of the material. 
7.1.4 How may the group setting of expert panels evaluating 
research affect the outcome? 
Four possible group effects have been outlined:  
(1) The interaction has qualities that enhance the review work, for 
example that more ideas/information are considered by each 
member, or that the group members gain new insights through 
dialogue. 
(2) The group members try to impress each other and therefore work 
harder (or appear tougher) than when working alone. 
(3) Shared responsibility results in collective shirking. 
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(4) The group situation leads to uniformity/groupthink, including 
impairment of critical thinking, less rigorous review and suppres-
sion of minority opinions/false consensus. 
 
The data point towards various group effects, but there is not much 
clear evidence for any of the effects sketched above (see Section 5.2.3 
and Tables 5.2–5.7). In general, the processes on the evaluation panels 
were characterised by division of tasks, little interaction on assess-
ments and mostly tacit compromises in case of disagreements among 
panel members. Consequently, the opportunities for dialogues leading to 
new insights were limited.150 It should be noted that this conclusion 
concerns the effects of interaction in the panels on the assessments of the 
research under review. There seems to have been much more 
interaction and potential for fruitful dialogue on how to carry out the 
evaluation and on the policy conclusions than on the assessments of 
the research. 
 The second kind of group effects, more thorough review to make a good 
impression, seems to have appeared in one case – the case of a ‘junior’ 
panel member with no prior experience with this kind of evaluation. 
In addition, there were cases where the group context made panel 
members work harder to get his/her point of view into the report. 
This is another kind of group effect. More weight was put on good 
argumentation, but not necessarily on more thorough review work. 
 The material contains two cases of individual shirking, but no 
evidence for collective shirking. With regard to groupthink, the kind of 
setting and processes found – division of tasks and little interaction on 
assessments – tell us that groupthink was not much likely. 
 In sum, the kinds of group effects sketched in Chapter 3 seem to 
have been of minor importance for the expert panels, mainly because 
of the high degree of task division on the panels. To study the 
processes defining task division and the ways of tacit co-ordination 
between members of a task divided panel are more important in this 
setting.  
 Task division on the panels seems to rely on mostly tacit compro-
mises on who ought to bow to whose judgements.151 In addition to the 
authority and expertise areas of the panel members, their time and 
interests here seem important for how the borderlines are drawn 
between panel members’ areas. Not all the research under review 
clearly belongs to the area of (only) one of the panel members. The 
 214 
panel members take special interest in different evaluation units/fields 
and the time they are willing to devote to the evaluation work, also 
vary. In this way borderlines are more ‘personally’ adjusted than they 
would be without a panel, that is compared to single evaluators 
writing separate evaluation reports without any interaction.  
 Tacit co-ordination between panel members also adjusts the 
outcome of reviews. Ideal Type I (Section 6.5.1) illustrates how this 
can be done between members of a strictly task-divided evaluation 
panel. With the help of game theory it is concluded that each panel 
member will produce a review of their respective areas that put weight on 
what is good and promising (Figure 6.2). A central condition for this outcome 
is that it is commonly known among the panel members that they all 
take special interest in promoting research in their own areas. Each 
panel member expects the other panel members to write a review that 
places their own area in a good light, and in case some of them do 
not choose that strategy, the better the reason for the rest to do it. This 
kind of adjustment is even more likely when evaluators are not part of 
a panel, but work individually. In such a situation each evaluator may 
likewise suppose that the other evaluators will write a positive review 
and consequently write a positive review himself.  
 The differences between the two situations (group or individual 
evaluators) are the information on the other evaluators (who evaluates 
what, and what are their interests) and also the possibility of adjusting 
one’s assessments after reading the assessments of the other evalua-
tors. If one or more panel members initially choose to write a more 
nuanced/balanced or critical report than the others, this possibility of 
adjustments is important. It should be noted here that the question of 
positive or nuanced assessments is a question of degrees of emphasises 
on positive aspects, and not a choice between two different, clearly 
defined approaches. Some adjustments will therefore normally have to 
be done if panel members are concerned about how the assessments 
of the various areas relate to each other. What will be the result of 
such adjustments? The data here point to adjustments towards more 
positive assessments as the likely outcome. The panel members are 
not in a position to demand that other panel members write more 
critically about their area, but may of course say that after having read 
the other assessments they need to reword their own assessments to 
make them comparable. 
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7.1.5 How may the research council influence the outcome?  
In the meaning of not foreseeing the influence of one’s choices, the 
commissioner of a research evaluation may be ‘neutral’, but not in the 
meaning of not influencing the outcome. Central factors are set when 
commissioning and organising a research evaluation: scope and 
subject of evaluation, time and resources, mandate, signals about 
planned use of the report, and selection of evaluators. 
 The number and size of institutes, fields or programmes selected for 
evaluation might influence both the evaluation process and the 
content of the evaluation report. In the present material there is not 
enough variation in the size of the evaluation task to see effects, for 
example, on what unit/level of assessment the panel adopts (e.g. 
research groups, institutions or research areas). On the other hand, it 
is found that whether institutes, programmes or fields are evaluated 
does not necessarily influence what levels or units the panels focus on 
when assessing the research. Both the programme evaluations and the 
institute evaluations differ with regard to focused units/levels. 
 The time and resources available for the evaluations set important limits 
for the thoroughness of review. In general, it seems that the panels 
ability (and/or willingness) to devote time to thorough review, 
collaborative assessments or discussions of the assessments was 
marginal – with regard to the demands that should ideally be met in 
these kinds of evaluations.152 The effects of time limits were most 
obvious in the case where the report was to be finished during the site 
visits and there was no time for discussion on the individual reviews.  
 The terms of reference generally gave no particular guidelines on the 
evaluation approach, nor the standards or criteria for evaluation, 
except stating that the research should be evaluated in an international 
perspective or that extra-scientific relevance was to be assessed. The 
mandates’ potentials for determining the focus of the assessments 
were therefore limited. Nevertheless, for the two programme evalua-
tions the terms of reference seem vital to the approach chosen by the 
panel. Different mandates can explain why one of these panels 
focused on programme effects whereas the other did not. In the two 
field evaluations the commissioning bodies provided the panels with 
copies of previous evaluation reports and in this way indicated what 
kind of report they expected. The access to these previous evaluation 
reports clearly influenced the approach adopted by the panels. In the 
institute and programme evaluations it seems that there was no 
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tradition for the kind of evaluation in question; the commissioning 
body did not know precisely what was wanted and therefore gave no 
signal on, for instance, what should be the units of assessments. In 
conclusion: The commissioning body influenced the aspects being 
considered and assessed by the panel, and the unit of analysis of the 
evaluation report, in the cases where clear signals/instructions were 
given on these matters. 
 The composition of the panel is found to have great importance. The 
composition set the potential for interaction, divergent opinions and 
conflict in addition to the fact that the selection of panel members 
determines what scholarly positions and opinions are allowed access 
to the evaluation report. The selection of panel members may explain 
the potential for controversies on the panels. To some degree the 
commissioning bodies designed for panels characterised by consensus 
or by divergent opinions. Unanimous panels were obtained by 
appointing a small group of experts already known to the body 
organising the evaluation or its trusted advisers. A broad represen-
tation of opinions, on the other hand, was obtained by letting all 
parties involved getting their candidate on the panel. With the last 
kind of appointment process, one risks appointing evaluators with 
loyalty relations to the evaluees. This happened in some of the cases. 
7.1.6 Summary of empirical findings with focus on the major 
weaknesses and sources of bias  
When we focus on the constitutive aspects of research quality we risk 
giving a one-sided account – to leave out the contextual and decision-
making aspects and the possible informal rules of assessments. On the 
other hand, the understanding of constitutive aspects is important for 
the interpretation of such contingent aspects.153 The present mono-
graph has used a discussion of the constitutive aspects of good 
research as the point of departure to study decision-making in 
research evaluation and possible bias due to factors at the organisa-
tional level, the panel level, and the level of the individual evaluator. 
‘Bias’ was found at all levels: 
• Bias on the organisational level was basically related to the selection of 
panel members – i.e. which scholarly points of view were invited 
to participate in the process – but such factors as time limits were 
also found to have influenced the outcome. 
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• Bias on the panel level: No clear cases of group effects resulting in 
biased outcome were found. Tacit negotiations and compromises 
dominated much of the decision-making. Such decisions give a 
more narrow representation of the reviewers’ opinions than either 
a process based on open confrontation of the divergent views or a 
process based on independent reviews. Consequently, from the 
point of view of idealism central conditions for ‘unbiased’ out-
comes were not present. Broad representation of divergent views 
and open discussions are the best ways to avoid bias and ensure 
acceptability of the outcome.  
• Bias on the individual level: Most of the assessments of research quality 
were written by individuals without much intervention from other 
panel members. When there were disagreements between panel 
members, these were solved in some cases by minority decisions. 
Both individual decisions and minority decisions give ample room 
for the research interests and the scholarly points of view of single 
evaluators to be decisive for the outcome.  
 
These cases of ‘bias’ imply that the views of the individual panel 
member selected by the research council play a central role. Individual 
views may be modified due to the panel context – by anticipating 
objections or other kinds of tacit negotiation – but the scholarly 
division of tasks give each panel member the major say on his/her 
own fields. In addition, the large scope and limited time of the 
evaluations does not allow thorough review or the kind of panel 
processes that best prevent bias.154 The likely results are vague and 
weak reports and/or reports in which the panel members’ prior 
impressions of the research and researchers under review are 
important.  
 There was no significant guard against the possible bias of the 
individual panel members. However, norms or considerations that 
modify or erase harsh assessments were important. Most evaluators 
wanted to help to promote the research under review, and took care 
not to write anything that could harm the units under review. Site 
visits gave the evaluees ample room to promote their case. There were 
more effective guards for the single panel members against expressing 
their antipathies than against expressing their sympathies in the 
evaluation report.  
 218 
 Bottom-up processes and a substantial element of chance are 
major implications of such research evaluations: 
• Research evaluations are based on information from the research-
ers under review and the opinions of their peers (qualified 
evaluations). The evaluees are heard (as they are listened to by 
their peers/those writing the evaluation reports). Evaluees acquire 
increased status (‘good evaluation’) and/or their problems get 
attention. 
• A substantial element of chance: one expert in an area gets the 
major say (the one appointed by the research council and willing 
to spend time on the task). The points of view of these experts 
get increased status (possible Matthew-effect for future evaluation 
tasks). 
 
Table 7.1 Central findings 
Central combined theoretical and empirical findings include: 
• a common set of criteria of good research 
• tacit bases of judgements and divergent judgements (tacit and divergent 
operationalisation and use of criteria)  
Æ large grey area of acceptable outcomes of evaluations 
 
Central empirical findings include: 
• the composition of the expert panel, the organisation of its work, its time limits, 
and the (lack of) group interaction may be decisive for the conclusions of the 
evaluations 
• little overlap of competence and clear scholarly division of tasks  
Æ   tacit decision-making on panels, little interaction on judgements and ample 
room for scholarly ‘bias’ and a substantial element of chance 
 
Table 7.1 gives a brief summary of central conclusions. The combina-
tion of a broad scope of acceptable outcomes and an ample room for 
scholarly ‘bias’ emphasises the importance of the ‘luck of the reviewer 
draw’ (a substantial element of chance). 
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7.2 Research design and analytical tools in 
retrospect 
The present study is explorative. It contains detailed analysis of 
selected cases, focuses on a broad group of factors and uses a variety 
of different approaches. This section discusses strengths and weak-
nesses in the chosen design and analytical tools with regard to 
answering the research questions. 
 
Design 
The empirical basis of this multiple case study is six evaluation 
processes. As the study is explorative and not set out to test specific 
hypotheses, no strict comparative design was used for the selection of 
cases. A ‘mixed strategy’ with some variation and some similarities 
between the cases was adopted (see Section 1.4.1). The cases cover a 
variety of different panels, research areas, different kinds of evaluation 
units and evaluations commissioned by several different research 
councils. The strength of this strategy proved to be that it allowed 
conclusions on the more general characteristics of expert panel 
evaluations of research, regardless of varying contexts. Interesting 
features common to all the cases are found: clear scholarly task 
division, little interaction on judgements and (mostly) tacit decision-
making, ample room for scholarly bias and a substantial element of 
chance. The variation between the cases inspired the construction of 
some ‘ideal types’, which also describes contexts that are likely to give 
evaluations deviating from some of these characteristics (Section 6.5). 
 A central question when doing a multiple case study is whether 
more or other cases would have improved the possibilities for drawing 
general conclusions. To collect in-depth interview data to reconstruct 
decision-making processes have been essential for the conclusions of 
this study. Given the resources of the project, more cases would imply 
less in-depth study, and would probably not have provided this kind 
of understanding of decision-making processes. To include other cases, 
on the other hand, might have improved the basis for conclusions. If it 
had been possible to include some cases clearly deviating from the 
‘vague and kind assessments’-approach, this would allow a better 
understanding of processes resulting in more explicit and harsh 
assessments and also the background for different evaluation strate-
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gies. As explained in Section 1.4.1, such cases were not available 
when this study commenced. 
 A variety of data sources has been combined: the evaluation 
reports, the research councils’ files on the evaluations, interviews with 
panel members, oral information from the secretaries of the panels, 
and in some cases the evaluators’ private notes and draft reports. 
Some scholars advocate, while others criticise, ‘triangulation’ of data 
sources as a test of the validity of qualitative data. The argument for 
triangulation is that a conclusion is ‘more convincing and accurate if it 
is based on several different sources of information’ (Yin 1989:97). The 
opposing argument is that it is naïve to assume ‘that the aggregation of 
data from different sources will unproblematically add up to produce 
a more complete picture’, and that it often means to use ‘one account 
to undercut the other, while remaining blind to the sense of each 
account in the context in which it arises’ (Silverman 1993:157, 158). An 
account being corroborated or refuted by other accounts should, of 
course, not be taken as a simple test of whether it is true or false. For 
the present study, I am convinced that drawing on different data 
sources has given a better basis for conclusions. For the kind of 
processes in focus, a broad set of data has been essential to get a 
better understanding of the context in which to analyse each account. 
 Direct observation of decision-making processes is not among the data 
sources. The question of whether or not to collect observational data 
is complex. The less routine the activity, the more likely that the 
presence of an observer taking notes to study the process may affect 
the participants and the processes. In another study of more routine 
peer review (of grant proposals) I found direct observation of panel 
meetings a valuable data source in the study of what affected the 
judgements and decision-making (Langfeldt 1998). Here, I experienced 
that the less the routined the panel was, the harder it was to gain 
access to observe meetings. In addition to the problems of access and 
interference, direct observation may complicate a comparative design. 
Direct observation means observations of processes with an unknown 
outcome, and less prior information of characteristics of the chosen 
cases complicates the choice of an appropriate comparative design 
(cases with different or similar outcomes). 
 It should be added that while observation is not among the 
explicit data sources of the study, direct observation has contributed to 
forming my general understanding of the decision-making process on 
peer panels, and thereby form a more general input to the study. The 
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above-mentioned study of grant peer review based on direct observa-
tion was undertaken while working with the present study, and served 
as a valuable source providing insight and understanding of central 
aspects of the evaluation of research and the character of judgements. 
In the final phase of the dissertation work I also served as a secretary 
of an expert panel evaluating research institutes, a job that allowed me 
to come very close to, and be part of, the kind of processes studied. 
 
Theoretical approaches 
The analytical tools included input from a variety of different areas 
and approaches: the sociology of science, the philosophy of science, 
theory of group behaviour, game theory, analysis of goal structures 
and ideal types. The philosophy and sociology of science, theory of 
group behaviour and game theory proved useful in the theoretical 
discussion, and were central in pointing out factors for analysis. They 
also provided an overarching frame for the empirical analysis. Below, 
the different ways that the various approaches contributed are briefly 
summarised. 
• The philosophy and sociology of science were used to understand the 
constraints on actors and the bases of assessments. The main 
conclusions here are that there seems to be a common set of 
general criteria for good research, but no common understanding 
of such criteria. The bases of judgements are tacit and we may 
find a dual set of rules for assessments. 
• Theory of group behaviour was used to study possible ‘bias’ at the group 
level. Conditions for good group work were identified. These 
conditions were not present on the studied panels as they had 
little overlap of competence and interests, clear scholarly division 
of tasks and little interaction of judgements. A substantial room for 
chance and bias were found. 
• Game theory was used to outline the logic of different settings and 
implications of various constellations of interests on a panel 
(hypothetically in Chapter 3). Game theory also contributed to the 
understanding of the outcome of the controversies on assessments 
in some of the empirical cases. Moreover, game theory was used 
to explain the pull toward positive assessments on a heteroge-
neous peer panel (ideal Type I).  
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• The analysis of goal structures concluded that evaluators, evaluees and 
commissioning bodies had a common interest in the chosen 
approach (mild assessments and arguments for better research 
conditions). This analysis is input to an understanding of the 
evaluation strategies as well as the relation between evaluators, 
evaluees and commissioners. 
• Ideal types were used to pinpoint central findings regarding the logic 
of decision-making of expert panel evaluations, and to illustrate 
how the policy-setting and the composition of the panel set 
central premises for panel interaction and for the content of the 
evaluation report. 
 
The theoretical and empirical parts of the project are not closely 
integrated in the sense that the theoretical discussion points out 
hypotheses to be tested. This would restrict the focus in a way that is 
not fruitful for this kind of explorative study. In retrospect, with the 
insight on decision-making processes on expert panel evaluations 
gained through the study, theory and data might, of course, be better 
matched. For example, data collection and interview questions might 
be better designed in order to analyse the role of the commissioning 
body, to undertake a more detailed analysis of task division and 
overlapping competencies and interests on the panels, and also to 
study tacit co-ordination between panel members.  
 
7.3 Policy implications 
Several factors indicate that the kind of evaluations studied have 
limited value as a basis for policy-making. Firstly, there are no 
significant guards against the possible bias of individual panel 
members and the conclusions rest upon a substantial element of 
chance (i.e. who is responsible for the assessment of an area). 
Secondly, the reports are rather vague – they do not offer nuanced 
assessments of research quality, nor comparisons of the units under 
review. Organisational constraints set by the commissioners them-
selves contributed to this kind of outcome. The scope of the 
evaluations and the limited time available for panel interaction set 
clear limits to the thoroughness of review. In addition, the terms of 
reference (mandates) given the panels were not helpful with regard to 
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writing a report suited for policy-making – the intended use of the 
report was not specified, neither were there guidelines for approach 
or units of analysis. 
 Did such weaknesses affect the use of the evaluations? Lack of 
implementation of recommendations because of the Research 
Council’s lack of trust in the recommendations is found in one case 
only. This was related to lack of trust in the representativity of the 
recommendation (due to minority decision). The Council’s knowledge 
about possible bias and weaknesses here seems to have affected the 
use. 
 It is not obvious whether or how vague assessments affected the 
use of the reports. It should be noted that recommendations were clear and 
that there was no stated intended use that demanded nuanced 
assessments and clear comparisons. In addition, vague assessments 
may hinder evaluees’ mobilisation against the report – a situation that 
may limit the possibilities of implementing the recommendations. 
Effects on policy and reasons for lack of implementation of 
recommendations consequentially need to be studied more broadly 
than the question of vague and feeble assessments and conclusions 
resting on a substantial element of chance and potential bias. 
 In general, the effects on policy of the studied evaluations are not 
obvious. Those who agreed with the conclusions of the evaluation 
reports received better arguments for more resources for long-term 
basic research and/or better conditions for particular areas/groups. 
These were the main recommendations of the evaluation reports. 
Concrete effects on policy of these recommendations demanded 
receptiveness by funding authorities.155 The authority of the recom-
mendations and the receptiveness from funding authorities varied. In 
most cases major recommendations were not implemented. One 
programme evaluation is the clearest exception.156 Here, the main 
ideas of the evaluation report were influential on the continuation of 
the programme. Programmes are supposed to be ‘dynamic’ and 
temporary, and evaluations of programmes therefore stand a better 
chance of making a real impact than evaluations of research disci-
plines or research institutions.157 
 Given the lack of implemented recommendations, the reports 
have probably played a more substantial role in distributing status and 
credits than in reorganising research or reallocating resources.158 
Evaluations are part of scholars’ credibility cycle (see Latour & 
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Woolgar 1986; Rip 1994). The points of view of some scholars get 
increased status, and the research of some evaluees get increased 
status (‘good evaluation’). This implies an important function of 
research evaluations regardless of their policy implementation. It 
should be noted that the Matthew effect of credibility cycles increases 
the consequences of chance. Those who partly by chance get a good 
evaluation (by ‘luck of the reviewer draw’) increase their chances of 
future good evaluations.159 
 There are various reasons why recommendations may not be 
implemented. As mentioned, there are indications of lack of trust in 
the recommendations in one concrete case. More generally, the 
increase in research evaluations commissioned by funding authorities 
in the last twenty years may be taken as an indication of decrease in 
trust in the self-organisation processes of science (van der Meulen 
1998:400). If lack of trust is the problem, peer dominated evaluation 
panels, and substantial input from the evaluees may in itself reduce 
the chances of the funding authorities’ being receptive to the recom-
mendations of the evaluation reports, and consequently make such 
evaluations less suitable as a basis for policy measures.  
 Another explanation of the lack of policy effects may be that the 
focus of the evaluations did not correspond to that of meet the 
commissioning research councils. A study of 27 evaluations commis-
sioned by the Research Council of Norway concludes that they were 
better tools for administrative needs than for strategic research policy-
making. Individual research evaluations are a poor instrument for 
overall and general research policy and strategic priorities. For this 
purpose evaluations on broader areas and whole research sectors 
focused on policy questions would be better policy tools (Brofoss 
1998). 
 ‘More basic research’, a central recommendation of the reports, is 
a central policy question on strategic priority (but here restricted to 
specific areas or units). Put forward by peers to the researchers under 
review, it is also a predictable recommendation, and might be regarded 
as ‘peer bias’. I have found no indications of lack of trust or 
understanding by the commissioning research councils of the impor-
tance of basic research. Such lack of trust or willingness to priority 
might be found at the government and political levels, and lack of 
receptiveness at this level might have reduced the possibilities of 
implementation. If this is the case, peer panel evaluations have 
 
 225
weaknesses as policy tools: they recommend (predictable) policy 
measures with low chances of implementation.  
7.3.1 Overlap of competence – a central factor to be improved 
The degree of overlap of competence on the panels is a central factor 
that influences the possibility for bias on all levels: 
• Organisational level: Picking more than one expert in a field 
would give a broader spectrum of expert opinions access to the 
process.  
• Panel level: Interaction among panel members may give more 
thorough and less biased judgements, but is conditioned by over-
lap of competence.160 
• Individual level: Overlap of competence and interaction among 
panel members would reduce the possibility of individual bias 
affecting the final evaluation. 
 
Overlap of competence is more costly and implies more time-
consuming processes. There is, as already mentioned, a limit to the 
time and resources that can or should be spent on preventing 
arbitrariness. Even with several experts with overlapping competence 
and good time for discussion, there may always be an element of 
arbitrariness influencing the outcome (e.g. depending on the decision-
making method used when experts disagree (see Langfeldt 2001a). 
Yet, processes that define good research are important, and should be 
given the needed time and resources for proper work. Two experts 
assessing each unit under review and some time for discussing the 
results, would be the minimum needed if expert panel evaluations are 
to have some function exceeding individual review reports when it 
comes to assessing the quality of research. 
 The issues at stake regarding overlap of competence are the 
degree of chance and the thoroughness and legitimacy of research 
evaluations. These are central factors for the foundation on which the 
concept of ‘good research’ is constituted. The Research Council of 
Norway has research quality as a major policy aim, which should 
imply a responsibility to secure that the concept of ‘good research’ is 
founded on solid ground. Even if research councils do not make any 
explicit use of the conclusions of evaluation reports, evaluations are 
part of the processes defining what is good and worthwhile research. 
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To commission evaluations means to take part in these processes, and 
the commissioning body should try to avoid all obvious sources of 
possible bias. Moreover, the degree of chance and the thoroughness 
and legitimacy of the conclusions are central when evaluations are 
input to policy-making. From all the above points of view, overlap of 
competence on evaluation panels is a central element requiring 
improvement. To my knowledge, the composition of more recent 
evaluation panels does not differ from the cases studied with regard to 
overlap of competence. 
 It might be objected that overlap of competence would increase 
the problem with vague evaluation reports. In the data there is no 
indication of such effects. On the contrary, the least vague report was 
found in a case with some overlap of competence and interaction on 
assessments (and open confrontation of divergent views). Previous 
literature has suggested that ‘rational and creative disagreement’ may 
improve peer review (Harnad 1985).161 
 
7.4 Unanswered questions  
Scholarly ‘bias’? Realism or idealism? 
No conclusions are drawn on whether assessments based on a 
scholarly viewpoint or scholarly preconceptions of what is good and 
bad research are ‘biased’ or not. The answer depends on whether we 
adopt the point of view of idealism or realism. Scholarly ‘bias’ is bias 
according to realism, but is unlikely to be seen as bias from the point 
of view of idealism. 
 The present study does not draw any philosophical conclusions 
on realism versus idealism.162 The existence and content of standards 
of good research, unrelated to how we assess good research (realism), 
are open questions. Nevertheless, further elaboration on intrinsic 
characteristics of good research (i.e. realism) is possible. Some 
elements of research quality may be said to be part of our definition 
of research as such (although the interpretation of such intrinsic 
criteria may still depend on context), other elements may have a clear 
context dependent character (e.g. scholarly value and relevance). 
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How do expert panels operate in other policy contexts? 
The evaluation policy of the Research Council has changed since the 
evaluations studied here were carried out. Budgetary consequences in 
favour of the best units are now recommended in policy documents 
on institute evaluation (Norges forskningsråd 1994). An evaluation 
approach of general praise, no clearly negative criticism and vague 
assessments on ‘not-so-good’ units, combined with general arguments 
for the need of better research conditions, can hardly satisfy such 
ambitions. 
 Does altered policy change evaluation processes and outcomes? 
Are peer panels loyal to commissioners which demand clear ranking 
of evaluated units as tools for reallocations? The ideal types based on 
the findings in this study should be valuable for understanding all  
 
kinds of expert panel evaluation of research (Section 6.5). In one of  
the sketched ideal types, the policy context is to provide a basis for 
reallocation in favour of the best units, and the predicted outcome is a 
report with clear comparisons or rankings of the units under review.  
 It is an open question how evaluators tackle such a demand in 
practice. The ideal types of Section 6.5 are analytic constructs to 
pinpoint the logic and mechanisms of expert panel evaluation of 
research. They do not predict the outcome of real cases as real cases 
will not have the extreme and simple outset conditions of the ideal 
types. If the present study was supplemented by new cases with 
reallocations in favour of the best units as part of the outset condi-
tions, it would be easier to elucidate the question on basis of 
comparative method. Such cases are still difficult to find in the 
Norwegian research policy context. As mentioned, the policy regard-
ing institute evaluations has changed in the direction of reallocations 
in favour of the best units. However, the recommended budget 
implications in favour of the best units do not seem to have been 
implemented. Neither do the evaluation reports allow for comparisons 
between institutes evaluated by different panels (Brofoss & Langfeldt 
1999). There are also varying degrees of ranking or comparisons of 
the units evaluated by the same panel.  
 Nevertheless, interesting cases deviating from those of the present 
study can be found among more recent field evaluations in the natural 
sciences commissioned by the Research Council of Norway. In 
particular, the evaluation of physics research has much more explicit 
 228 
assessments than has been usual in Norwegian evaluation reports (The 
Research Council of Norway 2000). The report grades individual 
researchers in the evaluated field from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent’. What kind 
of processes led to this result? According to ideal Type II, central 
factors leading to this result are: (a) panel members perceive the 
purpose of the evaluation as to provide a basis for reallocation in 
favour of the best units, (b) the panel does not include members from 
all research directions under review, (c) there are no conflicting 
research directions represented on the panel, and (d) there is overlap-
ping competence between the panel members’ areas. No conclusions 
as to whether such conditions were present or not may be drawn 
without comprehensive data on the panel members’ positions and 
views. From the report and from the public debate that the report 
provoked, we may find tentative answers to three of these conditions: 
From the CV of the seven panel members (included in the evaluation 
report) there seems to have been some overlap of competence with 
regard to the eight sub-disciplines into which the evaluated research is 
divided in the report. According to some of the evaluated researchers, 
the panel did not cover all areas and directions under review (Rekstad 
et al. 2000). The mandate given to the panel does not say that purpose 
of the evaluation is linked to reallocation of resources, but such a 
purpose might be read out of the letter sent the evaluees prior to the 
evaluation (the letter is enclosed the evaluation report). 
 It should also be noted that in the UK interesting data might be 
found for the study of how expert panels tackle a demand for reports 
suited as tools for reallocation. In the UK a large part of research 
funds from the higher education funding bodies are allocated on the 
basis of the ratings given by expert panels (the so-called RAE – 
Research Assessment Exercise). Various panels rate the university 
departments at intervals of four to five years, and they do give precise 
grades (a 7-point scale is currently used). I am not aware of any 
studies of the work of these panels.163 
 
Decision-making processes on the borderline between science 
and politics 
The boundaries, relations and interactions between science and 
politics are complex questions to investigate. In the present study, 
science and politics are found to interact in the sense that the 
commissioning body (that is, the research council which represents 
the government) affects panels’ conclusions and recommendations. 
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The composition of the panel sets premises for panel interaction and 
for conclusions. The commissioning body is also likely to affect the 
evaluation approach adopted by the panel if clear signals are given on 
such matters. It is also important to note that the various parties 
directly involved in the evaluations – the commissioners, the evalua-
tors and the evaluees – seem to have had central interests in common: 
they had reasons to help forward the research under review and to 
welcome good arguments on how to improve research and research 
conditions. These common interests were served by the kind of 
conclusions and recommendations that dominated the studied reports: 
mild assessments and arguments for better research conditions. 
 The composition of the evaluation panel is found to be of vital 
importance for the outcome of evaluations. Two different methods of 
selection were applied:  
• The evaluees were asked to propose evaluators and were in this 
way given formal input on the selection. 
• The council found suitable candidates without any input from the 
evaluees. 
 
The first model is found to enable broad representation of opinions on 
the panels, whereas the latter gives a much higher degree of consen-
sus.  
 As my focus has been on the work of the evaluation panels, there 
are central questions raised by the findings that are not answered: 
What are the reasons and conditions for the choice of different ways 
of selecting panel members? Who are the actors setting the premises 
for the selection of panel members? What is the role of research 
council staff, council members and evaluees in such selections? To 
what degree are the commissioning bodies (policymakers/staff) aware 
of the consequences of their choices? How does the interaction 
between commissioners and evaluators set conditions for implemen-
tation of recommendations? Given the importance of the composition 
of the evaluation panel found here, these should be central questions 
for future studies of expert panel evaluations of research.  
 Results from such studies of the politics of research evaluation 
may also prove fruitful for the study of decision-making processes on 
the borderline between science and politics in other contexts. With 
regard to such factors as the importance of personal and professional 
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networks and the importance of evaluations/research for symbolic 
purposes, such studies should be especially useful for the study of 
use, or non-use, of science and scientific expertise in public policy-
making. 
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Appendix A Definitions of central 
terms 
This appendix deals with some central terms that are used in a specific 
meaning in the present study. The concepts of norms, rules, criteria 
and standards are used in relation to different phenomena and should 
be separated from each other. Furthermore, ‘tacit’ is used with two 
different meanings. 
 
Norms, rules, criteria, indicators and standards 
Social and professional norms refer to particular kinds of social 
expectations. Rules, criteria, indicators and standards, on the other 
hand, refer to more cognitive or technical regulations, and may or may 
not involve social expectations. 
• Social expectations refer to the way people in general expect others, or 
certain groups of people, to react or behave, including the kind of 
opinions they expect others/certain groups to have. 
• Social norms are social expectations that are sustained by the feelings 
of embarrassment, guilt, anxiety or shame that a person suffers at 
the prospect of being caught violating them. Social norms are 
shared by the members of a society or a group and supported by 
sanctions, either positive or negative sanctions (Elster 1989:99). 
Sanctions may range from subtle to severe expressions of 
approval or disapproval. Social norms may be more or less 
internalised and are often unspoken.164 
• Professional norms are shared by members of a professional or 
scholarly group or community. The explicity and internalisation of 
the norms, as well as the embarrassment when caught violating 
the norms, may vary. Negative sanctions may be subtle, like loss 
of esteem, respect, or credibility. 
• In contrast to norms, rules do not need to be related to social 
expectations and are not necessarily followed by sanctions. Rules 
may be voluntary in the sense that it may be up to the individual 
or group to choose what rule(s) to adopt in a particular situation, 
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i.e. rules may be regarded as a voluntary aid for regulating social 
or cognitive processes. Rules deal with how to precede or conduct 
in specific situations, or how to solve certain kinds of problems, 
such as rules of decision-making. In relation to assessments of 
research, rules may, for instance, advise on the criteria to use or 
how to combine or balance various criteria.165 
• Criteria are attributes used as a basis for defining and judging a 
quality. One may operate with a hierarchy of criteria, e.g. truth as 
a criterion of good research, and consistency, profundity and 
completeness as criteria of truth. 
• Indicators are more operational than criteria. For example, citations 
may be understood as quantitative indicators of intra-scientific 
relevance and contribution to knowledge. 
• Standards state what score on indicators or criteria must be obtained 
for a certain kind of assessment (excellent, good, mediocre, etc.). 
For the evaluation of research there are few if any explicit 
standards – standards for assessing the quality of scholarly 
research are generally tacit. 
 
Tacit knowledge and tacit decision-making 
‘Tacit’ has different meanings depending on whether it is used about 
knowledge and basis of judgements (including criteria etc.) or about 
group decision-making.  
• Tacit knowledge refers to personal, internalised knowledge, not 
theorised or written down, i.e. knowledge not easily made 
explicit. Tacit knowledge may include craft skills, ‘know how’ and 
intuitive knowledge. ‘[W]e can know more than we can tell. ... 
The skill of a driver cannot be replaced by a thorough schooling 
in the theory of the motorcar; the knowledge I have of my own 
body differs altogether from the knowledge of its physiology; and 
the rules of rhyming and prosody do not tell me what a poem 
told me, without knowledge of its rules’ (Polanyi 1966/1983:4, 20).  
• When used about judgements or evaluations, ‘tacit’ refers to the basis of 
assessments. Tacit judgements mean that the basis of judgements 
cannot fully be described or explained. The ‘tacitness’ of 
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judgements is a question of degree. Few judgements are based on 
decisive rules alone and few are based on ‘blind’ intuition.166 The 
more difficult to make explicit, the more tacit is the basis of 
judgements. 
 
When it comes to group decision-making tacitness does not refer to 
whether the basis may be made explicit or not, but whether the basis 
is explicit or not. Tacit group decision-making includes tacit negotiations, 
bargaining or logrolling, tacit compromises and implicit voting. In all 
cases the rules of decision-making are tacit, i.e. unspoken and implicit, 
and not necessarily understood in the same way by all participants. 
• Tacit controversy, tacit disagreement or tacit dissension refers to unspoken, 
concealed differences of opinions, differences which might be 
known or unknown to the actors. 
• Tacit negotiations or tacit bargaining refer to bargaining concealed as co-
operative discussions: the fact that the outcome of the process is 
subject to bargaining between parties with (at least partly) 
conflicting interests, is unstated and concealed by the parties – 
meaning that claims or proposals for compromises must be put 
forward with use of another set of arguments than used in 
straightforward explicit bargaining. To bargain some sort of 
awareness is needed: it cannot be claimed that (tacit) bargaining is 
going on if none of the parties are aware of seeking a compro-
mise/agreement on the basis of (at least partly) conflicting 
interests. However, the distinction between tacit bargaining and 
discussions may be subtle and hard to define. 
• Tacit compromise refers to the result of (tacit) bargaining, concealed as 
agreement in the sense of concurring opinions, i.e. that there has 
been no ‘giving and taking’ to reach the outcome. 
• Tacit or implicit voting refers to implicit majority decisions, i.e. a 
process where decisions are reached by sounding for a majority 
opinion. In contrast to explicit voting, implicit voting may conceal 
the existence of a minority. 
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Appendix B  Interview guide 
1 Had you done this kind of evaluation before?/have previous 
evaluation experience? 
 
2 Why do you think you were chosen to do this work?/Who proposed 
you? 
 
3 Why did you take the job? 
 
4 There were various aspects of ............. which were to be 
evaluated. I have some questions about the division of tasks:  
- Was it clear to you what were your tasks were? 
How?/when?/Who decided this?/formal/informal 
- Could you have done other tasks than those you were given? 
- In which of the fields that were evaluated did you have the 
best oversight? 
- Were there questions that you fully or partly left to the others 
in the panel? 
 
5 Did the panel, formally or informally, receive assessments from 
external experts? 
 
6 Did you have any advance knowledge about ............ in Norway? 
  knew by reputation 
  have close colleagues who collaborate with  
  have collaborated/published with/supervised 
If yes, was this information useful for the evaluation? Could you have 
done the same evaluation without advance knowledge? (Why/why 
not?) 
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7 ........... probably had some advance knowledge. Was this useful for 
the evaluation? 
• What about the other members of the panel, did they have 
such sources of information? 
• If yes, did this influence his/her attitude to these researchers? 
(in what way? − advocate, oppose or withdraw from the 
discussion saying he was disqualified) 
Did such sources of information have any influence on the content of 
the evaluation report? 
 
8 Was it an advantage being a foreigner in the sense that you were 
free to write what you meant without thinking that some of your 
colleagues might not like it, and that you were to write a public 
report to be used by the Research Council? 
• Did you write anything in the report that you wouldn't have 
written about research groups in your own country? 
 
9 What was the most important information for the evaluation? 
(publications, site visits, personal experiences and contacts, 
external expertise, other sources) 
- How did you get this information?/Who provided this 
information? 
- Who decided what written material you were to examine? 
 
10 Was the evaluation work properly organised by the Research 
Council? (enough information about the purpose of the 
evaluation, enough time for discussing and writing) 
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11 This is a list of criteria for evaluating scientific work (card is given): 
• Pure scientific criteria: consistency, correctness, stringency, 
profundity, etc. 
• Results: theoretical contributions, productivity, publications 
(how much, where) 
• Intra-scientific relevance: relevance of subject, novelty, 
originality, cumulativity, citations 
• Extra-scientific relevance: applicability, use, effects 
• Properties of the researchers: achievement, motivation, 
ambitions, reputation, international position 
• Properties of the surroundings: equipment, freedom, group 
size, financing, organization 
What would you put on top if you were to rank these criteria?  
Are any of them irrelevant?/Which of these are the least important? 
Would the other members of the panel agree? 
 
12 What criteria were the main considerations in the evaluation of.......? 
- Why?/Was there any discussion about criteria? 
- How did you decide what criteria to use? 
- Did any of the panel members disagree? 
 
 238 
13 How did you reach agreement on the assessment of the various 
research groups, etc.? 
• In what way was the discussion conducted?/Who were the 
most active participants? 
• How were your assessments/views received in the group? 
• Did you get any comments?  
• How was the evaluation report put together? 
• (Case specific question: why are there few evaluative 
statements in the report/so few clear comparisons?) 
 
14 To what degree did the terms of reference steer the evaluation work 
and the content of the evaluation report? 
- Would the result have been the same without the terms of 
reference? 
- Were the terms of reference precise? 
- What about oral statements from the Research Council? 
- What about the secretary? 
 
15 Do you think the content of the evaluation report was predictable for 
the Research Council/the research groups/institutes? 
• Did they get what they wanted? 
 
16 What reactions have you got on the report? 
• Was the work meaningful/what did you learn? 
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17 Peer review is traditionally made at the micro-level – on individual 
researchers – and is used for decisions about employment, 
promotion, publication, and funding of research projects. In the 
last twenty years or so, it has been usual to set up peer panels to 
evaluate larger units, like research groups, research disciplines, 
institutes and research programmes – and such evaluations are 
used for reallocations and setting other research policy priorities.  
• Is this new kind of evaluation useful according to your 
experience?  
• Are such evaluations appropriate as bases for setting research 
policy priorities? 
     useful  appropriate for priority setting 
 Research groups 
 Research disciplines (nationally) 
 Institutes/institutions 
 Research programmes 
• Why? Weaknesses? 
 
18 Should peer review in these contexts  
• be used alone? 
• not at all? 
• together with other indicators? (Publication analysis/Citation 
analysis/analysis of use and effects/other possibilities?) 
 
19 How would you have undertaken a similar evaluation task today? 
 
20 Have you retained notes or documents? 
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